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1 Introduction
Since the works of Adam Smith, who is widely considered to be the father of modern economics,
labor market outcomes have been at the root of economic reections. As labor earnings
constitute the most important source of income for the majority of households around the world,
the importance of labor market outcomes for economic well-being can hardly be overstated.
The last decades have seen rapid technological advancements, growing economic inequality,
and severe nancial crises. It is a vital task for economic research to expose which develope-
ments aected labor market outcomes, to enhance our understanding of how they aected
labor market outcomes, and to explore which economic policies can support workers during
and after transition periods.
1.1 Overview of the Thesis
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by advancing our understanding of the forces
that have shaped labor market outcomes in recent decades. It consists of three independent
research papers, which zoom in on the eects of nancial frictions, routine-biased technical
change, and judicial ideology, respectively. My coauthors and I employ both empirical and
analytical methods to analyze the underlying mechanisms and discuss appropriate policy
implications.
Collateral Constraints, Wage Rigidity, and Jobless Recoveries The Great Recession
has drawn attention to the importance of macro-nancial linkages. In Chapter 2, I explore
the joint role of imperfections in labor and nancial markets for the cyclical adjustment of
the labor market. I show that jobless recoveries emerge when, upon exiting a recession, rms
are faced with deteriorating credit conditions. On the nancial side, collateral requirements
aect the cost of borrowing for rms. On the employment side, hiring frictions and wage
rigidity increase the need for credit, making the binding collateral constraint more relevant. In
a general equilibrium business cycle model with search and matching frictions, I illustrate that
tightening credit conditions calibrated from data negatively aect employment adjustments
during recovery periods. Wage rigidity substantially amplies this mechanism, generating
empirically plausible uctuations in employment and output.
1
1 Introduction
A Joint Theory of Polarization and Deunionization Over the past 40 years, the U.S. and
several European labor markets have undergone two incisive developments – labor market
polarization and deunionization. In Chapter 3, using state-level labor market data, Anna
Hartmann and I document a positive relationship between the two phenomena in the U.S.:
the decrease in unionization rates has been signicantly more pronounced in states with a
higher employment share in routine-intensive occupations. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
deunionization is mainly driven by large within-industry and within-occupation changes in
union membership rates and not only by compositional eects. Building on this observation,
we argue that the commonly assumed driver of polarization, routine-biased technical change,
is also the main driving force behind the decline in union membership rates. In a model with
search and matching frictions where workers choose occupations and endogenously form
unions, we illustrate that shifts in the structure of labor demand in favor of low- and high-skill
occupations worsen the bargaining position of unions and make participation in collective
bargaining less attractive for workers. The ensuing within-industry and within-occupation
decline in unionization rates in turn provides incentives for former middle-wage workers to
switch to low-wage occupations, which further amplies job market polarization.
Outlawed: Estimating the Labor Market Eects of Judicial Ideology Most evidence
on the economic impact of the judiciary is either case-based or purely anecdotal. In Chapter
4, Christian Bredemeier, Anna Hartmann, and I provide evidence on the systematic labor
market eects of judicial ideology, employing broad data on court rulings and labor market
outcomes. Our identication strategy uses heterogenous eects of ideological shifts of the
U.S. Supreme Court on U.S. district court rulings, which we derive from a theoretical model
of judge decision-making and document empirically. Exploiting this heterogeneity, we nd
that an increase in the share of conservative rulings substantially increases the employment
rate and promotes labor market uidity but also contributes to wage stagnation, employment
polarization, deunionization, and rising income inequality. Our main empirical results can be
rationalized in a search and matching model with wrongful-termination lawsuits.
1.2 Contribution to Chapters 3 and 4
While Chapter 2 is based on a research paper produced entirely by myself, Chapter 3 is based
on joint work with Anna Hartmann and Chapter 4 is based on joint work with Christian
Bredemeier and Anna Hartmann.
The research idea for the paper "A Joint Theory of Polarization and Deunionization" was
developed in discussions between Anna Hartmann and myself. The empirical analysis was
performed by both of us. Anna Hartmann developed the formal representation of the idea
and I conducted the quantitative evaluation. We both wrote the rst draft of the paper and all
subsequent revisions.
2
1.2 Contribution to Chapters 3 and 4
The research idea for the paper "Outlawed: Estimating the Labor Market Eects of Judicial
Ideology" was developed by Christian Bredemeier. The related literature was evaluated by
Christian Bredemeier and myself. Anna Hartmann and Christian Bredemeier conducted most
of the empirical analysis. I contributed the assessment of datasets from the law literature and
the formal representation and quantitative evaluation of the labor market model. I have written
the rst draft, which Christian Bredemeier, Anna Hartmann, and I revised.
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During the 2008 nancial crisis, the unemployment rate in the U.S. doubled from 5.0% to 10.0%
within only 18 months. While output fully recovered less than two years after the end of the
recession, the unemployment rate took three times as long to reach its pre-crisis level. The
marked increase in the unemployment rate was preceded by deteriorating credit conditions
and an increase in collateral requirements (cf. Jermann and Quadrini, 2012; Garín, 2015). As
collateral constraints directly aect rms’ hiring decisions, recessions caused by nancial
frictions might have particularly large adverse eects for the labor market. Motivated by this, I
aim to determine the role of disturbances in the nancial sector for jobless recoveries in the
U.S. since the 1990s.
In order to to so, I add a nancial market friction to the standard DSGE model with search
and matching frictions, whereby rms need to provide capital as collateral in order to take on
loans. Labor and capital are treated asymmetrical, with capital serving a dual role as production
factor and as collateral. These elements generate diverging output and employment dynamics
during recovery periods and contribute to the emergence of jobless recoveries.
The key interaction in the model arises from the need for funding: due to a cash ow
mismatch, rms are required to nance their working capital requirements, including vacancy
posting costs, by taking on loans. The presence of nancial frictions makes hiring more costly
for constrained rms, as they have to cut investment or dividend payouts to nance their wage
bill. This implies that the degree to which rms are aected by wage rigidity also varies with
credit tightness.
The model is calibrated to U.S. data and simulated using technology and credit shocks, where
credit shocks are meant to capture variation in credit conditions. I compare the model dynamics
to business cycle statisitics for the U.S. between 1964 and 2004. The simulated model with only
two shocks can account for nearly 50% of the variation in unemployment, roughly 90% of the
uctuations in vacancies, nearly 70% of the variation in labor market tightness, and virtually
100% of the uctuations in the job-nding rate.
5
2 Collateral Constraints, Wage Rigidity, and Jobless Recoveries
I nd that after a negative technology or credit shock, the initial increase in the unemployment
rate is stronger and steeper because wage rigidity keeps rms’ borrowing needs high. Financial
frictions are responsible for atter decreases in the unemployment rate: following an increase
in productivity, rms prioritize investment into the asset used as collateral in order to relax
the borrowing constraint. Thus, the initial increase in vacancies and hiring during a recovery
period is lower compared to models with perfect credit markets.
The interaction of nancial frictions and wage rigidity generates asymmetric unemployment
dynamics. I illustrate that the combined eect of these frictions on unemployment dynamics is
larger than the sum of the separate eects of nancial frictions or wage rigidity. This allows for
an amplication of shocks in the model that is close to what is found in the data. In contrast to
the results obtained in similar models without nancial frictions, even a small and empirically
plausible amount of wage rigidity is sucient to generate highly volatile labor market variables
once collateral constraints are taken into account.
Despite the asymmetry in the unemployment rate generated by the combination of a collateral
constraint and wage rigidity, recoveries in the model are not jobless unless there is a concomitant
erosion of credit conditions. The reason is that credit conditions directly aect the marginal
value of an additional worker and thereby the number of hires and the unemployment rate.
When credit conditions deteriorate while total factor productivity recovers, unemployment
remains above its pre-crisis level. Since capital can be used as production factor and as collateral,
the capital stock and output are almost entirely driven by total factor productivity and not by
credit conditions. Consequently, recovering total factor productivity, combined with worsening
credit conditions, causes jobless recoveries.
This mechanism is consistent with empirical evidence. Analyzing credit conditions during
recessions and subsequent recovery periods in the U.S. between 1964 and 2010, I nd that prior
to 1990 credit conditions started to improve immediately after the end of recessions. During
the recent jobless recoveries, credit conditions deteriorated for several quarters after the end of
the recessions and the unemployment rate only began to recover once credit conditions had
stabilized.
My analysis suggests that low credit availability matters for the occurrence of jobless re-
coveries after the recent recessions. This has important policy implications. Policies aimed at
reducing transitional unemployment through reemployment services, such as the $47 billion
dollar spent i.a. on job training in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, might
not be as eective as hoped. Alternative policies could be aimed at reducing uncertainty on the
credit market in order to make credit more easily available and to facilitate job creation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Previous research is discussed in the next
section. The model outline is presented in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 the quantitative analysis
is described in detail. Jobless recoveries and policy implications are discussed in Section 2.5. To




This paper adds to the literature trying to understand the role of nancial conditions for
macroeconomic dynamcis. First steps in this direction have been taken by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997). Wasmer and Weil (2004) introduce search frictions into the credit market and nd that
the presence of nancial frictions increases macroeconomic volatility. Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) estimate nancial shocks and show that they contribute siginicantly to the dynamics
of real and nancial variables. While all of these approaches provide interesting insights, I
choose to follow Garín (2015) who introduces nancial frictions in the style of Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) into a search and matching framework. This approach has the advantage that
it provides a direct link between collateral requirements and asset prices and that changes in
credit availability directly aect rms’ job creation decision.
Closely related to this work are Schoefer (2016) and Moiseeva (2018) who both study the
interaction of nancial frictions and wage rigidity in a search and matching framework. How-
ever, neither of the models presented in these papers is able to generate jobless recoveries. In
Moiseeva (2018), since the nancial costs of hiring are high in recessions, rms delay hiring
until the recession has passed. While this mechanism amplies uctuations in labor market
variables, the rapid increase in hiring after a recession stands in sharp contrast to the observa-
tion of jobless recoveries. Schoefer (2016) explores a channel similar to the one presented here,
through which wage rigidity and nancial frictions inuence a rm’s job creation decision.
Since labor is the only production factor in Schoefer (2016), any asymmetry in unemployment
mechanically spills over to output dynamics as long as technology shocks are symmetric. Thus,
after a recession, employment will have fully recovered at the point of output recovery.
Finally, this paper adds to the literature that studies the role of nancial conditions for jobless
recoveries.
1
Schott (2013) distinguishes between incumbent rms and startups and argues that
low credit availibility for young rms is responsible for the lack of job creation. Wesselbaum
(2019) emphasizes the role of nancial frictions under match eciency shocks. Calvo et al.
(2014) make the case that jobless recoveries are caused by the interaction of nancial frictions
and wage rigidity. To illustrate their empirical ndings, they analyze a stylized competitive
model of the labor market with an ad-hoc borrowing constraint. In their model, productivity
growth leads to jobless recoveries when the borrowing constraint binds and wages are rigid. I
demonstrate that these conditions are not sucient for the emergence of jobless recoveries in a
general equilibrium framework with an endogenous borrowing constraint. Additionally, since
the labor market in Calvo et al. (2014) is assumed to be competitive, wage rigidity is essential
in generating jobless recoveries. My ndings suggest that while wage rigidity amplies the
extent of jobless recoveries, it is not a prerequisite for their occurrence.
1
The proposed reasons for the joblessness of the most recent recessions in the U.S. are manifold. For example,
Meltzer (2003) puts forward a potential downward bias in employment statistics, Groshen and Potter (2003)
propose increased speed of structural change, Galí et al. (2012) demand shocks, Shimer (2012) wage rigidity,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017) liquidity traps, and Jaimovich and Siu (2018) job polarization.
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2.3 A Model with Financial Frictions and Wage Rigidity
In this section, I introduce wage rigidity into a simple version of the model presented in Garín
(2015).
2
The model economy is populated by two types of agents: workers and capitalists.
Capitalists own the rms. Firms produce a homogenous good yt using labor nt and physical
capital kt. All dividends dt are transferred to the capitalists. Workers have access to a one-period
riskless bond at that is issued by capitalists.
The labor market is subject to search frictions in the sense of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994):
hiring workers entails vacancy posting costs that are paid by the rms. Wages are determined
by standard Nash bargaining over the entire surplus of a worker-rm match. Households
consist of a continuum of workers and are assumed to perfectly share all risks.
2.3.1 The Labor Market




t , where ν is the
eciency of the matching technology, ut is unemployment, and vt vacancies. The parameter γ
governs the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment and vacancies.
The job-lling rate, the probability with which a rm lls a vacancy, is given by mt/vt ≡
q(θt) = νθ
−γ
t . The job-nding rate, the probability with which an unemployed worker nds
a job, is given by mt/ut ≡ f(θt) = νθ1−γt . Labor market tightness θ is dened as θt ≡ vt/ut.
When labor market tightness is low, many unemployed workers compete for few vacant jobs.
The job-lling rate is high and the job-nding rate is low.
At the beginning of each period, a fraction x of all existing worker-rm matches is ex-
ogenously separated. Newly separated workers immediately begin searching for a new job
and have the same job-nding rate as all other unemployed workers. Employment evolves
according to
nt = (1− x)nt−1 +mt.
and at the end of each period
ut = 1− nt (2.1)
workers remain unemployed. Since search is costless from the household perspective, all
non-employed workers search for a job.
Posting a vacancy entails costs of c(vt) =
κ
2




the resources a rm must spend because of matching frictions.
3
Furthermore, I assume that
2
The simplications are made in order to facilitate the understanding of the relevant mechanisms. All of the
results are robust to the inclusion of the training costs present in Garín (2015). The model outline is kept brief
and derivations are deferred to the appendix.
3
I follow Merz and Yashiv (2007), Kaas and Kircher (2015), and much of the recent literature in assuming convex
vacancy posting costs. While the asymmetry of unemployment dynamics is somewhat dampened, all results
are robust to the standard assumption of linear vacancy posting costs. The resource costs are dened as κ/2
in order to simplify the rst order conditions of the rm.
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there is no risk on the rm side. Firms can hire ht workers with certainty by posting mt/q(θt)
vacancies.
2.3.2 Households
The setup allows for the existence of a representative household, consisting of a continuum
of workers of measure one. The household aims at maximizing lifetime utility by allocating




βjh [ln(ct+j)− ϕnt+j] ,
where ct is consumption, βh is the discount factor of the household, ϕ is the disutility from
work, and nt is the share of workers that is employed at time t.
4
The household’s ow of funds




+ Tt ≤ wtnt + at + (1− nt)s.
Employed workers earn wages wt and unemployed workers receive benets s. The benets
are nanced through a lump-sum tax Tt = (1− nt)s. The one-period riskless bond at pays an
interest rate of Rt and is used for consumption smoothing.
The representative household chooses consumption and the number of bonds in order to
maximize the expected discounted lifetime utility over consumption and leisure. Since it takes
the job-nding rate as given, employment evolution from the household perspective can be
described by
nt = (1− x)nt−1 + f(θt)ut−1.
The complete household maximization problem is given in Appendix A.1. Combining the








Intuitively, the household invests into bonds until the marginal utility of today’s consumption
is equal to the discounted marginal utility of consuming tomorrow, weighted by the rental rate
Rt.
4
Since the utility function is separable between consumption and leisure and perfect risk-sharing is assumed, all
workers have the same level of consumption.
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2.3.3 Financial Markets
Due to a cash-ow mismatch rms need to raise funds via intra-period loans lt in order to
nance their working capital requirements.
5
Wage payments, dividend payouts, investments,
current debt, and vacancy posting costs all accrue before the realization of revenues. Since
contract enforcement is costly, rms are subject to a collateral requirement. Following a
default, nancial intermediaries cannot seize production. Only the installed capital stock can
be recovered and sold at ηtqk,tkt, where ηt captures uncertainty regarding the tightness of the
credit market and qk,t is the marginal Tobin’s Q. As is standard in the literature, nancial
intermediaries are assumed to have no bargaining power in the debt renegotiation and they
do not value the stock of workers in the rm (cf. Garín, 2015; Perri and Quadrini, 2018). ηt is
interpreted as an exogenous collateral shock following the stochastic process
ln ηt = (1− ρη) ln η̄ + ρη ln ηt−1 + εη,t
with εη,t ∼ N(0, ση), where η̄ is the mean of the stochastic process.





The intra-period loan and the newly issued debt must lie below the value of the fraction of
the physical capital stock that lenders can recuperate after default. The derivation of the
enforcement constraint is provided in Appendix A.2.
2.3.4 Firms
Capitalists are risk-averse and derive utility from the consumption of dividend payouts. They
can only access the nancial market through the rm and are assumed to be more impatient
than households, i.e., βh > βc, where βc is the discount factor of the rm.
6








As rms are owned by capitalists, the objective of a rm is to maximize the expected future
stream of discounted dividends. Firms own the capital stock kt and use it together with labor




t , where 0 < α < 1 and technology zt
follows the stochastic process ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εz,t with εz,t ∼ N(0, σz). Firms can borrow
5
Evidence by Buera and Shin (2013) supports the assumption that most of a rm’s costs require working capital.
6
These assumptions are standard in the literature. First, with access to nancial markets, capitalists could smooth
consumption and reduce the costs associated with changes in dividends. This would dampen any eect of
credit frictions. Second, the smaller discount factor compared to households impedes capitalists from saving
enough to avoid the borrowing constraint.
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using one-period riskless bonds bt+1 at the gross interest rate Rt. Since the model does not
feature any idiosyncratic shocks, I focus on a symmetric equilibrium and a representative rm.
The complete maximization problem is given in Appendix A.3.
The marginal value of an additional worker for the rm Jn,t is obtained by taking the rst







t (1− µb,t)− wt
]
+ (1− x)EtΛct|t+1Jn,t+1, (2.4)






is the stochastic discount factor of capitalists and µb,t is the Lagrange
multiplier on the borrowing constraint. The term in square brackets is equal to the net return
of an additional worker, while the second term is the present discounted value of the hired
worker. Note that without nancial frictions µb,t is equal to zero. Consider an increase in
collateral requirements. The rm is more constrained, which increases the value of relaxing
the borrowing constraint, i.e., µb,t. This reduces the net return of an additional worker and
therefore the marginal benet of hiring. Intuitively, the rm has to nance an additional
worker’s wage via intra-period loans. When the borrowing constraint is already binding, this
can only be done by reducing investment or dividend payouts. This reduces the marginal value
of an additional worker.
Proposition 1. The eect of wage rigidity on the hiring decision is larger for a nancially
constrained rm.
Proof. The elasticity of the marginal value of an additional worker with respect to the wage





The absolute value of this elasticity increases with µb,t. As the marginal value of relaxing the
borrowing constraint increases proportionally with collateral requirements, the elasticity of
the marginal value of an additional worker with respect to changes in the wage increases with
collateral requirements, too.
This means that the marginal benet of hiring an additional worker reacts more strongly to
changes in the wage compared to standard search and matching models. Consequently, even a
small amount of wage rigidity has large eects on labor market variables in my model.
2.3.5 Wage Bargaining and Wage Rigidity
As is standard in most of the search and matching literature, wages are determined as the
solution of a generalized Nash bargaining problem. The production function exhibits constant
11
2 Collateral Constraints, Wage Rigidity, and Jobless Recoveries
returns to scale, which greatly simplies the bargaining problem.
7
























Since the model economy is subject to two kinds of shocks, wage rigidity in the style of
Blanchard and Galí (2010) or Michaillat (2012) is not feasible. Instead, as in Hall (2005) and
Krause and Lubik (2007), wage rigidity is introduced through a backward-looking wage norm
that limits the adjustment capability of wages
wt = τw
∗
t + (1− τ)wt−1, (2.6)
where w∗t is the solution to the generalized Nash bargaining problem given by Equation (2.5)
and τ determines the extent of wage rigidity. With this wage schedule, the steady state real
wage remains the same regardless of the amount of wage rigidity in the model.
Proposition 2. Assume that the wage schedule is given by Equation (2.6). Wages are privately
ecient if the wage schedule satises
s+ ϕct − (1− x)EtΛht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Hm,t+1





Proof. See Appendix A.7.
This proposition implies that no worker-rm match generating a positive bilateral surplus is
separated because of wage rigidity as long as the actual wage remains within the postulated
bounds. Thus, the wage schedule in Equation (2.6) is not subject to the Barro (1977) critique that
bargaining workers and rms should be able to exploit all possible bilateral gains in long-term
worker-rm relationships with reoccuring wage renegotiations. Due to constant returns in
production, the model is also not aected by the critique of Brügemann (2017) concerning
wage rigidity in search and matching models with diminishing returns.
An alternative way of introducing wage rigidity is provided by Gertler and Trigari (2009).
They assume a standard Calvo (1983) wage-setting scenario in the sense that only a fraction τ of
7
Models with diminishing returns are subject to the critique by Stole and Zwiebel (1996), as each additional
worker has a lower marginal product than the last. In addition to constant returns to scale, it is also necessary
that rms rst hire workers, subsequently bargain about the wages, and only then choose the capital stock (cf.
Cahuc and Wasmer, 2001).
8
The derivation of the wage schedule is provided in Appendix A.4.
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all rms is able to renegotiate wages in every period. If a rm is able to adjust wages in a given
period, the new wage is determined by generalized Nash bargaining over the total surplus of
the match. However, this approach requires a deviation from the standard assumption of xed
vacany posting costs. Since Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) point out that there is no compelling
theory of wage determination in the kind of model presented here, I stick to the analytically
very simple form of wage rigidity given by Equation (2.6), which allows me to use the standard
labor market setup with constant vacancy posting costs. The derivation of a staggered wage
schedule à la Gertler and Trigari (2009) in a model with nancial frictions and the corresponding
model simulations are provided in Appendix A.8. The results are qualitatively the same and
quantitatively very close to the results obtained with the ad-hoc wage norm.
Remarkably, the log-linearized wage index derived in Gertler and Trigari (2009) looks very
similar to the wage schedule in Equation (2.6). In particular, the derivations in Appendix A.8
establish that Equation (2.6) is the outcome of their staggered Nash bargaining approach under
nancial frictions, if neither rms nor workers take into account that they might not be able
to renegotiate wages in the subsequent periods. I use this interpretation of the wage norm to
calibrate the parameter τ , governing the extent of wage rigidity, in Section 2.4.
2.3.6 Equilibrium
With the model completely described, I dene the equilibrium.
Denition 1. A recursive equilibrium is dened as a set of i) rm’s policy functions d(ωc; Ω),
b(ωc; Ω), k(ωc; Ω), i(ωc; Ω), and v(ωc; Ω); ii) household’s policy functions c(ωh; Ω) and a(ωh; Ω);
iii) a lump sum tax T (Ω), iv) prices w(Ω) and R(Ω); and v) a law of motion for the aggregate
states, Ω′ = Ψ(Ω), such that: i) the rm’s policies satisfy the rm’s rst order conditions (Equations
(A.7)–(A.11)) and the job creation condition (Equation (2.4)); ii) household’s policy function satises
the household’s rst order condition (Equation (2.2)), iii) the wage is determined by Equation (2.6);
iv) R(Ω) clears the market for riskless assets such that a(Ω) = b(Ω); v) the law of motion Ψ(Ω)
is consistent with individual decisions and with the stochastic processes for z and η, and vi) the
government has a balanced budget such that s(1− n) = T .
2.4 antitative Analysis
In this section, I calibrate all parameters discussed above to match dierent aspects of quarterly
U.S. data for the time period between the rst quarter of 1964 and the fourth quarter of 2004.
9
.
I use the calibrated model to simulate time series of all variables. The model performance is
evaluated along several dimensions, most importantly with respect to unemployment dynamics.
9
The 2008 nancial crisis is deliberately left out of the sample to guarantee that the results are not driven by this
particular recession.
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2.4.1 Calibration
Table 2.1 lists the exact parameter values as well as the source that encourages the specic
choice. The discount factors are set to βh = 0.996 and βc = 0.983, to match an annual interest
rate of 1.6% and an annual return on equity of 7%.
Next, I calibrate the labor market variables. For the separation rate, I choose a conventional
value of 0.1 (cf. Shimer, 2005). Regarding vacancy posting costs, there is a relatively wide range
of admissable values in the literature. Silva and Toledo (2009) estimate recruitment costs equal
to 3.6% of a worker’s monthly wage. Using microdata by Barron et al. (1997), Michaillat (2012)
estimates the costs of posting a vacancy at 9.8% of a worker’s steady state wage. Vacancy costs
calibrated to match the latter value imply steady state vacancy posting costs of 0.28% of the
total wage bill and 0.17% of GDP in Michaillat (2012). I calibrate κ/2 to 0.18, which is slightly
more than 9% of a worker’s steady state wage. Given this value, steady state vacancy posting
costs account for 0.31% of the total wage bill and 0.2 % of GDP.
The eciency of the matching function is chosen to match a quarterly job-nding rate of 0.8
and the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment to match empirical
evidence from Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). Unemployment benets are set to 0.4. This
value implies a steady state replacement rate of about 0.2, which is at the lower end of the
values found in the literature. The parameter ϕ, governing the disutility of labor, is set to match
a steady state unemployment rate of 11%.10
Next, I calibrate the parameter governing wage rigidity based on the interpretation of the
wage schedule arising from a staggered Nash bargaining setting. With this calibration strategy,
τ can be interpreted as representing an upper bound on wage rigidity. Taylor (1999) argues
that medium sized and large rms typically readjust wages anually. Additional evidence is
provided by Gottschalk (2005), who nds that wage adjustments are most common one year
after the last change. Thus, I set τ to 0.25, implying an average renegotiation frequency of once
per year.
Since investment adjustment costs can potentially generate asymmetric unemployment
dynamics, they are cautiosly set to ξ = 0.05, a value at the very low end of the values found
in the literature.
11
The mean of the credit shock process, η̄, is set to match the empirical
ratio of outstanding debt in the non-nancial corporate business sector to output of 1.75. The
parameters for the persistence and standard deviation of the technology and credit shock
sequence are estimated using the dataset constructed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
12
10
I choose a value twice the size of the actual unemployment rate over the considered time period as the model
does not accout for workers that are out of the labor force. For similar reasons Barnichon (2010), Chugh (2013),
Garín (2015), and Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) choose a steady state unemployment rate of 10%.
11
A more detailed discussion of the role of investment adjustment costs is provided in Appendix A.5.
12
For the estimation I use the code provided by Pfeifer (2016).
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Table 2.1. Calibration of the Model Parameters
Symbol Interpretation Value Source/Target
βh Household’s discount factor 0.996 Annual interest rate of 1.6%
βc Firms’ discount factor 0.983 Annual return on equity of 7%
x Separation rate 0.1 Shimer (2005)
κ
2
Recruiting costs 0.18 Michaillat (2012)
ν Matching eciency 0.651 Job-nding rate of 0.8
γ Unemployment-elasticity of matching 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
s Unemployment benets 0.4 Replacement rate of 0.2
ϕ Disutility of labor 0.85 Unemployment rate of 11%
τ Renegotiation probability 0.25 Taylor (1999); Gottschalk (2005)
ξ Investment adjustment cost 0.050 Lower end of literature values
η̄ Steady state credit market tightness 0.3086 Debt-to-output ratio of 1.75
σ Agents relative risk aversion 2 Standard in the literature
φ Worker’s bargaining power 0.4 Midpoint of literature values
α Marginal returns to labor 0.66 Labor share of 0.66
ρz Autocorrelation of technology shocks 0.9508 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
σz Standard deviation of technology shocks 0.0083 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
ρη Autocorrelation of credit shocks 0.9788 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
ση Standard deviation of credit shocks 0.0126 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.025 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
2.4.2 Simulated Moments
I compare the simulated moments of the model to business cycle statistics for U.S. data. For
the vacancy series I take data from Michaillat (2012), who merged the Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for 2001–2004 with the Conference board help-wanted advertising
index for 1964–2001. Unemployment data is taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
and labor market tightness is calculated as the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. For each of
these series I take the quarterly average. The real wage estimates are average hourly earnings
in the nonfarm business sector constructed by the BLS Current Employment Statistics. Output
is quarterly real output from the BLS Major Sector Productivity and Costs program. In order to
isolate business cylce uctuations, I use a Hodrick-Prescott lter with smoothing parameter
15
2 Collateral Constraints, Wage Rigidity, and Jobless Recoveries
Table 2.2. Summary Statistics – arterly US Data, 1964–2004
u v θ w y z
Standard deviation 0.166 0.186 0.339 0.021 0.030 0.020
Autocorrelation 0.918 0.946 0.934 0.949 0.902 0.890
Correlation 1 -0.888 -0.968 -0.114 -0.820 -0.514
— 1 0.975 0.162 0.762 0.488
— — 1 0.140 0.810 0.514
— — — 1 0.499 0.639
— — — — 1 0.883
— — — — — 1
Note: All data are seasonally adjusted. The sample period is 1964:I - 2004:IV. The
unemployment rate u is the quarterly average of the monthly series constructed
by the BLS from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Vacancies are taken from
Michaillat (2012) and constructed as detailed in the text. Labor market tightness
θ is the ratio of vacancies to unemployment. The real wage is quarterly average
hourly earnings in the nonfarm business sector, constructed by the BLS Current
Employment Statistics program, and deated by the quarterly average of the
monthly Consumer Price Index for all urban households, constructed by the BLS;
y is the quarterly real output in the nonfarm business sector constructed by the
BLS Major Sector Productivity and Costs dataset; ln(z) is constructed as a residual.
Following Haefke et al. (2013), uctuations in the capital stock are ignored. All
variables are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 105.
100.000 as recommended in Shimer (2005).
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Table 2.2 displays the second order moments for
key labor market variables that will be used to evaluate the performance of the model.
I simulate 264 quarters of data corresponding to the empirical sample size of 1964:I to
2004:IV.
14
The data is detrended using the same HP lter. The simulation is repeated 500
times and each repetition provides an estimate of the means of the simulated data. Standard
deviations are calculated to judge the precision of the estimates. While the technology and
credit shock processes are calibrated to match the empirical data, all other simulated moments
are outcomes of the mechanics of the model. All simulations are performed using a second-
order perturbation method. Since I am interested in asymmetric unemployment dynamics, a
rst order approximation is obviously not feasible. As the results remain virtually unchanged
when using third- or fourth-order approximations, a second-order approximation seems to
capture most of the relevant dynamics.
The model performs well along most dimensions that a model without nancial frictions
and without wage rigidity fails to capture.
15
While the standard deviation of unemployment
13
The results remain virtually unchanged when using a smoothing parameter of 1600.
14
The rst 100 quarters are discarded as a burn-in period.
15




Table 2.3. Simulated Moments – Financial Frictions and Wage Rigidity τ= 0.25
u v θ w y z
Standard deviation 0.080 0.164 0.227 0.011 0.021 0.015
(0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Autocorrelation 0.810 0.388 0.533 0.960 0.849 0.829
(0.061) (0.102) (0.100) (0.022) (0.061) (0.070)
Correlation 1 -0.782 -0.881 -0.494 -0.839 -0.747
(0.021) (0.016) (0.090) (0.054) (0.094)
— 1 0.975 0.223 0.624 0.576
(0.004) (0.073) (0.051) (0.072)
— — 1 0.330 0.726 0.665
(0.081) (0.052) (0.082)
— — — 1 0.820 0.788
(0.040) (0.037)
— — — — 1 0.973
(0.015)
— — — — — 1
Note: Results from simulating the model with stochastic technology with a second-order
perturbation method. All variables are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 105. Simulated standard errors (standard deviations across 500 simulations)
are reported in parentheses.
is still too low compared to U.S. data, it is about four times the standard deviation of output.
In addition, the model accounts for roughly 70% of the volatility of labor market tightness,
90% of the volatility in vacancies, and nearly 100% of the uctuations in the job-nding rate.
Robustness exercises in the form of business cycle statistics for a model with nancial frictions
but without wage rigidity and for a model with wage rigidity but without nancial frictions
are provided in Appendix A.9. These simulations conrm that the interaction between wage
rigidity and nancial frictions, and not only the sum of the separate eects, plays an important
role in matching business cycle statistics and in explaining unemployment dynamics.
Shocks are amplied considerably in the model: a 1% decrease in productivity increases
unemployment by 3.9%, decreases vacancies by 6.2%, and decreases labor market tightness by
9.9%.16 In the data, a 1% decrease in productivity increases unemployment by 4.2%, decreases
16
The elasticity of unemployment with respect to technology εua is the coecient obtained in an ordinary
least squares regression of log unemployment on log technology. This coecient can be calculated as
εua = ρ(u, a)× σ(u)/σ(a) = −0.514× 0.166/0.020. All other elasticities can be calculated accordingly.
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Figure 2.1. Impulse Response Functions: Negative Technology Shock
Note: The scale represents percentage deviations from the steady state. The size of the technology shock is one standard deviation.
vacancies by 4.5%, and decreases labor market tightness by 8.6%. The response of vacancies
and labor market tightness is a bit higher in the model than in the data, which might be due to
a lower elasticity of wages with respect to changes in technology. Haefke et al. (2013) nd an
elasticity of about 0.7, while the presented business cycle statistics for the U.S. suggest a value
of 0.65. The simulated elasticity is a bit lower with a value of 0.58.
Comparing the elasticity of unemployment to technology in this model with the elasticity in
a model with perfect credit markets, I nd that the eect of wage rigidity is six times larger
when rms are constrained in their ability to borrow. Additionally, the eect of nancial
frictions on the elasticity of unemployment to technology is more than twice as large under
wage rigidity compared to a model with exible wages. As they reinforce each other, the
combined eect of wage rigidity and nancial frictions is two times larger than the sum of the
two separate eects.
2.4.3 Impulse Response Functions
In this section, I present the impulse response functions of several variables to a negative one
standard deviation shock to total factor productivity and a negative one standard deviation
shock to credit tightness. The scale represents log deviations from steady state. The impulse
response functions for a positive and a negative shock are not symmetric for the unemployment
rate. This asymmetry is discussed in detail in Subsection 2.4.4.
The impulse response functions for a negative shock to technology comply with the literature.
Following a negative shock, rms decrease their hiring with vacancies dropping by nearly
18
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
Figure 2.2. Impulse Response Functions: Negative Credit Shock
Note: The scale represents percentage deviations from the steady state. The size of the credit shock is one standard deviation.
9% on impact. The unemployment rate increases, leading to an even larger decrease in labor
market tightness. The marginal value and the collateral value of the capital stock drop, which
triggers the decrease in investment. Note that the model captures unemployment dynamics
quite well: after a negative technology shock unemployment peaks around four months after
the initial shock. This is in line with the empirical ndings in Stock and Watson (1999).
Figure 2.2 depicts the response of the model to a negative one standard deviation shock to
credit market tightness. Firms are able to borrow less against their collateral and respond by
cutting hiring and investment. This lowers the future capital stock and further tightens the
credit constraint. The drop in vacancies is not persistent, but still large enough to generate
a persistent increase of the unemployment rate. After dropping on impact, hiring increases
above its steady state value long before output has recovered. This is in line with Blanchard
and Diamond (1990), Fujita and Ramey (2006), and Elsby et al. (2009), who all document an
increase in the number of hires in recessions. These dynamics are not present in standard
search and matching models as the number of hires tends to follow production closely.
Note that neither technology nor credit shocks generate dynamics in the unemployment
rate that are more persistent than output dynamics. Therefore, neither a simple shock to credit
tightness nor a simple shock to total factor productivity is able to induce a jobless recovery.
2.4.4 Unemployment Dynamics
In this section, I turn to the asymmetric behavior of the cyclical component of the unemployment
rate documented and analyzed in, for example, McKay and Reis (2008), Barnichon (2010), and
19
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Table 2.4. Skewness of the Simulated Unemployment Rate
τ = 1 τ = 0.5 τ = 0.25
With Financial Frictions
Levels 0.42 0.44 0.56
Changes 0.23 0.25 0.30
Without Financial Frictions
Levels 0.12 0.13 0.18
Changes 0.02 0.03 0.05
Note: The amount of wage rigidity τ implies an average renegotiation frequency
of three months, six months, and twelve months, respectively.
Atolia et al. (2018). Following Sichel (1993), I measure asymmetry in unemployment dynamics
with the skewness coecient.
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For U.S. data in the time period between 1964 and 2004, the
skewness of the unemployment rate is 0.72 in levels and 1.30 in changes.
18
These values suggest
that the unemployment rate is characterized by short periods of sharp increases and long
periods of at decreases.
Table 2.4 displays the skewness of the simulated unemployment rate in levels and in changes
for dierent amounts of wage rigidity.
19
A standard search and matching model with symmetric
shocks is unable to match these observations despite the asymmetry resulting from costly
vacancy posting. The simulated unemployment series in a benchmark model without nancial
frictions and without wage rigidity displays a skewness of 0.12 in levels and 0.02 in changes,
explaining only about 17% and 2% of the respective skewness in the data.20 For the model with
nancial frictions and with wage rigidity, the skewness of the simulated unemployment series
is 0.56 in levels and 0.30 in changes. Over 75% of the skewness in levels and nearly 25% of the
skewness in changes in the data can be explained by combining both frictions in a search and
matching framework.
21
As for the elasticity of unemployment to technology shocks, nancial frictions and wage
rigidity reinforce their respective eects. The combined eect of wage rigidity and nancial
frictions on the skewness in levels is 22% larger than the sum of the two separate eects. For
the skewness in changes the combined eect is 17% larger.22
The mechanism generating asymmetry is intuitively simple and depends on both nancial
17
Positive skewness in levels implies that the unemployment rate is more often above than below its trend.
Positive skewness in changes implies that the unemployment rate is more likely to decrease than to increase.
18
The unemployment rate is the quarterly average of the monthly unemployment series constructed by the BLS
from the CPS. The series is detrended using a HP lter with smoothing parameter 100.000.
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For this exercise τ is adjusted, leaving all other parameter values unchanged. Independent of the size of τ , the
simulated volatility of output is always below the actual volatility of output. Thus, higher wage rigidity does
not come at the cost of counterfactually large uctuations in output.
20
The results remain virtually unchanged when the model without nancial frictions and without wage rigidity
is calibrated to match the volatility of the unemployment rate in the model with nancial frictions and wage
rigidity instead of the same steady state targets.
21
Other important aspects for explaining asymmetric unemployment dynamics might be demand shocks (cf.
Barnichon, 2010), goods market frictions (cf. Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2015), or creative destruction (cf.
20
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Figure 2.3. Asymmetric Impulse Response Functions: Unemployment
Note: This gure plots the dierence between the deviation of the unemployment rate from its steady state following a negative one standard
deviation shock to technology and the absolute value of the deviation of the unemployment rate from its steady state following a positive
one standard deviation shock to technology.
frictions and wage rigidity. With rigid wages, the response of the unemployment rate to negative
shocks increases as the rm’s surplus reacts more strongly to changes in technology and credit
tightness. This implies steeper increases in the unemployment rate on impact compared to
models with exible wages. With nancial frictions, a positive technology shock tightens the
credit constraint as it increases working capital requirements. Firms invest in the asset used as
collateral in order to loosen the borrowing constraint. The increase in employment is delayed
and the decrease in unemployment is atter compared to standard search and matching models.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the asymmetry of the unemployment rate based on the impulse response
functions. The absolute value of the deviation of the unemployment rate from its steady
state following a positive one standard deviation shock to technology is substracted from
the deviation of the unemployment rate from its steady state following a negative shock
to technology of the same size. A value larger than zero implies that the deviation of the
unemployment rate is larger after a negative shock. The asymmetry is most pronounced for the
model with nancial frictions and wage rigidity. The stronger reaction of the unemployment
rate visualizes the argument that rms proiritize investment into collateral following a positive
technology shock. In contrast, the impulse response functions for output are almost completely
symmetric.
McKay and Reis, 2008).
22
In line with the data, simulated output displays no skewness in levels or in changes (cf. Barnichon, 2010).
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Figure 2.4. Jobless Recovery During the Great Recession
Note: The unemployment rate is the quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment series constructed by the BLS from
the CPS. Output is the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For both series the value in 2007Q4 is
normalized to 100.
2.5 Jobless Recoveries
The recessions and subsequent recoveries in 1990–1991, 2001, and more recently the recovery
after the Great Recession in 2007–2009, have sparked a debate about so called jobless recoveries
in the U.S. (cf. Galí et al., 2012; Shimer, 2012; Calvo et al., 2014; Jaimovich and Siu, 2018).
Following the denition used in, among others, Calvo et al. (2014), I classify recoveries as
jobless if the unemployment rate is above its pre-crisis level by the time output has fully
recovered.
23
Figure 2.4 depicts the joblessness of the recovery following the Great Recession. After the
end of the Great Recession in June 2009 it took slightly less than two years for output to fully
recover. At the point of output recovery the unemployment rate had only recovered by about
15% and was still about four percentage points above its pre-crisis level.
2.5.1 Mechanism
In my model, regardless of whether the recession is caused by a technology or by a credit
shock, output and unemployment behave very similarly as long as only one shock drives the
economy. Jobless recoveries emerge when credit conditions continue to erode while total factor
productivity recovers. They are jobless because worsening credit conditions are an important
driver of unemployment dynamics and keep unemployment high, but play only a minor role
for uctuations in output. In the variance decomposition exercise in Table 2.5, over 25% of the
uctuations in unemployment are caused by credit shocks, while virtually all of the uctuations
23




Table 2.5. Variance Decomposition
y u v θ w
TFP Shocks 98.61 73.87 56.08 63.77 99.35
Credit Shocks 1.39 26.13 43.92 36.23 0.65
Note: The variance decomposition is used to assess the relative
importance of technology and credit shocks for generating
volatility in the simulated model.
in output are due to productivity shocks.
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The mechanism behind this result is also evident in the rst order conditions of the rm.
Credit conditions directly aect the marginal value of an additional worker. A tightening of
future credit conditions increases µb,t+1, the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint,
and thus the marginal value of relaxing this constraint. This increase in credit tightness reduces
the marginal value of an additional worker by
Ln,µb,t+1 = −αzt+1nα−1t+1 k1−αt+1 .
Now consider the eect of the same increase in credit tightness on the marginal value of an
additional unit of capital
Lk,µb,t+1 = −(1− α)zt+1nαt+1k−αt+1 + EtΛct|t+1ηt+1qk,t+1.
As for the marginal value of an additional worker, the increase in credit tightness reduces the
marginal value of the capital stock in the production process. However, capital can also be used
as collateral, the value of which increases with credit tightness. Thus, the eect of credit shocks
on unemployment is larger than the eect of credit shocks on capital and output.
25
When
total factor productivity recovers after a recession, rms increase their capital stock which
in turn increases production. If this recovery is accompanied by tightening credit conditions,
the marginal value of an additional worker stays low and at the point of output recovery the
unemployment rate will be above its pre-crisis level.
24
The ndings in Garín (2015) suggest that the role played by credit shocks is even larger. The presence of
wage rigidity in my model reduces the importance of credit shocks for explaining variation in the key labor
market variables. Since wages are already relatively more rigid with respect to credit conditions, wage rigidity
increases the relative importance of productivity shocks for uctuations in the considered variables. Note,
however, that the validity of results from a variance decomposition with only two shocks is limited.
25
In this sense joblessness arises because labor cannot be used as collateral. This is in line with empirical evidence.
Calvo (2015) shows that collateral requirements are lower for rms possesing easily recognizeable collateral
and that the majority of this easily recognizeable collateral is physical capital.
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Table 2.6. Credit Shocks During Recoveries
Average Credit Shock
Recessions Prior to 1990 -0.00248
1990-1991 Recession -1.3968
2001 Recession -0.8237
Note: The average credit shock is the average size of the
credit shocks in the four quarters following the end of a
recession divided by the standard deviation of the credit
shock series. The credit shock series is estimated from the
dataset provided by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) for the
time period between 1964 and 2010. The recession in 1980
is left out of the sample as the recovery period is overlaid
by the start of the recession in 1981. The Great Recession
is left out as the dataset only covers the time period up to
the rst quarter of 2010.
2.5.2 Empirical Evidence
Evidence for deteriorating credit conditions during jobless recoveries can be found in the
dataset provided by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) as well as in the Senior Loan Ocer Opinion
Survey on Bank Lending Practices from the Federal Reserve Board.
Table 2.6 displays the average size of credit shocks following the end of a recession estimated
from the dataset provided by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). A negative value implies a tightening
of credit conditions. Prior to the two jobless recoveries in 1990–1991 and in 2001, credit
conditions remained virtually constant immediately after the end of a recession.
26
Following
the end of the recessions in 1990–1991 and in 2001, credit conditions continued to worsen with
the average credit shocks amounting to -1.4 and -0.82 times the standard deviation.
A tightening of credit conditions during the recent recoveries, including the recovery after
the Great Recession, is also reported in the Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices from the Federal Reserve Board depicted in Figure 2.5.
27
Credit market tightness
is calculated as the fraction of surveyed banks reporting to tighten credit standards minus
the fraction of banks reporting to lower their standards. A positive value therefore implies a
tightening of credit conditions.
Two observations are striking. First, following the end of all three recessions, credit conditions
continued to deteriorate – for several months after the recessions in 1990–1991 and in 2007–
2009, and for nearly two years after the recession in 2001. Second, following the end of the
recessions, the unemployment rate only began to decrease after credit conditions had stabilized.
26
Prior to 1990 the largest negative average credit shock following a recession was one fourth of a standard
deviation.
27
The Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices is available from 1990 onwards.
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2.5 Jobless Recoveries
Figure 2.5. Unemployment Rate and Credit Market Tightness, 1990–2004
Note: The unemployment rate is the quarterly average of the seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment series constructed by the BLS
from the CPS. Credit market tightness is measured as the Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards for Commercial
and Industrial Loans for Medium and Large Firms obtained from the Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices from
the Federal Reserve Board. Periods classied as recessions by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) are highlighted in gray.
2.5.3 Simulated Recoveries
Figure 2.6 plots a jobless recovery in the model. Technology and credit shock series are
calibrated to match the behaviour of output during the Great Recession. Negative shocks to
credit tightness and to technology cause a recession in which output decreases by 4% during
the rst four quarters. Technology recovers but credit conditions continue to deteriorate. Firms
invest into capital to oset the increasing credit tightness and output fully recovers after six to
seven quarters. At the point of output recovery the unemployment rate has only recovered by
around 31% relative to its peak (compared to a recovery by 15% after the Great Recession) and
is two percentage points above its pre-crisis level (compared to four percentage points after
the Great Recession).
In contrast to the results obtained by Calvo et al. (2014) in a competitive model of the labor
market, wage rigidity is not necessary to generate joblessness in a DSGE model with nancial
frictions. Nonetheless, the joblessness of the recovery period is more pronounced under wage
rigidity. Without wage rigidity, the unemployment rate would have recovered by about 45% at
the point of output recovery.
Next, I consider the ability of the model to account for jobless recoveries given technology
and credit shocks estimated from the data. To that end I again use the dataset provided by
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) to estimate credit and technology shock series for the time period
between 1964 and 2010. Figure 2.7 plots the simulated series for unemployment and output.
In line with the data, the model displays no sign of joblessness for the four recovery periods
after recessions prior to 1990. At the point of output recovery after the recession in 1990–1991,
unemployment is slightly above its pre-crisis level. The model predicts a more pronounced
25
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Figure 2.6. Simulated Jobless Recovery
Note: The jobless recovery is generated using series of technology and credit shocks in the simulated model with nancial frictions and
wage rigidity. The shock series are calibrated to match the behaviour of output during the Great Recession. The pre-recession levels of
unemployment and output are normalized to 100.
Figure 2.7. Simulated Unemployment and Output, 1964–2010
Note: Output and unemployment are simulated using technology shock and credit shock series estimated from the dataset to Jermann and
Quadrini (2012). Periods classied as recessions by the NBER are highlighted in gray.
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2.6 Conclusion
Table 2.7. Changes in Employment and Output: Model versus Data
Output Employment
Data Model Data Model
1900–1991 Recession
1 year -0.7% -1.6% -1.1% -2.8%
2 years 2.3% 0.5% -0.5% -0.6%
2001 Recession
1 year 1.5% 0.1% -1.2% -1.8%
2 years 3.3% 1.8% -0.3% -0.7%
2007–2009 Recession
1 year -3.3% -2.5% -1.7% -2.1%
2 years -3.8% -1.2% -5.5% -1.4%
Note: The growth rates are calculated by comparing peak output and em-
ployment at the start of the recession (or within one quarter) with output
and employment one and two years later. Employment is total nonfarm
payroll employment from the BLS Current Employment Statistics. Output
is the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
joblessness for the recovery following the recession in 2001: at the point of output recovery the
unemployment rate has only recovered by about 50%. Similarly, by the time simulated output
recovered after the Great Recession, the model predicts a recovery of unemployment by 56%
compared to its peak.
Finally, Table 2.7 displays the development of output and employment in the model and
in the data for the three U.S. recessions after 1990. In line with the data, the model predicts
employment to be below its peak value two years after the peak for all three recessions.
Comparing the recent recessions with recessions prior to 1990, lower employment after two
years is a unique feature of jobless recoveries.
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2.6 Conclusion
Incorporating nancial frictions and wage rigidity considerably improves the performance of
the standard search and matching model. Besides increasing the volatility of key labor market
variables, the interaction of the two frictions facilitates the replication of important aspects of
unemployment dynamics.
The simulated model with only technology and credit shocks can account for nearly 50%
of the variation in unemployment, roughly 90% of the uctuations in vacancies, nearly 70%
of the variation in labor market tightness, and virtually 100% of the uctuations observed
in the job-nding rate. I nd that wage rigidity is responsible for the steeper increase in the
28
The only exception is the recession in 1980. However, the recovery period after this recession is overlaid by the
beginning of the recession in 1981.
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unemployment rate after negative shocks, whereas credit constraints ensure that decreases
after positive shocks are atter. Jobless recoveries are induced by eroding credit conditions
during recovery periods.
While the explored mechanism provides an easy way to add important dynamics to search and
matching models, it might also be able to reconcile models with endogenous separations with
the highly negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies, i.e., the Beveridge curve.
In models with endogenous seperations, the unemployment pool increases disproportionately
after a negative technology shock due to the large inow of separated workers. This decreases
the labor market tightness and makes hiring in recessions cheap. Most models with endogenous
separations therefore entail on-the-job search in order to reconcile the model with the data. In
a model with endogenous separations and nancial frictions, unemployment will also increase
disproportionately after a negative credit shock. However, the incentive to post vacancies
is reduced by a tightening of the borrowing constraint. It is an interesting task for further
research to explore whether this mechanism is strong enough to generate a highly negative
vacancy-unemployment correlation.
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3 A Joint Theory of Polarization and
Deunionization
Authors: Tobias Föll and Anna Hartmann
3.1 Introduction
Job market polarization and deunionization have radically changed the labor market over the
last decades. Job market polarization refers to the falling employment shares in middle-skill
occupations and increasing employment shares in low-skill and high-skill occupations. The
share of employment in the middle range of skills has been continuously decreasing in the U.S.
and is now more than 10 percentage points below its value in the 1980s (cf. Autor and Dorn,
2013). Deunionization describes the ongoing decline in union membership rates. According to
the Union Membership and Coverage Database constructed by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003),
U.S. union membership rates declined from 24.0% of all employed workers in 1973 to 10.5% in
2018.
Polarization and deunionization have both proven to be especially harmful for low-wage and
middle-wage workers: job market polarization because the relative shifts in labor demand away
from routine occupations have suppressed wage growth in that area and deunionization because
unionization rates are typically highest among lower middle-skill workers. American middle
class workers have been in the focus for U.S. politicians not just since President Barack Obama
declared himself "a warrior for the middle class".
1
Even though the share of U.S. households
classied as middle class by the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER) has declined
steadily since the 1980s, roughly 50% of households still counted as middle class in 2013.2
Thus, identifying and implementing suitable policies to support the middle class has become
an ever more pressing issue for today’s policymakers, especially considering the recent trends
of political radicalization among this group (cf. Post, 2017).
The prevalent explanation for polarization is the routinization hypothesis, which states
that machines or computers replace middle-wage workers in occupations performing routine
tasks (cf. Autor et al., 2003, 2006b; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al., 2015; Michaels et al.,
1
Remarks by the president on the economy, Knox College, Galesburg, IL, 24.06.2013.
2
The AIER denes households with a disposable income of two thirds to twice the median income for their
household size as middle class.
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Figure 3.1. Relative Price for Investment Goods, Share of Routine Workers, and U.S. Union
Membership Rate
Note: The share of workers in routine occupations is constructed using the dataset and the occupational classication by Autor and Dorn
(2013). Data for the union membership rates are taken from Mayer (2004), who merges data from the Current Population Survey, the Union
Membership and Coverage Database constructed by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003), and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook and
Employment and Earnings Survey. The membership rate includes all wage and salary workers. Public sector and agricultural workers are
included in order for the data to be comparable to the data used in Autor and Dorn (2013). Missing data points are extrapolated from adjoining
data points. The FRED series for the relative price of investment goods is measured as the investment deator divided by the consumption
deator and displayed as an index with 1980 = 100. We display the relative price for investment goods rather than the price for computer
capital since data on the former is more reliable and available for a longer time period.
2014; Feng and Graetz, 2015). The non-routine nature of tasks performed by low-wage and
high-wage workers means that their jobs are more dicult to automate. In contrast to job
polarization, no consensus has yet emerged regarding the source of deunionization (cf. Dinlersoz
and Greenwood, 2016; Ortigueira, 2013; Aghion et al., 2011; Lee and Roemer, 2005). In this paper,
we argue that routine-biased technical change is also the main driving force behind falling
unionization rates. Figure 3.1 depicts the falling relative price for investment goods (proxying
routine-biased technical change), the employment share of workers in routine occupations, and
the union membership rate for the U.S. between 1950 and 2005. The union membership rate
and the share of routine workers display a very similar negative trend over the last decades
(with a correlation of 0.92).
To estimate the causal eect of routine-biased technical change on unionization, we borrow
methodology from the trade (cf. Autor et al., 2013) and migration literatures (cf. Dustmann
et al., 2017). Specically, we use an interaction term between time-varying relative prices for
investment goods and time-invariant state-specic routine employment shares in regressions
of unionization rates that include both time and state xed eects. Using state-level labor
market data, we document that the eect of falling prices for investment goods on unionization
rates is more pronounced in U.S. states with a larger share of workers employed in routine-
intensive occupations. Thus, states that are more strongly aected by routine-biased technical
change also experience larger declines in unionization rates. Additionally, and in contrast to
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conventional wisdom, we illustrate that the decrease in union membership is not mainly driven
by changes in the industry or occupational composition.
Motivated by this, we develop a joint theory of polarization and deunionization. We endoge-
nize both the occupational choice of workers, who dier with respect to their ability, and the
union status of a rm in a search and matching model of the labor market. The occupational
choice is modeled by giving previous routine workers the option to switch to low-skill manual
occupations upon becoming unemployed. The union status of a rm is determined through an
election, in which the employees decide whether they want to form a union, and consequently
a collective bargaining unit, or whether they want to bargain individually over their wages
with their employer.
3
If a union is established, it enters into a negotiation with the rm and
distributes its share of the negotiated surplus equally across its members.
The main mechanism behind our results is quite simple. Relative prices for computer
capital, which is able to replace routine tasks, fall (proxying for routine-biased technical
change). This reduces the demand for routine workers, whereas manual and abstract workers,
who are complementary to routine tasks, are in greater demand. The change in the labor
demand structure implies that wages in manual occupations increase by more than wages
in routine occupations. Manual workers, who benet from the changing demand structure,
are discouraged from voting in favor of a collective bargaining agreement because the lower
demand for routine workers dampens the growth of union wages. The lowest-skilled previously
unionized routine workers, when faced with lower wages compared to manual workers, decide
to switch occupations. This amplies the initial polarization caused by routine-biased technical
change. Notably, our mechanism is in line with the empirical literature on union membership
decisions. DiNardo et al. (1996) and Rueda et al. (2002), among others, document a decreasing
eectiveness of unions in redistributing earnings over the last decades. Building on this
argument, Baccaro and Locke (1998) and Checchi et al. (2010) both emphasize disillusion about
potential wage growth as the main reason for declining union membership rates among the
least skilled workers.
The increasing relative skill of union members (cf. Farber et al., 2018), the constant union
wage premia over time (cf. Bryson, 2002; Hirsch and Schumacher, 2004; Breda, 2015; Farber
et al., 2018), and the large contribution of within-industry and within-occupation changes to
deunionization constitute three importamnt empirical observations that existing models of
technical change and deunionization are unable to explain jointly (cf. Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Açıkgöz and Kaymak, 2014; Dinlersoz and Greenwood, 2016).
4
We illustrate that all three of
these observations can be rationalized in our model, where routine-biased technical change
is driving deunionization. Low-skilled workers endogenously decide to vote against union
coverage because of low wage growth in unionized rms. This leads to large within-industry
3
A bargaining unit is commonly dened as a group of employees that shares a set of interests and may reasonably
be represented by a collective bargaining agreement.
4
Related literature is discussed in detail in Section 3.3.
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and within-occupation changes in unionization rates and to a larger share of high-skilled union
members. As only the weakest unions, i.e., those providing the lowest wage growth for their
members, are terminated, average union wage premia are only mildly aected by declining
membership rates.
We assess quantitatively the eect of routine-biased technical change on occupational
decisions and on union formation. The model is calibrated to match U.S. data for the time
period between 1983 and 2005. Predicted changes in the employment and wage distribution
are close to the data. Routine-biased technical change, through changes in the labor demand
structure, leads to a drop of 9.3 percentage points in overall union density in the model compared
to a drop of 6.6 percentage points in the data. The falling union density amplies polarization.
As previously unionized routine workers are more likely to switch occupations when they are
unable to nd a routine job that is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, about 15% of
the simulated changes in low- and middle-skilled employment are driven by deunionization.
In line with the empirical literature, the predicted overall eect of deunionization on inequal-
ity, measured by the Gini index, is small (cf. Frandsen, 2012; Checchi et al., 2010; DiNardo and
Lee, 2004). However, deunionization has substantial eects for the lowest-skilled previously
unionized routine workers. For this group of workers, wage growth in the model would be
60% larger if they were covered by one of the remaining collective bargaining contracts.
In our model, unions could dampen polarization and deunionization if they were able
and willing to adjust the wage distribution, allowing for less equality inside the collective
bargaining agreement. However, empirical evidence suggests that unions are characterized by
rigid structures that partly prevent them from adjusting to recent developments on the labor
market (cf. Waddington, 2005; Bryson et al., 2016). Bryson et al. (2016) argue that the decline in
union membership rates across countries is strongly related to the degree of progressiveness
of the unions. Thus, it seems that unions are lacking the modern and progressive structures
necessary to attract more and especially younger members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Empirical evidence on job market
polarization and deunionization is presented in Section 3.2 and previous research is discussed in
Section 3.3. We give an overview of the union framework in the U.S. in Section 3.4. The model
and analytical results are presented in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we provide a quantitative
evaluation of the model. Policy implications are discussed in Section 3.7. To conclude, the
results of this paper are summarized in Section 3.8.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence on the within-industry and within-occupation
contribution to deunionization and on the relationship between polarization and deunionization.
32
3.2 Empirical Evidence
3.2.1 A Decomposition Analysis
Conventional wisdom holds that the decline in unionization rates since the 1980s is mainly
driven by a composition eect: routine-biased technical change reduces employment in the
heavily unionized routine-manufacturing occupations while increasing employment in the
less-unionized service and information technology occupations. We illustrate that changing
employment shares between industries and between occupations contributed only little to
declining union membership rates between 1983 and 2005, which are mainly driven by strong
within-industry and within-occupation declines in unionization.
Borrowing the methodology used in, among others, Farber and Krueger (1992) and Baldwin
(2003), we conduct a decomposition exercise to assess the relative importance of within-
and between-industry and within- and between-occupation changes for deunionization. The
within-industry (within-occupation) component measures the eect of a change in the union
membership rate for a specic industry (occupational group), keeping the employment share
in that industry (occupational group) constant. The between-industry (between-occupation)
component measures the eect of a change in the employment share of a specic industry
(occupational group), keeping the union membership rate in that industry (occupational group)
constant. Summing up both components over all industries (occupational groups) yields the
estimated overall change in the union membership rate.
For the analysis, we use data on industry-specic and data on occupation-specic union
membership rates for several industries and occupational groups provided in the Union Mem-
bership and Coverage Database described in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). The results are
summarized in Table 3.1. Nearly 95% of the decline in unionization rates is accounted for by
the within-industry component, with changing industry employment shares only contributing
about 5%. These results are in line with previous empirical ndings (cf. Baldwin, 2003). A
similar picture emerges for the within- and between-occupation contribution to deunionization.
Over 80% of the overall decline in unionization rates is driven by within-occupation declines in
membership rates, with between-occupation changes accounting for less than 20%. When the
occupational groups are reduced to abstract, routine, and manual, using the classication by Au-
tor and Dorn (2013), the contribution of the between-occupation component drops to below 5%.
Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, deunionization is mainly driven by within-industry
and within-occupation changes in union membership rates and not by simple composition
eects.
3.2.2 Linking Polarization and Deunionization
A rst look at the detailed statistics on union creation and union termination in the 20th century
in Troy and Shein (1985) reveals that 1970 has been the year with the highest number of newly
founded unions, while the most union terminations are observed in 1980. The accelerated
decline in union membership rates in the late 1970s to early 1980s ts well with the documented
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Table 3.1. Changing Unionization Rates – Decomposition, 1983–2005
Industry
Percentage Point Share





Total Change -11.01 100%
Within-occupation -8.93 81.07%
Between-occupation -2.08 18.93%
Note: Data for industry employment shares, occupational
employment shares and union membership rates are taken
from the Union Membership and Coverage Database con-
structed by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). Industries in-
clude mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation,
trade, services, nance, insurance, real estate, and pub-
lic administration. Occupational groups include executive,
managerial, professional, sales, machine operating, con-
struction, transportation, and service.
starting point of job polarization.
5
Job polarization, and to a lesser extent also wage polarization,
can be observed in the U.S. and several European countries at least since the 1980s (cf. Autor
and Dorn, 2013; Goos et al., 2009). Additionally, and supporting our argument, Dinlersoz and
Greenwood (2016) document that the steep decline in union membership rates in the 1980s
followed the emergence and diusion of early advanced technologies.
Cross-Country Evaluation
Looking at cross-sectional evidence, the degree of unionization is more pronounced in countries
with larger degrees of job and wage polarization (cf. Meyer, 2019; von Brasch et al., 2018). This
is visible when comparing the U.S. to Europe, but also within the group of European countries.
The Nordic countries, which experienced upgrading rather than polarization, exhibit constant
or even increasing union membership rates.
6
Figure 3.2 plots the polarization indicator developed in Duclos et al. (2004), which evaluates
5
The decline in union membership rates in the 1950s is usually explained by political resistance and the sharp
increase in labor force participation of women, who tend to be less unionized (cf. Oh, 1989; Troy and Shein,
1985).
6
The term upgrading refers to a specic pattern of changes in the employment structure, where employment
growth is positively correlated with the required skill level.
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Figure 3.2. Polarization and Collective Bargaining Coverage across Countries, 2004
Note: Figure 3.2 plots the polarization indicator developed in Duclos et al. (2004) against the collective bargaining coverage for the U.S.,
Canada, Mexico, and several European countries. Country selection is based on data availability. For all countries the polarization indicator
is calculated for the year 2004. The collective bargaining coverage is the share of employed workers covered by a collective bargaining
agreement in 2004 from the OECD data. The red line is the result of an OLS regression of the polarization indicator on the collective
bargaining coverage. The regression coecient is β = −8.78 and R2 is 0.66.
the distance between and the distinction of income groups, against the collective bargaining
coverage for the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and several European countries.
7
Despite the small
sample size, the negative coecient in an OLS regression of the collective bargaining coverage
on the polarization indicator is statistically signicant at the 0.1%-level.
Polarization and Deunionization Across U.S. States
Due to vast dierences in the institutional frameworks of the considered countries, and due to
the small number of countries for which reliable estimates can be obtained for the entire sample
period, the previous results are only suggestive of a relationship between polarization and
deunionization. We establish a causal relationship between routine-biased technical change
and deunionization, using broad state-level labor market data for the U.S.
Data Sources We use labor market data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Data
on union membership and union coverage is taken from the CPS and from the the Union
Membership and Coverage Database constructed by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) using CPS
data. For capital prices we use the Relative Price of Investment Goods, which is the investment
deator divided by the consumption deator. For minimum wage laws we use the minimum
7
In contrast to the U.S., the dierences between union membership rates and the percentage of workers covered
by a collective bargaining agreement are large for most of the European countries. Thus, when looking at union
inuence, the share of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement seems to be more appropriate
here. The results also hold when exchanging the collective bargaining coverage for union density. The
results are very similar when using changes in collective bargaining coverage instead of collective bargaining
coverage.
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wage rates by state. Both series are taken from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). Data on
the federal intergovernmental revenue is taken from the State and Local Government Finance
Dataset constructed by the Census Bureau. The tax burden is constructed by the Tax Foundation
and calculated as the total amount of paid taxes divided by the state’s total income. Data on
state legislatures is obtained through the State Partisan Composition collected by the National
Conference of State Legislatures.
Sample Selection We choose 1983 as the starting date for our analysis, as union membership
estimates by detailed occupation are provided in the Union Membership and Coverage Database
from this date onwards. 2005 is chosen as the endpoint because Beaudry et al. (2016) document
a reversal in the demand for cognitive skills since the early 2000s and accounting for this
reversal goes beyond the scope of our analysis.
An observation is a state-year combination, as union membership rates and detailed labor
market data can only be constructed at the state level from the CPS. In principle, our sample
thus contains 23 years× 50 states = 1150 state-year observations.8 After excluding observations
for which we lack information on certain control variables, we are left with a consistent sample
of 1116 observations.
Methodology We estimate
us,t = γ · pK,t · rshs,83 + β ·Xs,t + δs + ηt + εs,t, (3.1)
where us,t is the union membership rate or union coverage rate in state s in year t, pK,t
is the relative price of investment goods in year t, and rshs,83 is the employment share in
routine-intensive occupations in state s in year 1983.9 Xs,t is a vector of control variables,
including controls for state policy (minimum wage laws, tax burden), state government and
state legislation (party of governor, majority party in state senate and state house), state demo-
graphics (age, education, gender, ethnic composition), industry composition, and occupational
composition.
10
The complete list of control variables is provided in Appendix B.7. δs and ηt are
state and time xed eects and εs,t is the residual. Observations are weighted by the average
state population over our sample period.
We explicitly address two potential concerns about our methodology. First, the eect of
routine-biased technical change might work through changes in employment composition. To
adress this concern, we run seperate regressions with and without controls for the industy
and occupational composition in a state. Comparing these regressions allows us to gauge the
relative importance of composition eects. Second, standard errors are not clustered as our
8
The District of Columbia is excluded because of its specic labor market structure.
9
Occupations are classied using the categorization in Autor and Dorn (2013).
10
The state legislature in Nebraska is unicameral and ocially non-partisan. However, since there has been a de




Table 3.2. Regression Results for Changes in the Routine Employment Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial routine employment share -0.8430*** -0.8174*** -0.6639*** -0.7881***
(0.1029) (0.0845) (0.2267) (0.0896)
Observations 50 50 50 50
R2 0.8960 0.8648 0.8306 0.6174
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no no
State policy controls yes no yes no
State legislation controls yes no yes no
State demographic controls yes no yes no
Note: Observations are weighted by the average state population over our sample period. The standard
errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level, ** indicates
signicance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level.
regressions include state xed eects and there is no reason to expect heterogeneity in the
sampling or in the treatment eects (cf. Abadie et al., 2017).
Results In a rst step we conrm that the negative relationship between the initial em-
ployment share in routine-intensive occupations and the subsequent change in the share of
routine-intensive occupations documented for U.S. commuting zones by Autor and Dorn (2013)
holds on the state-level as well. Column (1) in Table 3.2 reports the results for our most preferred
specication, including the entire set of controls. The other three columns illustrate that the
results do not depend on the specic set of controls. In all four columns, the initial routine
employment share in 1983 is highly predictive of the change in the routine employment share
between 1983 and 2005. States with a higher initial routine employment share are the ones
that experience a more pronounced employment polarization.
In a second step we use the interaction term between the time-invariant initial routine
employment share and the time-variant relative price of investment goods in regressions with
unionization rates as the dependent variable.
11
States with a larger initial employment share in
routine-intensive occupations are more strongly aected by routine-biased technical change.
Thus, a positive coecient on the interaction term implies that routine-biased technical change
(measured as the relative price of investment goods) causes deunionization.
11
Several robustness checks are discussed in Appendix B.6.
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Table 3.3. Regression Results for Unionization Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital prices 0.3104*** 0.4267*** 0.2914*** 0.3588***
× routine employment share (0.0509) (0.0516) (0.0465) (0.0459)
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116
R2 0.9870 0.9833 0.9864 0.9819
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no no
State policy controls yes no yes no
State legislation controls yes no yes no
State demographic controls yes no yes no
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes
Note: Observations are weighted by the average state population over our sample period. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level, **
indicates signicance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level.
The results are reported in Table 3.3. Column (1) constitutes our most preferred specication,
featuring the full set of control variables. Column (2) excludes all control variables except the
industry and occupation controls, Column (3) excludes industry and occupation controls, and
Column (4) excludes all control variables. The coecient on the interaction term is positive
and highly statistically signicant in all four specications. This means that an increase in
capital prices has a larger positive eect on unionization rates in states with a larger routine
employment share. Consequently, following a decrease in capital prices, the fall in unionization
rates is more pronounced in states with a high share of routine employment.
Quantitatively, the relative price of investment goods has dropped by 48% between 1983
and 2005. Consider two states that dier by ten percentage points in their routine employment
share in 1983. When capital prices fall by 48%, our analysis suggests that the drop in the
unionization rate will be about 1.6 percentage points larger in the state with the higher share
of routine workers in 1983, controlling for both industry and occupational composition.
Columns (2) to (4), which leave out control variables, illustrate that our results do not depend
on the set of controls. Specically, the industry and occupation controls do not substantially
change the size of the coecient. Thus, the eect of routine-biased technical change on




The evidence presented in the previous section motivates us to develop a joint theory of polar-
ization and deunionization. We add to the literature by providing the rst model of technical
change and deunionization that is in line with the empirical literature on declining union
membership rates (cf. Farber et al., 2018). Furthermore, our paper is the rst to theoretically
evaluate how routine-biased – as opposed to skill-biased – technical change aects union
membership decisions.
Until now, technical change as a cause for deunionization has received only limited attention
in the theoretical literature. Acemoglu et al. (2001) show that skill-biased technical change
can trigger deunionization by increasing the outside option of skilled workers. In their model,
deunionization is counterfactually entirely driven by quitting high-skilled workers: skill-biased
technical change weakens the incentives for skilled workers to join the unionized sector, which
they interpret as the manufacturing industry. Furthermore, the lower share of high-skilled
workers in the unionized sector in Acemoglu et al. (2001) counterfactually implies declining
union wage premia and less skilled union members over time.
Açıkgöz and Kaymak (2014) study deunionization in a search and matching framework with
endogenous union membership. In their model, an exogenous increase in the skill premium
encourages the most skilled workers to leave the union, while rms avoid to hire the least
skilled union workers. This contrasts with evidence in Baccaro and Locke (1998) and Checchi
et al. (2010), who argue that disillusion about potential wage growth is the main driving force
behind declining union membership rates among the least-skilled workers. Additionally, and
counterfactually, the decline in the union membership rate in Açıkgöz and Kaymak (2014) is
stronger for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers, implying a decrease in the relative skill
level of union members.
Dinlersoz and Greenwood (2016) focus on the connection between technology, unionization,
and inequality. In a general equilibrium model of unionization with heterogeneous rms, skilled,
and unskilled labor, they show that when the productivity of unskilled labor is high, unions
decide to organize a lot of rms and demand generous wages for their members. Thus, skill-
biased technical change leads to counterfactually declining union membership premia. While
union members are exclusively drawn from low-skilled workers in Dinlersoz and Greenwood
(2016), the inclusion of union members of other skill types would, as in Acemoglu et al. (2001),
Açıkgöz and Kaymak (2014), and in basically any model of skill-biased technical change, lead
to union members becoming less skilled over time.
3.4 Unions in the U.S.
In this section, we provide a brief overview of how labor unions work in the U.S. These
institutional features will be used when setting up the model.
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In the U.S., unions base their right to represent workers through collective bargaining on
the voting decision of a so called bargaining unit. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
species the structure through which union organization and legal recognition takes place.
This structure focuses on a system of petitions and elections to determine whether a majority
of employees in the workplace wants to be represented by a union. The union then becomes
the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are union
members or not. If a majority of the employees votes against union representation, the unit is
not represented by the union, no matter if workers individually choose to be union members
or not. In the event of a lawfully-called strike, unions are allowed under the NLRA to ne
members that still decide to work.
An appropriate bargaining unit, according to the NLRA, is a group of employees in a
workplace that meets the legal test of sucient community of interest to be represented
by the union, whereby managers and supervisors are excluded from any bargaining unit.
According to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), professional employees who engage
in predominantly intellectual and not in routine mental, manual, or mechanical work are
excluded from bargaining units with manual and routine workers, since they do not share a
community of interests.
The structure of bargaining in the U.S. is highly decentralized with the estimated number of
separate collective bargaining agreements ranging between 170,000 and 190,000 according to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Most collective bargaining in the private sector takes place at
the level of the individual rm (cf. Traxler, 1994; Nickell and Layard, 1999).
3.5 A Model of Occupational Decisions and Union
Formation
In this section, we introduce labor unions into the multi-sectoral search and matching model
developed by Albertini et al. (2017). There are two types of workers, abstract and non-abstract.
Non-abstract workers are heterogeneous and dier with respect to their ability η, which is
uniformly distributed. For each ability level, there is a continuum of workers. Abstract workers
are assumed to be homogenous. As depicted in Figure 3.3, workers can be specialized in
manual, routine, or abstract tasks. Upon becoming unemployed, workers previously employed




To ease notation, and in line with the empirical evidence in Smith (2013), we abstract from other switches. Thus,
in our model there will be ’overqualied’ routine workers in manual occupations, but we rule out the case
of ’underqualied’ manual workers in routine occupations and ’underqualied’ routine workers in abstract
occupations. Neither the results on deunionization nor the results on polarization depend on the assumption
that manual workers are unable to switch to routine occupations. Note that because of falling prices for
computer capital, the relative demand for manual workers increases. Thus, switches from manual to routine
occupations only occur whenever the job-nding rate for routine workers is larger than the job-nding rate
for manual workers in a unionized environment. These inecient switches would only increase the speed
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Figure 3.3. Graphical Representation of the Model
In our model, unions arise endogenously through elections within rms.
13
When a simple
majority of the respective bargaining unit votes in favor of a union, wages are bargained
collectively between the respective rm and the union. The collective bargaining agreement
covers all workers in the bargaining unit regardless of the individual voting decision.
3.5.1 Labor Market Frictions
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions à la Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994). Search is directed, as there are labor sub-markets for each of the three occupations
i = a, r,m, where a, r, and m refer to abstract, routine, and manual occupations, respectively.
Within each pool, vacancies and unemployed workers are matched randomly in any period and
rms learn about the ability level of a worker upon matching. Given the number of vacancies vi
posted and the share of unemployed workers ui for every occupation i, the number of matches





i where 0 < ψ < 1 and i = a, r,m.




and the job nding probability is fi =
mi
ui
. The labor market tightness
is dened as the ratio θi ≡ viui . When the labor market is tight, many rms compete for few
unemployed workers. The job nding probability is high, but the job lling rate is low.
with which deunionization occurs. Additionally, Smith (2013) shows that the increase in abstract employment
is mainly driven by increased educational attainment and not by occupational switches. Thus, we let the labor
supply of abstract workers increase exogenously in our model.
13
Our production function features constant returns to scale. In contrast to Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017), rms
have no incentive to overhire high-wage and low-wage workers and to underhire middle-wage workers in our
model.
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3.5.2 Occupational Choice
Workers can be employed in an abstract, a routine, or a manual occupation. Existing jobs
are destroyed at the exogenous rates si, with i = a, r,m. The value function for unionized
(superscript u) manual workers is given by
W um(η) = w
u




m,+1(η) + (1− 1u,+1)W nm,+1(η)
)
+ smUm,+1(η)],
where β is the discount factor and wum(η) denotes the wage received by a manual union worker
with ability η. 1u is an indicator function with 1u = 1 if and only if the worker is a union
member. Thus, the term 1u,+1 indicates whether a worker in the rm is covered by a collective
bargaining regime in the next period.
In turn, the non-union (superscript n) manual workers’ value function is given by
W nm(η) = w
n




m,+1(η) + (1− 1u,+1)W nm,+1(η)
)
+ smUm,+1(η)],
where wnm(η) is the wage received by a manual non-union worker with ability η.
When unemployed, workers lose their union membership.
14
Therefore, the union and
non-union value functions for an unemployed manual worker are identical and given by




m,+1(η) + (1− 1u,+1)W nm,+1(η)
)
],
where zm(η) denotes the unemployment benets received from the government by a manual
worker with ability η.
Analogously, the value functions for abstract workers and routine workers are
W ua = w
u




a,+1 + (1− 1u,+1)W na,+1
)
+ saUa,+1],
W na = w
n




a,+1 + (1− 1u,+1)W na,+1
)
+ saUa,+1],








W ur (η) = w
u






r,+1(η) + (1− 1u,+1)W nr,+1(η)
)]
+ βsr max {Um,+1(η), Ur,+1(η)},
W nr (η) = w
n






r,+1(η) + (1− 1u,+1)W nr,+1(η)
)]
+ βsr max {Ur,+1(η), Um,+1(η)},









This is in line with Lewis (1989), who nds that unions are not perceived to represent the interests of the
unemployed.
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The term max {Um,+1(η), Ur,+1(η)} governs the occupational choice of routine workers. When-
ever the value of being an unemployed manual worker is larger than the value of being an
unemployed routine worker, the worker switches occupations. Thus, the equation dening the
endogenous occupational threshold between manual and routine occupations, ηm, is given by
Ur(ηm) = Um(ηm). (3.2)
3.5.3 Firms
The model features a continuum of nal good rms and intermediate rms. As the setup admits
the presence of a representative rm on each level, rm indices are dropped. To further ease
notation, we only use indices related to the union status of a rm when they are necessary to
understand the model mechanics.
The nal good-producing rm uses three homogeneous intermediate goods, Za, Zr, and
Zm, as input factors to produce the nal product Y . Intermediate goods are acquired at
their competitive factor prices.
15 Za is produced with abstract jobs L
a
, Zr with computer
technology K and routine workers Lr(η), and Zm with manual jobs L
m(η). Routine workers
and computer technologyK are close substitutes, whereas abstract workers are complementary





{Y − pZaZa − pZrZr − pZmZm}
s.t. Y ≤ [(AZαaZ1−αr )ρ + (AmZm)ρ]1/ρ,
where 0 < α < 1, −∞ < ρ < 1, A, and Am are parameters of the production function.
Intermediate rms maximize prots by choosing employment next period and the number of
vacancies to be posted subject to the rm-level employment constraint. Job creation comes at a
ow cost of ca, cr, or cm. The behavior of the intermediate rm in producing the intermediate
good Za, which is paid at price pZa , is described by
ΠZa = max
{
pZaZa − 1uwuaLa − (1− 1u)wnaLa − cava + βΠZa+1
}
s.t. Za ≤ La
La,+1 = (1− sa)La + qava,
15
This production structure is chosen in order to facilitate representation, as it allows for solving the maximization
problems of the good-producing rm and the intermediate rms consecutively. The job creation conditions
are identical if we instead assume that the good-producing rm directly uses manual, routine, and abstract
workers as input factors.
16
A nested production function is chosen in order to allow for larger complementarity in production between
abstract and routine than between routine and manual tasks.
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where La,+1 denotes the total abstract workforce next period. 1u is again an indicator function
with 1u = 1 indicating if the workforce in the rm is covered by a collective bargaining regime.




pZrZr − pKK − 1u
∫ η̄
ηm
wur (η)Lr(η)− (1− 1u)
∫ η̄
ηm












Lr,+1 = (1− sr)Lr + qrvr,
where 0 < µ < 1 and −∞ < σ < 1 are production parameters, η̄ denotes the upper bound
on the ability distribution for non-abstract workers, and ηm the endogenous ability threshold
between manual and routine workers. Following Albertini et al. (2017), rms can freely choose
their desired level of computer capital K at the price pK .
The behavior of the intermediate rm in producing the intermediate good Zm, which is paid
at price pZm , is described by
ΠZm = max
{
pZmZm − 1uwumLm − (1− 1u)wnmLm − cmvm + βΠZm+1
}
s.t. Zm ≤ Lm
Lm,+1 = (1− sm)Lm + qmvm.
As in Autor and Dorn (2013), workers in manual occupations are homogenous with respect to
their productivity in performing manual tasks. This implies that wages for manual workers are
constant, while wages for routine workers are increasing in the skill level η. Combining this
with the denition of ηm in equation (3.2), it is straightforward to see that workers with an
ability level lower than ηm work in manual occupations. The rst order conditions and the job
creation conditions are derived in Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2.
3.5.4 Wage Bargaining Regimes
Since we focus on the U.S., we want our union framework to be as close as possible to the
institutional framework presented in Section 3.4. Workers can decide to form a union on the
level of the good-producing rm, which bargains with the rm and distributes the surplus
according to a union wage schedule. Once new workers are hired, all workers vote to decide
whether to form a union or not. Abstract workers are excluded from the collective bargaining
unit with manual and routine workers. Thus, our model features two types of unions: one
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industrial union - aiming to cover workers of two dierent skill groups - and one craft union,
covering only abstract workers. If a union is established, the collective bargaining agreement
covers all workers in the bargaining unit, regardless of whether or not the individual worker
voted in favor of the union. The voting decision of an individual worker is endogenously
determined and depends directly upon the potential union wage premium. Workers vote in
favor of a union if the value of being a worker in a unionized rm is higher than the value of
being a worker in a non-unionized rm
W ui (η) > W
n
i (η), with i = a, r,m.
In the model, the number of voting thresholds above or below which workers in a bargaining
unit vote against the union depend on the choice of the union wage schedule. The thresholds
are denoted by ηul and η
u,a
l with l ∈ [1, 2, ...], where the superscript a denotes the union for
abstract workers.
If a majority of the bargaining unit votes against a collective bargaining agreement, workers
in this bargaining unit are not represented by the union and wages are negotiated individually.
Union and non-union wages are both determined by generalized Nash bargaining over the
match surplus. However, the surplus that is bargained over diers between the two bargaining
regimes: non-union workers bargain individually over their marginal product, whereas the
union bargains over the total match surplus of all workers in the bargaining unit.
Individual Bargaining
If a majority of the manual and routine workers votes against a union, each worker bargains
individually with the rm. Denoting the worker’s weight in the bargaining process by γi ∈ [0, 1],
this implies the following sharing rule for individual bargaining




with i = a, r,m,
where W ni (η) is the asset value of employment for non-union members, Ui(η) is the value of
being unemployed, and Jni (η) is the value of the marginal non-union worker of type i and
ability η to the rm. The resulting wage schedules are
wna = γ
apZa + γ
acaθa + (1− γa) za (3.3)
for workers in abstract jobs,
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wnr (η) = γ
rpZryr(η) + γ
rcrθr + (1− γr) zr(η) (3.4)
for workers in routine jobs, and
wnm = γ
mpZm + γ
mcmθm + (1− γm) zm(η) (3.5)
for workers in manual jobs.
17
It follows that the wages resulting from individual bargaining are given by the sum of the
marginal productivity of the workers in each occupation, the search returns, and the outside
option.
Collective Bargaining
We consider unions which negotiate wages on behalf of all covered workers within a rm and
thus bargain over the total surplus of all union members. We make the following assumptions
based on the union framework in the U.S. outlined in Section 3.4:
Assumption 1. All workers that are covered by a collective bargaining agreement are union
members.
Assumption 2. The union can force all of its members to strike.
Under these assumptions, if no agreement on wages can be reached, all members of the
respective bargaining unit in the unionized rm go on a strike and the rm can only produce
using the remaining workers and computer capital.
Our approach only pins down the share of the surplus going to the workers, not how it
is distributed among them. It is well-established in the literature that unions induce wage
compression, that individual union wage premia decrease in the skill level of the worker, and
that craft unions tend to negotiate higher union wage premia compared to industrial unions
(cf. Card et al., 2004; Streeck, 2005). To keep the degrees of freedom in choosing the wage
schedule small, we assume the simplest wage schedule that is in line with these observations:
unions set a constant wage for all workers in the bargaining unit.
18
This accords with evidence
in Fitzenberger et al. (2006), who show that unions tend to prefer wage equality over higher
average wages. It follows that union wages are given by
wu = Su/(Lm + Lr) (3.6)
17
See Appendix B.3 for a detailed derivation of the wage schedules.
18
The evaluation in Appendix B.5 establishes that the main mechanism behind falling union membership rates in
our model is robust to alternative union wage schedules.
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Under collective bargaining the outside option of a union member is not the value of being
unemployed but the value of being a union member during a strike. Therefore, denoting the
industrial union’s weight in the bargaining process by γu ∈ [0, 1], the following surplus sharing






















i (η) d η
})1−γu
with i = r,m,
where W ui (η) is the asset value of employment for manual and routine union members with
productivity η and W u,si (η) is the value of being a union member during a strike. Zi is the
production of the manual or routine intermediate good and Z ′i is the production in the manual
or routine sector when workers are on a strike, which is compensated at price p′Zi .












u,s d η (3.8)
with i = r,m,
where wu,s denotes the wage received by a worker during a strike, regardless of occupation
and ability. Note that the total surplus of the industrial union is a function of the productivity
of all manual and routine workers, while the non-union wage is a function of the individual
productivity of the respective worker.
Cra Union
Analogously, denoting the craft union’s weight in the bargaining process by γua ∈ [0, 1], the





a −W u,sa ])
γu (pZaZa − p′ZaZ ′a − Lawua)1−γu ,
where W ua is the asset value of employment for craft union members and W
u,s
a is the value
of being a union member during a strike. Za is the production of the abstract intermediate
19
See Appendix B.4 for a detailed derivation.
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good and Z ′a is the production in the abstract sector when workers are on a strike, which is
compensated at price p′Za .
Thus, the total surplus received by the craft union Sua is given by
Sua = γ
u
a (pZaZa − p′ZaZ
′
a) + (1− γu)Lawu,sa . (3.9)
3.5.5 Households, Government Expenditures, and Transfers
In the model, there is one household for each occupation and for each employment status, i.e.,
employed and unemployed. Households own the rm and consume the nal good Y . There
are no savings. For each worker the budget constraint is given by
C = I
with I ∈ {wna , wnr (η), wur , wnm, wum, za, zr(η), zm(η)}.
Since the government pays out unemployment benets, government expenditures are
G = zaua +
∫ η̄
η
(zr(η)ur + zm(η)um) d η.
Firms can generate prots, which are given by
Ω = ΠZa + ΠZr + ΠZm .
Transfers received by households are therefore
Γ = −G+ Ω.
Total consumption in the economy is then given by the sum of individual wages, individual
benets, and the transfers.
20
3.5.6 Equilibrium
With the model completely described, we dene the equilibrium.
Denition 2. An equilibrium is dened as a set of i) rms’ policy functions; ii) households’ policy
functions; iii) a union wage schedule; iv) prices; and v) a law of motion for the aggregate states,
such that: i) for each rm the rm’s policies satisfy the rms’ rst order conditions and the job
creation conditions; ii) for each household the households’ policy functions satisfy the households’
rst order conditions; iii) the wage is determined through individual or collective bargaining; iv)
the choices given the aggregate states clear the markets; and v) the law of motion for the exogenous
20
This allows us to abstract from the distribution of transfers to households. The results remain unchanged when
lump-sum transfers are assumed instead.
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aggregate states is consistent with individual decisions and with the process for computer capital
prices.
3.5.7 Eects of Routine-Biased Technical Change
It is well-established in the literature, that routine-biased technical change generates polar-
ization in models of the labor market (cf. Autor and Dorn, 2013; Albertini et al., 2017). In
our model, polarization is driven by occupational switches from previous routine workers to
manual occupations. This result is formalized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Routine-biased technical change increases the incentives for previous routine
workers to switch to manual occupations if σ > 0 and σ > (1− α)ρ.
Proof. See Appendix B.5 for a proof of Proposition 3.
Thus, our model features polarization, as long as σ, the elasticity of substitution between
computer capital and routine labor, is large enough. Intuitively, in order for routine-biased
technical change to increase the incentives for occupational switches, capital and routine tasks
need to be substitutes and they need to be better substitutes than routine and manual tasks in
the production of the nal good.
Routine-biased technical change, by increasing the capital stock, raises the productivity of
manual workers by more compared to the productivity of routine workers. This leads to higher
relative wages and job-nding rates for manual workers. Thus, the incentives for previous
routine workers to switch to manual occupations increase. We add to this well-known result
by demonstrating that routine-biased technical change additionally leads to deunionization in
our model. Proposition 4 summarizes the main mechanism.
Proposition 4. Routine-biased technical change reduces the incentives for manual workers to
vote in favor of union coverage if the intermediate good produced by abstract labor, routine labor,
and computer capital is a substitute to the intermediate good produced by manual labor, i.e. ρ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.5 for a proof of Proposition 4.
Intuitively, falling computer capital prices imply lower marginal costs of production. This
increases the demand for workers in all three occupations. However, because of the complemen-
tarity of computer capital and routine workers in production, there is a negative substitution
eect that reduces the demand for routine workers. Their marginal productivity increases by
less than the marginal productivity of manual workers. Thus, the non-union wages of manual
workers increase by more than the non-union wages of routine workers. The increasing relative
demand for manual workers in response to the drop in the price of computer capital increases
the size of the surplus the union can extract, while the negative substitution eect on the
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relative demand for routine workers tends to work in the opposite direction. Since unions
set identical wages for manual and routine workers, routine workers benet from the higher
relative demand for manual workers, while manual workers suer from the lower relative
demand for routine workers, i.e. in the union the positive demand eect for manual workers is
partially absorbed by routine workers. This directly implies that non-union wages for manual
workers grow by more than union wages. Furthermore, the increase in the amount of capital
used in production worsens the bargaining position of unions, as a potential strike becomes less
harmful for the rm. This additionally dampens union wage growth compared to non-union
wage growth. Thus, the incentives to unionize decrease unambiguously for manual workers.
Note that the mechanism we emphasize here is in line with the literature on union mem-
bership decisions. Empirical studies, including DiNardo et al. (1996) and Rueda et al. (2002),
document that unions have become less eective in redistributing earnings over the last
decades. This argument is taken up and extended in Baccaro and Locke (1998) and Checchi
et al. (2010), who both highlight disillusion about potential wage growth as the driving force
behind declining union membership rates among the least skilled workers.
The eect of routine-biased technical change on the voting incentives for routine workers
is ambiguous and depends on the larger union wage growth due to the relatively larger
productivity growth of manual workers and the lower union wage growth due to the larger
amount of capital. In the quantitative evaluation, the incentives for routine workers to vote
in favor of a collective bargaining agreement monotonically decrease with falling computer
capital prices. However, even if the incentives were to increase for the lower-skilled routine
workers, manual workers would still drive deunionization, as they make up between 46% and
53% of the bargaining unit inside rms.
3.6 antitative Analysis
In this section all the parameters discussed above are calibrated to match dierent aspects of
U.S. data for 1983. In line with empirical data, we let computer capital prices fall by 48% until
2005. We use the calibrated model to quantify the eect on the occupational choice of workers
and on union elections. For the simulation we choose a setting with heterogeneous unions
that dier with respect to their bargaining powers γu and γua . We consider an economy that
consists of a number N of independent islands, where each island represents a set of rms in
an industry. This is in line with the empirical literature, as evidence in Tüzemen and Willis
(2013) suggests that polarization is also mainly driven by within-industry changes. All islands
are identical except for the bargaining power of the potential union. The performance of the
model is evaluated along several dimensions, especially with regard to the empirical evidence
on deunionization in the U.S. We focus on steady states as we are mainly interested in the




The model is calibrated to quarterly frequency. Target values pertain to economy-wide averages.
Table 3.4 lists the exact parameter values as well as the source that encourages the specic
choice. We rst calibrate the discount factor β to a conventional value of 0.99, which implies
an annual interest rate of 4%. Next, we calibrate the labor market variables. The separation
rates of manual and routine workers are set to the standard value of sm = sr = 0.1 (Shimer,
2005). Following Albertini et al. (2017), we set the separation rate of abstract workers to the
lower value of sa = 0.05.
The matching eciencies are calibrated in order to match the average job-nding rate
between 1983 and 2005 reported in Shimer (2005). Under this calibration the job-nding rate
increases with the skill level of workers. A large literature documents no or only small eects
of unionization on employment: Frandsen (2012) and Montgomery (1989) on the aggregate
level, Boal and Pencavel (1994) on the industry level, and DiNardo and Lee (2004) on the rm
level. Furthermore, using linked employer-employee data, Brändle and Goerke (2018) argue
that negative employment eects might be caused by selection in cross-sectional studies. We
take this evidence into account by calibrating the matching eciency on unionized islands to
match the same job-nding rates as on non-unionized islands.
Vacancy posting costs are chosen to correspond on average to 35% of a worker’s quarterly
steady state wage, which lies well in the range of values found in the literature (cf. Garín, 2015;
Michaillat, 2012). For simplicity, unemployment benets and strike pay are both set to zero.
21
All production and skill specic parameters are set in order to match data on employment
shares in 1983 (30.7% manual, 35.7% routine, and 33.6% abstract workers), as well as the
abstract employment share of 40.9% in 2005. This leaves manual and routine employment
shares in 2005 as untargeted moments to gauge the performance of the model. The growth
rates of computer capital prices gpK and abstract labor supply gLSa are calibrated to match a
drop in computer capital prices by 48% and an increase in the abstract employment share of
7.3 percentage points.
Depending on birth cohort, age group, and survey data (Census/ACS, CPS, NLSY, PSID, and
SIPP), the dierence in wages between high school graduates and college graduates amounts
to 10%-29%. The average Mincer college wage premium – over age groups, birth cohorts, and
survey data – amounted to roughly 15% to 20% in the U.S. in 1983 (cf. Ashworth and Ransom,
2019).
22
Setting the bargaining power of abstract workers to γna = 0.8 and the bargaining
power of manual and routine workers to γnm = γ
n
r = 0.5 yields a college wage premium of 17%
in the model in 1983 while leaving the average worker bargaining power in the standard range
between 0.4 and 0.6.
23
21
The results are robust to alternative parameter choices.
22
Mincer college wage premium refers to a wage premium that is adjusted for observable skills using the model
proposed by Mincer (1974). Typically, the Mincer wage premium is roughly half the size of the raw wage
premium.
23
The college wage premium can be calculated when assuming that the individual skill η refers to the educational
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Table 3.4. Calibrated Parameters
Symbol Interpretation Value Source
β Discount factor 0.99 Annual interest rate of 4%
sm Manual eparation rate 0.1 Garín (2015)
sr Routine separation rate 0.1 Garín (2015)
sa Abstract separation rate 0.05 Albertini et al. (2017)
Ψm Manual matching eciency 0.25 Job-nding rate of 0.56
Ψr Routine matching eciency 0.33 Job-nding rate of 0.56
Ψa Abstract matching eciency 0.8 Job-nding rate of 0.56
ψ Unemployment-elasticity of matching 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
cm Manual recruiting costs 0.3 35% of wages
cr Routine recruiting costs 0.3 35% of wages
ca Abstract recruiting costs 0.5 35% of wages
A Productivity routine and abstract input 3.4 Occupational shares in 1983
Am Productivity of manual input 0.77 Occupational shares in 1983
α Marginal return to abstract labor 0.45 Occupational shares in 1983
ρ Production parameter 0.65 Occupational shares in 1983
σ Production parameter 0.74 Albertini et al. (2017)
µ Production parameter 0.5 Albertini et al. (2017)
η Lower bound on skill 0.48 Occupational shares in 1983
η̄ Upper bound on routine skill 1.44 Occupational shares in 1983
gLSa
Growth rate of abstract labor supply 0.015 Abstract employment in 2005
gpK Growth rate of computer capital prices -0.029 Investment prices in 2005
γm Manual Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Midpoint of literature values
γr Routine Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Midpoint of literature values
γa Abstract Worker’s bargaining power 0.8 College Wage premium 1983
γu Union bargaining power 0.51 - 1 Non-Abstract Union Membership
γua Craft Union bargaining power 0.88 - 1 Abstract Union Membership
The union bargaining power of the potential unions is assumed to be equally distributed
– on the interval between 0.51 and 1 for the potential industrial unions and on the interval
between 0.88 and 1 for the potential craft unions.
24
With the bargaining power of the most
powerful unions set to one, a lower bound of 0.88 on the bargaining power of the unions
for abstract workers matches the union membership rate of 16.6% in 1983 reported in the
Union Membership and Coverage Database constructed by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) for
workers in abstract occupations. Given this calibration, a lower bound of 0.51 for industrial
attainment of otherwise identical workers. If we further assume that on average manual workers have high
school education, abstract workers a college degree, and routine workers some college or an associates degree,
than the college wage premium is given by the ratio of abstract to manual wages in the model.
24
The large dierences between the union bargaining powers and the individual bargaining power of a worker are
necessary because under collective bargaining workers are not lost to the rm when bargaining breaks down.
If we instead assume that the rm loses its workforce when no agreement is reached, the calibration targets
for the union bargaining power would be substantially lower than under individual bargaining. The reason
behind this is that the union bargains over the average product of all workers in the bargaining unit, while
each individual worker only bargains over his or her marginal product. The results are robust to alternative
intervals of the union bargaining power.
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Table 3.5. Unionization Rates: Model versus Data
1983 2005
Data Model Data Model
Overall 19.5% 19.5% 12.9% 10.2%
Manual Workers 24.8% 21.0% 14.5% 6.3%
Routine Workers 17.7% 21.0% 10.2% 6.3%
Abstract Workers 16.6% 16.6% 13.4% 15.9%
Note: Data for union membership rates by occupations are cal-
culated using the Union Membership and Coverage Database
constructed by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003) and include all
wage and salary workers. We use the occupational classica-
tion by Autor and Dorn (2013). The overall union membership
rate is calculated using the employment shares reported in
Autor and Dorn (2013) and the union membership rates by
occupation.
unions matches the overall union membership rate of 19.5% in 1983, calculated using the Union
Membership and Coverage Database and the employment shares from Autor and Dorn (2013).
3.6.2 Deunionization
As capital prices fall, the unions with the lowest bargaining power fail to gain majority support
in the subsequent elections and are terminated.
25
Our model performs well in generating
declining union membership rates between 1983 and 2005. The predicted and actual changes
are given in Table 3.5, with the only targeted values being the overall and the abstract union
membership rate in 1983.
The union membership rate falls by 9.3 percentage points from 19.5% to 10.2% in the model,
compared to a drop by 6.6 percentage points from 19.5% to 12.9% in the data. The union
membership rate for manual workers drops by 14.7 percentage points (10.3 in the data), the
membership rate for routine workers by 14.7 percentage points (7.5 in the data), and the
membership rate for abstract workers by 0.7 percentage points (2.5 in the data).
26
As abstract workers are unionized in a homogenous group, the higher marginal productivity
due to technical change aects union and non-union wages for these workers similarly. How-
ever, under individual bargaining the higher demand for abstract workers increases the cost
25
This model prediction is supported by evidence in the 2004 NLRB Performance and Accountability Report.
Going from 1994 to 2004, the number of led representation petitions has dropped by 25% and the share of
won elections has increased by over ve percentage points.
26
The model slightly overpredicts the decline in the membership rates for manual and routine workers and
underpredicts the decline in membership rates for abstract workers. Possible explanations for the former
are workers that remain union members despite declining monetary incentives out of habit, due to peer
pressure, or because of other non-monetary membership advantages. The latter might arise because we ignore
heterogeneity among abstract workers.
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Table 3.6. Simulated Changes in Unionization Rates – Decomposition, 1983–2005
Percentage Point Share
Total Change -10.27 100%
Within-occupation -9.97 97.08%
Between-occupation -0.30 2.92%
Note: The relative contribution of the within-occupation
and between-occupation component is calculated using the
methodology described in Section 3.2.
of hiring a worker in the next period. The outside option under collective bargaining, i.e., a
strike of abstract workers, is associated with the same costs as before. Thus, the incentives to
unionize decrease slightly for abstract workers but by less compared to manual and routine
workers.
Result 1. The drop in the overall union membership rate between 1983 and 2005 is mainly driven
by decreasing membership rates within occupations and not by changing employment shares.
Using the same methodology as in Section 3.2, we calculate the within-occupation and
between-occupation component for the three occupations in our model. The results are
summarized in Table 3.6. Deunionization does not only work entirely through changes within
industries (by construction) but also mainly through changes within occupations rather than
through changing employment shares: over 95% of the changes in union membership rates
between 1983 and 2005 are driven by the within-occupation component in our model.
Result 2. Despite falling union membership rates, the average union wage premium stays roughly
constant between 1983 and 2005.
Estimates of the average union - non-union wage dierential across workers range from
close to zero (cf. Bryson, 2002; Booth and Bryan, 2004) to 25% (cf. Hirsch and Schumacher,
2004). Recent studies by DiNardo and Lee (2004) and Frandsen (2012), who focus on employer
and union election data, nd only very small or even negative union wage premia on average.
Additionally, Streeck (2005) argues that because of its structure, industrial unions tend to exhibit
even lower wage premia on average compared to craft unions.
Farber et al. (2018) emphasize that existing models of union formation have trouble explaining
the observation of a relatively constant union wage premium in times of rapidly declining
union membership rates, as the increasing use of capital and high-skilled workers reduces the
value of low-skilled workers for the rm and thus worsens the bargaining position of unions.
A similar eect is at work in our model. However, as our model predicts that unions with the
lowest bargaining power will be the ones that are terminated, union termination in the model
is associated with an increasing average union bargaining power. These countervailing eects
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Table 3.7. Simulated Union Wage Premium and Skill Ratio
1983 2005
Union Wage Premium 0.6% -0.6%
Skill Ratio Non-unionized Workers 0.53 0.62
Skill Ratio Unionized Workers 0.4 1.75
Note: The skill ratio in the model is dened as the ratio of
abstract to non-abstract workers.
imply relatively constant union wage premia despite a sharp decline in union membership
rates. The evolution of the average union wage premium in the model is given in Table 3.7.
Despite a drop of close to 10 percentage points in the union membership rate, the average
union wage premium decreases by only 1.2 percentage points in the model.
Result 3. The relative skill level of union members increases between 1983 and 2005.
Existing models of union formation mostly rely upon declining membership rates among
the highest-skilled workers in order to explain deunionization. This stands in sharp contrast
to the union membership data in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). In our model the union
membership rate of abstract workers decreases only slightly. Consider an increase in the skill
level of a worker and how this aects his or her probability of being a union member. Given
the predicted changes in unionization rates between 1983 and 2005, an increase in the skill
level of a worker decreases the probability of being a union member in 1983 but increases the
probability of being a union member in 2005. This coincides with evidence on the eect of
educational attainment on the union status of workers in Farber et al. (2018). The reason is
that the union membership rate of abstract workers decreases by less compared to the union
membership rates of the less-skilled manual and routine workers, both in the data and in our
model. The ratio of abstract to non-abstract workers inside and outside of unions in our model
is reported in Table 3.7.
3.6.3 Polarization
As shown in Section 3.5.7, falling computer capital prices lead to employment adjustments, with
the lowest-skilled routine workers deciding to switch to manual occupations upon becoming
unemployed.
The employment shares of the three occupational groups in the model and in the data are
given in Table 3.8. The share of manual workers increases from 30.7% to 31.1% in the data and
to 31.0% in the model between 1983 and 2005, while the employment share of routine workers
decreases from 35.7% to 28.0% in the data and to 27.9% in the model. Figure 3.4 displays the
respective percentage point changes in the employment share for each occupation.
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Table 3.8. Employment Shares in 1983 and 2005: Model versus Data
1983 2005
Data Model Data Model
Manual 30.7% 30.7% 31.1% 31.0%
Routine 35.7% 35.7% 28.0% 27.9%
Abstract 33.6% 33.6% 40.9% 40.9%
The share of workers in each occupation is con-
structed using the dataset and the occupational
classication by Autor and Dorn (2013).
Employment changes are less pronounced in unionized rms: as wages for manual and
routine workers grow equally, the lowest-skilled unionized routine workers have no incentive to
switch to manual jobs.
27
While there is no direct evidence on the polarization of the employment
structure in unionized versus non-unionized rms, our model prediction is supported by two
strands of the literature. First, Calmfors et al. (2001) and Rogers and Streeck (1995) argue that
in many countries the management is under the obligation to at least consult with the relevant
unions over restructuring and layo plans. In these cases union ocials tend to prefer policies
that favor those workers who are most likely to be union members, in order to improve their
chances in future elections. Thus, unions will likely oppose plans that reinforce polarization.
Second, Connolly et al. (1986), Hirsch and Link (1987), and more recently Bradley et al. (2017)
argue that unions have detrimental eects on innovation and technology adaption. As technical
change is the most important driving force behind polarization, less innovation is likely to
be accompanied by less polarization. This implies, as our model predicts, that deunionization
amplies polarization.
Even though the manual employment share remains roughly unchanged, there has been
substantial employment reallocation with more than 10% of all routine workers in 1983 deciding
to switch to manual occupations. About 15% of the occupational switches in our model are
triggered by the termination of unions. When low-skilled routine workers are unable to nd
unionized jobs, which would pay them a substantial union wage premium, their incentives
to switch occupations increase. While the model predicts routine-biased technical change to
be the main explanation for job market polarization, deunionization substantially amplies
employment changes.
The changes in employment are accompanied by wage changes. The model predicts wages
for abstract, routine, and manual workers to grow by 10%, 8%, and 8.5%, respectively. Although
a bit smaller, these changes accord with the pattern of wage changes by skill levels reported in
Autor and Dorn (2013) for the time period between 1980 and 2005.
27
This result is independent of the specic choice of the union wage schedule and holds as long as union wages
for routine workers are higher compared to union wages of manual workers.
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Figure 3.4. Percentage Point Changes in Employment Shares, 1983–2005: Model versus
Data
Note: The share of workers in each occupation is constructed using the dataset and the occupational classication by Autor and Dorn (2013).
3.6.4 Inequality
In contrast to the large eect on employment changes, deunionization has only modest eects
on wage changes. Going from 1983 to 2005, the Gini index in our model increases by 18%
compared to an increase of 12% for U.S. data.28 However, since union wage premia are small
on average and the unions with the lowest bargaining power are terminated, this increase in
inequality is almost entirely driven by the increasing employment share of abstract workers
and by their increasing relative wages. The small overall eects of deunionization on wage
inequality in our model accord with the empirical ndings in DiNardo et al. (1996), Frandsen
(2012), and Farber et al. (2018).
The eects of deunionization for those groups that traditionally receive a high union wage
premium, the lower middle-skilled workers, are substantial. For the lowest-skilled previously
unionized routine workers, i.e., those workers that lose their union wage premium going from
1983 to 2005 and subsequently switch occupations, the wage growth would be 60% larger if
they were covered by one of the remaining unions.
3.7 Discussion and Policy Implications
While routine-biased technical change hurts middle-wage workers, job market polarization
per se, in the sense of changing employment shares, does not. In the model, the possibility to
switch occupations allows labor supply to adjust to the changes in labor demand and thereby
to partly oset the wage eects of routine-biased technical change. However, Kambourov
28
The Gini index in our model is computed using wage ventiles.
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and Manovskii (2009), Gathmann and Schönberg (2010), and Cortes and Gallipoli (2017) show
that occupational switching costs are large. Therefore, as proposed for example in Autor et al.
(2003), policies that simplify job switches or that aim at making them less costly for workers
could serve to dampen income inequality caused by routine-biased technical change.
Additionally, our analysis has shown that, even though the overall eect of deunionization
on income inequality is small, there are large eects for lower middle-skilled workers. Taking
into account evidence from Frandsen (2012), who reports that most union elections are very
closely contested, even small policy changes could lead to large eects on income inequality
for these workers.
We briey consider the eects of two policies that aim at supporting lower middle-skilled
workers. The rst policy simply abolishes union elections after the rst election in 1983
and maintains the established unions regardless of worker preferences. While this approach
prevents deunionization, it also prevents ecient deunionization in the sense that even unions
generating a highly negative average wage premium would be maintained. The second policy
lowers the necessary voting threshold for unions. For specic voting thresholds, this policy
achieves the same results as abolishing elections, with identical downsides. However, such an
intervention is not well suited to stop the overall trend of declining union membership rates
and the threshold would have to be regularly adjusted to changes in the economy. Furthermore,
low threshold values, apart from being dicult to justify, could in principle lead to the founding
of further inecient unions.
In our simulation, deunionization can always be prevented by adjusting the union wage
schedule towards less equality inside the unionized rms. However, empirical evidence sug-
gests that rigid organizational structures partly prevent unions from meeting today’s chal-
lenges. Waddington (2005) contends that trade union practices are perceived as formal and
old-fashioned and that the representative structures inside unions are often inappropriate for
the participation of all members. Bryson et al. (2016) argue that union representatives have
very long tenure and tend to become less representative of the membership over their term of
oce.
While unionization rates decline across all age groups, according to data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, membership rates for workers aged between 16 and 24 declined at twice the
rate of overall membership between 2002 and 2012. Data on the evolution of the median age
of union members points in the same direction: Dunn and Walker (2016) stress that over half
of all U.S. union members are between 45 and 64 years of age. Thus, it seems that unions are
mostly controlled and inuenced by older members that might display a tendency to stick to
established practices. Bryson et al. (2016) argue that the decline in union membership rates
across countries is negatively related to the degree of progressiveness of the unions. Thus, one
straightforward policy suggestion is to restrict the tenure of union representatives to ensure




This paper explores the eect of routine-biased technical change on both the occupational
and the union-membership choice of workers. We use broad state-level labor market data to
illustrate that the decline in unionization rates is more pronounced in U.S. states with a larger
decline in the employment share of routine-intensive occupations. We additionally show that
this decline is not driven by a simple composition eect but mainly by within-industry and
within-occupation changes. Building on this observation, we develop a model that endogenizes
both the occupational and the union membership decision in a search and matching framework.
We provide analytical results and use the calibrated model to show that routine-biased
technical change, represented by a sharp drop in computer capital prices, not only generates
employment and wage polarization but also deunionization. The drop in computer capital
prices reduces the demand for routine workers, while the demand for abstract and manual
workers increases. The changing demand structure inuences the surplus unions can extract
and thereby also the individual union wage premium of workers. Manual workers, who benet
from the changing demand structure, are discouraged from voting in favor of a collective
bargaining agreement. As wage gains for manual workers would be distributed more equally
between manual and routine workers by the union, manual workers are better o bargaining
individually with the rm. Former routine workers, when faced with lower wages compared to
manual workers, decide to switch occupations.
We demonstrate that this eect can lead to a change in the voting outcome, with the majority
of the workforce of previously unionized rms now voting against unionization and in favor of
individual bargaining. In an economy in which unions dier with respect to their bargaining
power, routine-biased technical change leads to a large decrease in union membership rates,
because those unions with the lowest bargaining power are terminated. As about 15% of all
job switches are triggered by deunionization, this contributes substantially to employment
polarization. While overall eects on income inequality are small, low- to middle-skilled
previously unionized workers are severely aected.
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4.1 Introduction
Do ideological tendencies inuence court rulings? An exhaustive literature suggests that the
answer to this question is: Yes! (cf. Cohen and Yang, 2019; Taha, 2004; Songer et al., 1994).
However, do general ideological tendencies of the judiciary also have direct economic eects?
And if yes, how large are these? In this paper, we aim to ll a gap in the literature by providing
answers to these important questions.
Ideological tendencies of the judiciary are generally considered to be of paramount impor-
tance in the United States. Among others, U.S. Circuit Judge Michael McConnell, a potential
nominee to the Supreme Court during the presidency of George W. Bush, is frequently cited
arguing that Supreme Court nominations are among the most important decisions of a U.S.
president. The conrmation battles regarding President Trump’s Supreme Court nominees Neil
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh in the U.S. Senate corroborate this view. Unsurprisingly, the
appointment of conservative federal judges has been one of most prominent topics in both of
Donald Trump’s presidential campaigns and one of the major appeals to moderate Republicans.
In light of this perceived importance, it is surprising that all existing evidence on the economic
impact of the Supreme Court is either case-based or purely anecdotal (cf. Epstein et al., 2013;
Gilman, 2014). In this paper, we document heterogenous eects of Supreme Court ideology on
district court rulings across U.S. states and exploit these dierences in order to identify the
economic impact of jurisdiction. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we move
the focus of the literature away from the individual judge and towards the judiciary in general.
Second, using an extensive dataset, we provide estimates of the degree to which economic
conditions in the U.S. are inuenced by ideological tendencies of the judiciary.
While the importance and inuence of the Supreme Court is undisputed, it can only hear
about 150 cases every year. The decisions made by federal courts thus constitute the last word
in thousands of cases every year. A large literature (cf. Boyd, 2015a; Benesh and Reddick, 2002;
Cannon and Johnson, 1984; Wasby, 1970; Songer et al., 1994) establishes that lower courts
tend to follow the path set by the Supreme Court when the Supreme Court’s orientation is
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clear and unambiguous, wheras an ideologically rather neutral or ambiguous approach of the
Supreme Court gives judges some leeway which they can use to follow their own ideology.
This behavior of judges is usually attributed to reversal aversion (cf. Miceli and Coşgel, 1994;
Posner, 2005; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2008; Randazzo, 2008). We conclude that one can expect
regional heterogeneity in the eect of changes in the ideology of the Supreme Court on court
decisions, which can be used to identify the eects of judicial ideology. Building on Miceli and
Coşgel (1994), we develop a model of judge decision-making with ideological preferences and
reversal aversion that makes this argument explicit. The model predicts that a state is more
strongly aected by the changes in Supreme Court ideology since the late 1970s (from center to
clearly conservative, see Figure 4.1) the more liberal its district court judges are. The intuition
is as follows. In the late 1970s, with the Supreme Court rather balanced ideologically, both more
conservative and more liberal district court judges were, at least partly, able to inuence court
rulings according to their own ideology. With the Supreme Court shifting towards being more
conservative, all district courts issue rather conservative rulings. While rulings in conservative
districts remain rather conservative, liberal judges shy away from the risk of reputational
damage due to overturned rulings by also issuing more conservative rulings.
We conrm the predicted regional heterogeneity in the eects of Supreme Court ideology on
decisions by lower courts using an econometric procedure derived from the model. To this end,
we use data on rulings of federal district courts in close to 24,000 economic or labor-related
cases from the Carp-Manning U.S. District Court Database compiled by Carp and Manning
(2016). District court rulings are chosen because of three reasons. First, the federal court system
hears cases involving the laws and treaties of the U.S. Hence, a large share of lawsuits related
to economic issues are led in federal courts, while the state courts are mostly concerned with
trac, criminal, and civil cases. Second, rulings issued by the district courts are much more
likely to create a precedent than rulings at state courts and are thus relevant to a large number
of additional cases. Third, district courts have the last word in about 99% of the led federal
court cases, as only about 1% of all district court cases are reversed by higher courts (cf. Cohen
and Yang, 2019; Edwards, 2019; Eisenberg, 2004). We nd that an increase in conservatism at
the Supreme Court, in line with our model, strongly and signicantly increases the share of
conservative rulings in states with rather liberal district courts relative to the rulings in states
with rather conservative district courts.
Having established that the interaction between Supreme Court ideology and district court
ideology can be used as an instrument for exogenous variations in district court rulings along
the ideological spectrum, we use it to analyze the eect of court rulings on the labor market.
This borrows methodology from the trade and migration literatures, where researchers exploit
regional variation in the exposure to import competition (cf. Autor et al., 2013) or migrant
inows (cf. Dustmann et al., 2017) to identify causal eects of these phenomena. Specically,
we use an interaction term between time-varying Supreme Court ideology and a time-invariant
state-specic measure of the ideology of district court judges in regressions of labor market
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Figure 4.1. Ideological Leanings of the Supreme Court
Note: This graph depicts the ideal point estimates provided in the dataset to Bailey (2013) for the ideological leanings of the median Supreme
Court justice between 1978 and 2011. The estimates from Bailey (2013) are chosen over the estimates from Martin and Quinn (2002), as the
former estimates explicitly take into account the problem of agenda changes over time by using bridging information. This allows for the
use of the scores in a cardinal sense, whereas the estimates in Martin and Quinn (2002) can only be used as ordinal measures. However, both
estimates clearly show the shifts in ideological leanings of the Supreme Court towards the conservative end of the ideological spectrum since
the 1970s.
outcomes that include both time and state xed eects.
1
This exploits that court rulings in
more liberal states are more strongly aected by the Supreme Court’s rising conservatism,
such that the coecient on the interaction term is to be interpreted as a causal eect of
ideological tendencies of the judiciary. Put dierently, the econometric procedure isolates the
part of the change in regional district court rulings that is driven by developments at the U.S.
Supreme Court in Washington D.C. and therefore arguably exogenous to regional labor market
conditions.
Our empirical analysis suggests that an increase in the share of pro-business rulings at
district courts increases labor market uidity. Unemployment and unemployment duration
fall, while the job-nding rate and employment increase. However, on the downside, we nd
that more pro-business rulings tend to reduce wages and other measures of job quality while
accelerating the hollowing-out of the middle class, as union coverage and employment shares
in routine-intensive occupations and industries fall. Moreover, we also nd that conservative
1
We focus on labor market outcomes as labor earnings are the major source of income for most households and
thus a primary determinant of life satisfaction. With more conservative judges and justices tending to be rather
pro-business and more liberal judges rather pro-worker, ideological shifts in Supreme Court composition
aect decisions in cases regarding armative action, union rights, worker compensation upon rings, layos,
and the like. The Business Litigant Dataset for the terms between 1946 and 2011 and the fraction of votes
in favor of business in Epstein et al. (2013) reveal large eects of changes in Supreme Court composition
on rulings, especially for cases concerning economic issues. Seven of the ten Supreme Court justices least
favorable to businesses served between 1960 to 1970. In contrast, in 2011 ve of the nine serving Supreme
Court justices counted among the ten justices most favorable to businesses.
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court rulings contribute to increasing income inequality. Quantitatively, a ten percentage point
increase in the share of pro-business rulings in a state is associated with a reduction in the
state’s unemployment rate by about 0.7 percentage points relative to other states. Average
hourly wages fall by 1.7%, union coverage by 1.3 percentage points, and the employment share
in routine-intensive occupations by 0.6 percentage points. Income inequality, measured as the
90/10 ratio in family income, increases by 3.7%.
Over the 34 years in our sample, the trend towards pro-business rulings increased their
share by about 6 percentage points. A back-of-the-envelope calculation, assuming that general-
equilibrium eects of court rulings in other states are small, indicates that the rise in the share of
conservative court decisions from 1978 to 2011 can be expected to be responsible for a decrease
of 0.4 percentage points in the unemployment rate, a 1.1% reduction in wages, a fall in union
coverage of 0.8 percentage points, a 0.4 percentage point reduction in the routine employment
share, and an increase in the 90/10 income ratio of about 2.2%. In this light, increasing judicial
conservatism seems to have contributed, although in a moderate way, to important long-run
economic developments such as wage stagnation, deunionization, job market polarization, and
rising inequality.
Our main empirical results can be rationalized in a simple search and matching framework
which we extend by wrongful-termination lawsuits upon separation. In the model, a larger
share of pro-business rulings induces falling wages by eroding the bargaining power of workers.
Lower labor costs result in a larger number of posted vacancies and consequently in a higher
job-nding rate and in a lower unemployment rate.
Our results have important implications regarding the appointment and retirement of federal
judges. Due to lifetime appointments and increasingly strategic retirements on federal courts,
changing an established majority in the judiciary has become ever more dicult over the last
decades. This means that today’s decisions regarding the composition of the judiciary inuence
peoples’ lives for decades to come, even though future generations might have very dierent
preferences regarding societal trade-os, especially when taking into consideration the rapidly
changing composition of the U.S. population. Given that our results reveal quite strong eects
of judicial ideology, they lend support to term limits for federal judges, as they are proposed by
politicians from both sides of the aisle.
2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we give an overview of the
related literature. The eect of Supreme Court ideology on district court rulings is discussed
and estimated in Section 4.3. The ndings from this section are used to estimate the eect
of ideological tendencies of the judiciary on the labor market in Section 4.4. The results are
summarized in Section 4.5.
2




This paper is related to dierent strands of the literature, in particular to those analyzing the
determinants of labor market outcomes and of court rulings, respectively.
A number of important determinants of labor market uidity have been identied by the
literature. For example, ring costs have been shown to reduce job-nding rates both the-
oretically (cf. Wasmer, 2006) and in the data (cf. Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004). Kugler and
Saint-Paul (2004) and Autor et al. (2006a) document that exceptions to the employment at-will
doctrine (wrongful-discharge laws) reduce job-creation and lead to lower employment rates.
Acemoglu et al. (2001), among others, illustrate that employment protection laws reduce the
job-nding probability for aected groups. Cahuc et al. (2019) show that pro-worker rulings in
wrongful-termination cases reduce job-creation rates in aected rms. We contribute to this
eld by emphasizing that increasingly conservative court rulings in economic cases increase
both the employment rate and the job-nding rate.
We also contribute to the debate about the causes of incisive developments witnessed over
the last decades. Computerization, skill-biased technical change, and routine-biased technical
change are put forward as explanations for rising inequality (cf. Autor et al., 2006c), structural
change away from manufacturing industries (cf. Autor et al., 2003), polarizing changes in the
occupational employment structure at the expense of routine-intensive jobs (cf. Autor and
Dorn, 2013), and deunionization (cf. Dinlersoz and Greenwood, 2016). Our results complement
these explanations by showing that increasing conservatism of the judiciary accelerates all of
these developments.
Literature on the economic eects of court rulings is rare. Analyzing case composition,
rulings, and votes of Supreme Court justices over time, Epstein et al. (2013) conclude that the
Supreme Court has indeed become more favorable to businesses over the last decades. The
analysis does however not extend to the eect of the larger share of pro-business rulings on
actual economic conditions. Gilman (2014) argues that the Supreme Court reinforces economic
inequality by verbally analyzing selected Supreme Court rulings. Neither Epstein et al. (2013)
nor Gilman (2014) provide a systematic statistical evaluation of the economic impact of the
Supreme Court.
Due to our identication of exogenous variation in court rulings, our paper is also related
to the literature that discusses determinants of court rulings which are not directly related
to the case at hand. This literature has established that court rulings, conditional on case
characteristics, depend on aggregate conditions such as outside temperatures (cf. Heyes and
Saberian, 2019), media coverage on crime (cf. Philippe and Ouss, 2018), the success of local
sports teams (cf. Eren and Mocan, 2018), and the aggregate business cycle (cf. Ichino et al., 2003;
Marinescu, 2011). Furthermore, there is ample evidence that, conditional on case characteristics,
individual characteristics of judges at various levels of the judiciary have substantial eects on
court rulings. Kling (2006), Dahl et al. (2014), French and Song (2014), Aizer and Doyle Jr. (2015),
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Dobbie et al. (2018), Bernstein et al. (2019b), Bernstein et al. (2019a), and Cahuc et al. (2019)
all construct measures of judge leniency which dier substantially across judges.
3
Knepper
(2017) and Boyd et al. (2010) focus on judge gender, Welch et al. (1988), Chew and Robert E
(2009), Yang (2015), and Kastellec (2013) on judge race, and Glynn and Sen (2015) on the eect
of parenthood. The ideology or political aliation of judges is an exceptionally important
determinant of rulings. While this is undisputed for U.S. Supreme Court justices, empirical
evidence also emphasizes an important role of ideology in the lower courts, including the
federal district courts on which our analysis focuses. For example, Cohen and Yang (2019)
exploit random case assignment of judges within district courts and document substantial
eects of party aliation on criminal-sentencing decisions. Similar ideology eects in district
court rulings are reported by Tiede et al. (2010), Schanzenbach and Tiller (2007), Schanzenbach
and Tiller (2008), and Taha (2004).
A number of studies have addressed the interplay between a judge’s own ideological pref-
erences and the preferences of the judge’s superiors at higher courts, which is at the core of
our identication strategy. In particular, judges are generally considered to be reversal-averse
which lets them put their own ideological preferences last when these stand in suciently
strong conict with the ideologies of their superiors at higher courts. Our theoretical model
builds on Miceli and Coşgel (1994), who construct a model of judge decision-making under
reversal aversion. Posner (2005) and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2008) also consider theoretical
models where judges’ decisions are determined in a conict between their ideological prefer-
ences and their reversal aversion. Empirical evidence for reversal aversion by district court
judges is provided by, among others, Randazzo (2008). Boyd (2015b) documents that ideological
dierences between a district court judge and direct superiors at the circuit court indeed raises
the probability of reversal. Songer et al. (1994) understand the relation between the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals as a principle-agent relation where appellate judges try to
pursue their own ideological interests, but face incentives to follow the Supreme Court’s lead.
They document that appellate judges are highly responsive to the Supreme Court’s monitoring
practices, but they also nd a strong independent eect of appellate judges’ own ideologies
which indicates that they satisfy their own policy interests when weaker monitoring oers
them leeway. Similarly, Cohen and Yang (2019) document that the inuence of district court
judges’ ideology on rulings increases with the amount of posessed discretion. Zorn and Bowie
(2010) illustrate that the importance of judge ideology for rulings decreases as one moves down
the federal judicial hierarchy, which is in line with reversal aversion, as district courts are more
strongly monitored than courts of appeals and the Supreme Court is not monitored at all. Choi
et al. (2012) document that district court judges in circuits with ideologically uniform circuit
court judges follow the orientation of their superiors, suppressing their own ideology, while
3
These studies exploit the random case assignment of heterogeneous judges to identify the eects of criminal
sentencing (cf. Dobbie et al., 2018; Aizer and Doyle Jr., 2015; Kling, 2006), bankruptcies (cf. Bernstein et al.,
2019b,a), disability payments (cf. Dahl et al., 2014; French and Song, 2014), and ring costs (cf. Cahuc et al.,
2019).
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district court judges in circuits with ideologically diverse circuit judges nd it more dicult to
minimize their risk of reversal. All of these observations support the mechanism underlying
our identication approach.
Our results additionally contribute to this literature by exposing that the ideology of the
Supreme Court inuences decisions of district court judges in a way consistent with reversal
aversion.
4
4.3 The Eect of Supreme Court Ideology on District
Court Rulings
Analyzing district court rulings across U.S. states, we establish that a conservative ideological
shift of the Supreme Court induces an increase in the share of pro-business rulings in states
with liberal district courts relative to states with conservative district courts.
4.3.1 Theory
To x ideas, we present a simple model which guides our identication of the eects of Supreme
Court ideology on district court rulings. We build upon the model of judge decision-making
developed by Miceli and Coşgel (1994). In this model, we focus on a specic factor that
potentially determines case outcomes: judge ideology. While existing laws and precedent are
undoubtedly the most important predictors of case outcomes, there is a large literature that
exposes substantial eects of seemingly unrelated factors, see Section 4.2.
Judges have two sources of utility from a particular ruling r. The rst source of utility
originates from private preferences over the case at hand, V (r). This source of utility reects
what we summarize as ideological leanings and includes, for example, the political views and
the theory of the law of the judge. This utility component is larger, the closer the actual decision
r resembles the private preferences. The second source of utility originates from the judge’s
reputation. Reputational utility is given by R (r) and is meant to capture increased promotion
chances of the judge due to a better reputation. While Miceli and Coşgel (1994) focus on future
citations, our focus is on the probability of a decisions being reversed by higher courts, i.e., by
the circuit courts or in the last instance by the Supreme Court.
5
See Section 4.2 for an overview
4
While Songer et al. (1994) document that rulings at courts of appeals strongly respond to Supreme Court
orientation, Choi et al. (2012) argue that the Supreme Court only weakly aects courts of appeals, stating
the low rate at which decisions of courts of appeals are reversed at the Supreme Court. However, what they
interpret as a low risk of reversal on the side of appellate judges might simply be a sign of compliance. If
appellate judges are reversal-averse, they can be expected to issue decisions in a way that reduces the risk of
reversals, such that reversals will be rare in equilibrium. In this case, the threat of reversal is still an important
determinant of the decisions of appellate judges. Our empirical results clearly indicate that ideological leanings
of Supreme Court justices aect district court rulings – arguably passing through the courts of appeals – in a
way that is consistent with reversal aversion of both district and appellate judges.
5
For simplicity, the model only includes district court judges and the Supreme Court. However, the results from
a nested model version including circuit courts are qualitatively the same. The circuit courts can be thought of
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of the literature on reversal aversion.
We consider the representative (average) district court judge in state s, called judge s. The
utility of judge s at time t is given by
Us (rs,t) = Vs (rs,t) +R (rs,t) .
Overall utility is given by the private utility of judge s
Vs (rs,t) = −
κ
4
· (rs,t − dcis)2 ,
where dcis (for district court ideology) summarizes the ideological leaning and κ > 0 determines
the preference weight on ideology, and by the reputational utility of judge s
R (rs,t) = −q (rs,t, scit) ,
where q is the probability of reversal and scit is the ideology of the Supreme Court.
Based on Songer et al. (1994), we postulate
q (rs,t, scit) = sci
2
t · (x− scit)
2 /4.
This implies that a neutral Supreme Court (sci = 0) overturns neither clearly liberal nor clearly
conservative decisions and that an ideologically clear Supreme Court (sci = −1 or sci = 1)
overturns every decision that is fully at odds with its own ideology.
Under this assumption for the behavior of the Supreme Court, the optimal behavior of a
district court judge can be expressed as the following maximization problem
max
rs,t
−κ/4 · (rs,t − dcis)2 − sci2t · (rs,t − scit)
2 /4.
Maximization with respect to the decision rs,t results in the rst order condition
−2κ/4 (rs,t − dcis)− 2 · sci2t · (rs,t − scit) /4 = 0,








It follows that the optimal decision of a district court judge is a weighted average of the judge’s
own ideology dcis and Supreme Court ideology scit. The respective weights depend on the
preference parameter κ and on the unambiguity of the ideological orientation of the Supreme
as passing through the guidelines set by the Supreme Court to the district courts – potentially imperfectly so
because appellate judges may be able to incorporate their own ideological orientation.
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Court. Specically, when the Supreme Court is rather balanced ideologically (i.e., scit takes
values close to zero), the weight on dcis is close to one and rulings are mainly based on district
court judges own preferences. By contrast, when the Supreme Court has a clear ideological
leaning (i.e., sci takes values close to -1 or close to 1), rulings mainly depend on Supreme Court
guidance.
Next, assume that the ideological leaning of the Supreme Court changes by ∆sci = scit+τ −
scit. Taking the ideology dcis of a district court judge as given, the eect of this change in
Supreme Court ideology on the optimal decision of judge s can be calculated as































Suppose that Supreme Court ideology is positive and increases, i.e., scit+τ > scit > 0 as in our
empirical sample, see Figure 4.1. Then, as Equation (4.1) illustrates, this change in Supreme
Court ideology induces an increase in the conservatism of district court rulings that is more
pronounced the more liberal the considered district court judge (i.e., the lower dcis) is. To see
this, note that the second summand of the nal expression in Equation (4.1) is independent of
dcis and that the rst bracket in this expression is negative if scit+τ > scit > 0, such that ∆rs
decreases in dcis.
Figure 4.2 illustrates this point in an example where Supreme Court ideology increases
linearly from zero to 0.4 (a stylized description of the empirical development illustrated in
Figure 4.1). We compare the share of conservative rulings of a rather liberal district court judge
A with dciA = −0.25 with the share of conservative rulings of a rather conservative judge
B with dciB = 0.25 (in our empirical sample this is roughly a comparison of New York and
Wyoming). The share of pro-business rulings in a district court ρs,t is linked to rulings rs,t
through the denition ρs,t = (1+rs,t)/2. Accounting for the large reversal aversion documented
in the literature, see Section 4.2, we use four relatively small values of the preference parameter
κ. While rulings turn more conservative in both courts, the increase in conservatism of the
Supreme Court induces rulings of the liberal district court judge A to become substantially
more conservative relative to rulings of the conservative district court judge B.
In our econometric analysis, we make use of this dierential impact of Supreme Court
ideology across district courts. We estimate a regression with average district court rulings
(where s now represents a state instead of a judge) rs,t as the dependent variable, year xed
eects ηt, state xed eects δs, and the interaction between Supreme Court ideology and district
court ideology, scit · dcis, (and control variables Xs,t in the empirical analysis) as independent
variables
rs,t = γ · scit · dcis + β ·Xs,t + δs + ηt + εs,t. (4.2)
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Figure 4.2. Model-Predicted Share of Conservative District Court Rulings
Note: These graphs depict the simulated share of conservative rulings in two dierent district courts: a court with a liberal district court
judge A (dciA = −0.25) and a court with a conservative district court judge B (dciB = 0.25). Supreme Court ideology increases linearly
from sci0 = 0 to sci5 = 0.4.
To understand the role of the interaction eect in Equation (4.2), suppose we observe two
states, A and B, in two years, t and t + τ . In such a setting, the estimated coecient on the





rA,t+τ − rA,t+τ − (rB,t+τ − rB,t)
(scit+τ − scit) · (dciA − dciB)
, (4.3)
where ∆∆r is the dierence of the change in average rulings in the two states, ∆sci is the
change in Supreme Court ideology, and ∆dci is the dierence in ideological leanings of the
two states’ district courts.
In our model, ∆∆r is given by








Hence, Equation (4.3) evaluates as
γ̂ = − κ
(κ+ sci2t ) (κ+ sci
2
t+τ )
· (scit + scit+τ ) , (4.5)
which is derived by substituting Equation (4.4) into Equation (4.3) and rearranging terms.
Consequently, when the Supreme Court is rather conservative, the model predicts the coecient
on the interaction term to be negative.
Table 4.1 illustrates this estimation approach using the example from Figure 4.2. In particular,
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Table 4.1. Illustration of the Econometric Procedure
(a) Average Rulings for Two States and Two Years
Year State sci dci
r
κ = 0.1 κ = 0.075 κ = 0.05 κ = 0.025
0 A 0 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
5 A 0.4 -0.25 0.15 0.1926 0.2452 0.3122
0 B 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
5 B 0.4 0.25 0.3423 0.3521 0.3643 0.3797
(b) Calculation of the Interaction Effect
κ = 0.1 κ = 0.075 κ = 0.05 κ = 0.025
∆rA = rA,5 − rA,0 0.4 0.4426 0.4952 0.5622
∆rB = rB,5 − rB,0 0.0923 0.1021 0.114 3 0.1297
∆∆r = ∆rA −∆rB 0.3077 0.3404 0.3810 0.4324
∆sci = sci5 − sci0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
∆dci = dciA − dciB -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
γ̂ = ∆∆r/(∆sci ·∆dci) −1.5385 −1.7021 −1.9048 −2.1622
the upper part of the table shows the average rulings in the two states in years 0 and 5
of the example in panel form. Rulings in both states become more conservative, but the
increase in conservatism is more pronounced in the state with the liberal district court judges,
∆rA > ∆rB > 0, ∆∆r > 0. This implies that the interaction term is assigned a negative
coecient, γ̂ = ∆∆r/(∆sci · ∆dci) < 0. Quantitatively, for the considered values of the
preference weight κ, resulting coecients lie between -1.5 and -2.2.6
4.3.2 Evidence
In this Section, we empirically assess the model prediction that increasing conservatism of
the Supreme Court renders district court rulings relatively more conservative in states with
rather liberal district court judges by estimating Regression (4.2). In Section 4.4, we will use the
thus identied ideological variation in state-specic court rulings (caused by changes at the
6
Note from Equation (4.5) that the dierence between the district court ideologies in the two states is irrelevant
for the value of the estimated coecient γ̂, as ∆∆r is proportional to ∆dci (see Equation (4.4)). Hence,
although the two district court ideologies are chosen arbitrarily for an illustrative example, the values for γ̂ in
Table 4.1 are informative about what to expect for a sample where the ideology of the Supreme Court develops
in a way as displayed in Figure 4.1.
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Supreme Court and thus arguably exogenous to state-specic developments) as independent
variable in regressions seeking to explain labor market outcomes. This makes the state the
relevant level of our analysis, as detailed labor market data from the Current Population Survey
is not available on a less aggregate level.
Variables, Data Sources, and Sample Selection
In the following, we describe our sample, give an overview of the variables used in our
regressions, and state the sources from which these variables are obtained.
District Court Rulings For district court rulings rs,t, we use the Carp-Manning U.S. District
Court Database compiled by Carp and Manning (2016). All cases in this dataset are taken
from the Federal Supplement, which is the primary source of published U.S. district court
decisions. In practice, even though the publisher has no legal monopoly over the court opinions,
any decision that a sitting federal district judge submits has been published in the Federal
Supplement. Decisions to publish are mainly determined by the ocial publication guidelines
and not by the judges’ ideological tendencies (cf. Swenson, 2004).
7
These ocial guidelines
generally encourage publication if the opinion lays down a new rule of law, alters an existing
rule, critizises an existing rule, or changes the way in which an existing rule has been applied
(cf. West Publishing Company, 1994). Hence, rulings in our dataset are rulings on cases with
a high precedential value and are thus bound to be inuential for a large number of other
(unpublished) cases.
The database contains a total of 23,135 rulings of district courts in the 50 states from 1978
to 2011 that can be clearly labeled as either conservative (+1) or liberal (-1) and that can be
categorized as Economic Regulation and/or Labor Cases. The majority of cases falling into this
category are employee versus employer cases, which make up over one third of all included
rulings. Cases of company versus either a union or the NLRB make up close to 15%. In general,
pro-business decisions are considered to be conservative rulings. In a dispute between workers
and their employer decisions in favor of the workers are regarded as liberal, whereas decisions
in favor of the employer are regarded as conservative. In regulation cases, decisions for the
government are considered to be liberal. Our dependent variable rs,t is the average ideological
leaning of rulings in state s and year t. This variable would take the value 1 (-1) if all cases
were decided in a liberal (conservative) way.
Supreme Court Ideology For the ideology of Supreme Court justices scit, we use the ideal
point estimates calculated by Bailey (2013). The ideology scores from Bailey (2013) are chosen
over the more common Martin-Quinn scores, since the former are able to distinguish between
shifts in ideologies and shifts in case composition by using bridging information such as
positions of justices on previous cases. With changing ideological leanings of Supreme Court
7
About 20% of all cases decided in district courts are eventually published in the Federal Supplement.
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justices, the case composition is bound to change as well.
8
If ideological leanings and case
composition change simultaneously, the eect on liberal voting percentages of Supreme Court
justices, on which the Martin-Quinn scores are based, is unclear. The use of briding information
allows Bailey (2013) to disentangle the two eects.
9
In the regressions, we dene scit as the
median Bailey score of Supreme Court justices.
District Court Ideology For the ideology of district court judges dcis, we use information
on ideologies provided by Boyd (2015a).
10
The lack of data on district court judges does not
allow for the use of the methodology developed in Bailey (2013) here. As the rulings of district
court judges will arguably be inuenced by Supreme Court ideology, we refrain from using
ideology scores that are based on rulings and use scores that are calculated based on the
appointment process for federal judges instead. The Boyd scores exploit the norm of senatorial
courtesy: if a judge is appointed from a state where the president and a senator (both senators)
share a political party, the judge is assigned the ideology score of the senator (the average
of the senators), else the judge is assigned the ideology score of the president. We link the
Boyd data to information on conrmation, reassignment, and retirement dates of district court
judges from the Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges provided by the Federal
Judicial Center.
While the ideology of judges at a district court is a constant in our model, in reality it can
change over time due to changes in judge preferences, the conrmation of new judges, and
the retirement of old ones. In order to avoid endogeneity in the ideology measure for district
courts, we use the average Boyd ideology score of district court judges in state s that have been
serving between 1936 (the rst year for which there are ideology scores available from the







where dcis is the average ideology score for state s, Js is the set of district judges serving in
state s between 1936 and 1977, yj is the term length for judge j in this time frame, and Bj is
judge j’s ideology score.
This pre-sample ideology measure is informative about the ideological leanings of a state’s
8
Cases are heard by the Supreme Court if they are supported by at least four Supreme Court justices. Thus, with
more conservative justices, one would expect some cases to be chosen that would not be heard by a more
liberal Supreme Court. This pertains, for example, to cases with liberal rulings of the lower courts, that a
liberal Supreme Court would be very unlikely to overturn.
9
The Bailey scores are bounded between -2 and 2, with a clearly liberal and a clearly conservative justice xed
at -1.5 and 1.5 for reference. In the data, median Baily score of the Supreme Court between 1950 and 2011
has never been below -1.1 and has never exceeded a value of 0.6. Thus, a value of -1 already constitutes an
exceedingly liberal Supreme Court that can be expected to overturn overly conservative rulings at lower
courts. The reverse argument holds for the value 1.
10
The calculation of the ideology scores from Boyd (2015a) follows the methodology developed in Giles et al.
(2001) and extended in Epstein et al. (2007). Ideology scores are bounded between -1 and 1.
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Figure 4.3. District Court Ideology and 2008 Voting Shares for John McCain
Note: This graphs plots the average Boyd ideology score of district court judges by state for the time period between 1936 and 1977 against
the voting share for John McCain in the 2008 presidential election, obtained from the Federal Election Commission.
district courts judges in the regression period, as ideological leaning of judges dispay substantial
persistence. Federal judges are appointed for life and hence serve (on average) long terms until
they retire voluntarily. Reappointments to other courts are rare. Further, strategic retirement
plays an important role at district courts, perpetuating ideological leanings beyond the current
judges’ retirements. Specically, district court judges tend to retire when the current President is
ideologically similar to themselves. As an extreme case, the district court for the district of North
Dakota has never had a judge who was appointed by a Democratic president since 1954. In the
Boyd database, the average ideology of judges at a district court is highly autocorrelated, with
most district courts displaying a yearly autocorrelation of about 0.8 and some an autocorrelation
of over 0.95.
11
. Thus, while the pre-sample ideology measure we use is indeed informative
about judge ideology within our regression sample, it is unrelated to potentially endogenous
ideological changes occurring within our sample.
In most cases, a state’s district court ideology coincides with the perceived political ideology
in that state, see Figure 4.3. However, there are a few exceptions like Kentucky (which has
rather liberal district courts) or Delaware (which has a rather conservative district court). The
correlation between the 2008 general-election voting for John McCain from the Federal Election
Commission (as an indicator for a states general conservatism) and our district court ideology
measure is 0.4. For our analysis, it is advantageous that this correlation is not too high, such
that we can actually disentangle a state’s district court ideology from the general political
leaning of the state. A map depicting the liberalism/conservatism of states according to their
district courts is provided in Figure 4.4. The map shows some concentration of rather liberal
11
The evolution of the average ideology score by district court is shown in Appendix C.1
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Figure 4.4. Average Ideology Score of District Court Judges by State, 1936–1977
Note: This graphs depicts the average Boyd ideology score of district court judges by state for the time period between 1936 and 1977. Darker
colors indicate conservatism and lighter colors indicate liberalism.
district courts in the northeast, with New York, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire belonging
to the ve states with the most liberal district court judges according to our measure. We
have tested for regional variation in treatment eects, which would indicate a need to cluster
standard errors despite the fact that we include state xed eects in the regressions (cf. Abadie
et al., 2017), but could not nd any systematic pattern.
Control Variables We control for variables that can be expected to aect court rulings
beyond the interplay between Supreme Court ideology and district court ideology. We account
for the case composition, using information from the Carp-Manning database, and for judge
composition along characteristics such as age, race, gender, and experience (which have been
identied as determinants of rulings by the literature, see Section 4.2), using information
from the Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges and the Carp-Manning database.
We take the role of circuit courts into account by controlling for the average Boyd score of
the responsible appellate judges. To ensure that our results are not driven by compositional
changes at the district courts, we include the share of district court judges appointed by a
Republican president.
12
. To capture non-judicial ideological forces potentially aecting district
court rulings, we also control for well-known determinants of ideological leanings of the state’s
population, such as population size, urban density, age, and racial composition, from the CPS.
Furhter determinants, like the political party of the governor and the majority parties in the
state’s legislative chambers, are obtained from the State Partisan Composition collected by the
12
A detailed description of the evolution of this share by district court is provided in Appendix C.2
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National Conference of State Legislatures and additionally included as controls.
Finally, since the autocorrelation of the average judge ideology score at a district court is
below one, average rulings by district courts might show some tendency to converge towards
the middle, i.e., rulings at initially rather liberal district courts might tend to become more
conservative over time independent of developments at the Supreme Court. To pick up such
mean-reverting tendencies, we also include the lagged dependent variable in the set of control
variables.
The literature, see Section 4.2, has also documented that court rulings can be aected by
economic conditions. In our preferred specication we leave out economic indicators as control
variables for two reasons. First, there is no obvious correlation between changes in state-
specic economic outcomes and changes in Surpreme court ideology, such that the omission
of economic variables is unlikely to bias the coecient on the interaction between Supreme
Court ideology and our constant measure of district court ideology. Second, we argue that
economic outcomes are themselves aected by court rulings, such that including economic
variables as controls would erroneously take out the correlation between economic outcomes
and court rulings that is driven by causal eects from court rulings to economic outcomes. To
corroborate our ndings, we consider additional specications where we include state-specic
labor market outcomes and state GDP growth as controls in Appendix C.3.
Sample Selection Our sample runs from 1978 to 2011. We choose 1978 as the starting date
because of two reasons. First, our measure of Supreme Court ideology reaches a value of zero
in 1978 and stays above this value for the entire sample period. Thus, liberal district courts will
be unambigously more aected by the shifts in Supreme Court Ideology over our entire sample
period. Second, state-level labor market data is only available from the late 1970s onwards in
the (CPS). The end date is chosen because ideology scores for the Supreme Court by Bailey
(2013) are only available until 2011. We concentrate on the 50 states and exclude the District of
Columbia because many cases heard at the district court for D.C. do not specically relate to
the D.C. labor market but concern the federal government.
In principle, our sample contains 34 years× 50 states = 1700 state-year observations. However,
there are 79 state-year combinations with no rulings falling into the Economic Regulation
and/or Labor Cases category. Since we also use lagged rulings as a control variable in our
regressions, we lose another 62 observations due to years without rulings in certain states.
13
13
The Carp-Manning U.S. District Court Database does not include rulings in the economic category for Alaska
in 1980, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1997, 2001, 2004, and 2009, for Arizona in 1981, for Arkansas in 2000, for Delaware in
2011, for Hawaii in 1985, for Idaho in 1977, 1979, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2006, for Iowa in 1978, for
Kentucky in 1980 and 2000, for Maine in 1977, 1978 and 1981, for Montana in 1984, 1990, 1991 and 1993, for
Nebraska in 1983, 1988, 1991, 2006 and 2007, for Nevada in 1994, 2007, and 2008, for New Hampshire in 1979,
2001, 2003, and 2011, for New Mexico in 1979, 1981, 1982, 1988, 1998, and 2006, for North Dakota in 1977, 1979,
1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2001, for Rhode Island in 1981, for South Dakota in 1987,
1988, 1991, 1998, and 1999, for Utah in 1978, for Vermont in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 2010, and 2011, for
Washington State in 1978 and 1979, and for Wyoming in 1977, 1981, 1984, 1998, 2003, 2006, 2007, and 2011.
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Figure 4.5. Share of Conservative District Court Rulings in Economic and/or Labor Cases
Note: This graphs depicts the share of conservative rulings for cases in the Economic and/or Labor Cases category in the Carp-Manning U.S.
District Court Database compiled by Carp and Manning (2016) for all states, for states with conservative district courts (dcis > 0), and for
states with liberal district courts (dcis < 0). The red lines are linear trends.
Missing values for other control variables induce the loss of another 60 observations.
14
This
leaves us with a consistent sample of 1499 state-year observations for which we observe all our
variables.
Descriptive Developments
We begin our analysis by looking descriptively at the evolution of the share of conservative
rulings in the district courts. Figure 4.5 is a clear rst indication that, as predicted by our model,
the share of conservative rulings has increased in states with liberal district courts relative to
states with conservative district courts between 1978 and 2011.
Figure 4.6 compares the evolution of the ideological leanings of Supreme Court justices to
the evolution of the ideological leanings of district court judges.
15
As both Supreme Court
justices and district court judges are appointed by the president, the two series naturally display
a high positive correlation. Still, the ideology scores depicted in Figure 4.6 suggest that the
14
Our urban-density variables are not reported in the CPS before 1986 for Delaware, Idaho, Maine, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South Dakota, as well as between 1986 and 1995 for Wyoming.
15
Keep in mind that the ideology scores of district court judges are based on their appointment process and are
thus unaected by changes in rulings or case composition.
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Figure 4.6. Ideological Leanings of Supreme Court Justices, District Court Judges, the
President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives
Note: This graph depicts the ideal point estimates provided in the dataset to Bailey (2013) for the ideological leanings of the median Supreme
Court justice, the median senator on the U.S. Senate, the median representative in the House of Representatives, and the president between
1978 and 2011, as well as the average Boyd ideology scores for district court judges between 1978 and 2011. Again, positive values are
tantamount to conservative ideological leanings, while negative values imply liberal ideological leanings.
conservative shift of district court judges is much more modest over the entire sample period.
This ameliorates potential concerns that the relative increase in conservative rulings in liberal
states might not be driven by ideologically unchanged district court judges following the
increasingly conservative guidelines set by the Supreme Court but by a concomitant shift of
district court ideology towards the conservative end of the ideological spectrum. To further
address this concern, we include the share of district court judges appointed by a Republican
president as a control variable in our regressions as explained above. Median ideology scores
for the Senate and the House of Representatives experience only very modest changes over
our sample period (which will arguably be completely captured by our time xed eects).
Figure 4.7 plots the average ideology score of district court judges by state and year against
last year’s value. Most observations concentrate around the 45-degree line, indicating a high
persistence in district court ideology by state. This persistence is key to our identication,
which relies on long-run ideological dierences between persistently rather liberal courts and
persistently rather conservative courts.
A simple regression of the average ideology score of district court judges by state and year
on its own lag and state xed eects gives a coecient on the lag of 0.92. Thus, while district
court ideology is highly persistent, it displays some tendency to revert to the middle of the
ideological spectrum over time, reecting that some rather liberal (conservative) judges retire
during the presidency of a Republican (Democratic) president in each year. One may argue
that this induces rulings in initially rather liberal district courts to become more conservative
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Figure 4.7. Correlation of Ideology Scores of District Court Judges by State and Year,
1978–2011
Note: This graph plots the average Boyd ideology score by state and year against last year’s value. The 45-degree line is indicated in red.
over time, independent of ideological developments at the Supreme Court. For this reason, we
include the lagged dependent variable as a control in our regressions to capture mean-reverting
tendencies in rulings by state, as described above. Additionally, we also directly control for the
share of judges appointed by a Republican president in our regressions.
Econometric Results
The regression results for district court rulings are reported in Table 4.2. Column (1) constitutes
our most preferred specication, featuring the full set of control variables. Column (2) excludes
the lagged dependent variable, Column (3) excludes all control variables except the lagged
dependent variable, and Column (4) excludes all control variables.
As predicted, the coecients on the interaction term between Supreme Court ideology
and district court ideology are negative in all four specications. This means that the shift
in Supreme Court ideology did indeed induce rulings to become more conservative in states
with rather liberal district courts relative to states with rather conservative district courts.
Quantitatively, estimates are about -1.8 to -2 and hence fall in the range suggested by our
model (see Table 4.1). Column (2) shows a somewhat larger coecient in absolute value than
Column (1), indicating that taking into account the tendency of rulings in a state to converge
to the center over time is indeed important. However, as the coecients are fairly similar, this
tendency does not seem to matter too much. Columns (3) and (4), which leave out certain
control variables, illustrate that our results do not depend on the specic set of included
controls.
We perform several checks in order to assess the robustness of our ndings. Specically, we
79
4 Outlawed: Estimating the Labor Market Eects of Judicial Ideology
Table 4.2. Regression Results for District Court Rulings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supreme Court ideology -1.9673 -2.0102 -1.7978 -1.8778
× district court ideology (0.7104) (0.7095) (0.6904) (0.6905)
p=0.0057 p=0.0047 p=0.0093 p=0.0066
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.2619 0.2612 0.0918 0.0885
Lagged dependent variable yes no yes no
State demographics yes yes no no
Court, judge, and case characteristics yes yes no no
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes no no
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the
standerd errors.
include controls for local labor market conditions, include higher lags of the dependent variable,
weigh observations by the number of rulings per state population, and use a moving average
of our measure of Supreme Court ideology scit. In all of these specications the coecient
on the interaction term between Supreme Court ideology and district court ideology remains
distinctly negative and highly statistically signicant. See Appendix C.3 for the detailed results.
4.4 Labor Market Eects of Judicial Ideology
In this section, we exploit that our instrument scit · dcis induces an increase in the share of
pro-business rulings in states with liberal district courts relative to states with conservative
district courts to estimate the eect that ideological tendencies in court rulings exert on the
labor market. After presenting the empirical results, we rationalize them in a simple search
and matching model with wrongful termination lawsuits.
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4.4.1 Evidence
In order to identify the economic eects of jurisdiction on the labor market, we now use our
instrument scit · dcis in regressions with labor market outcomes as the dependent variable.
Specically, we estimate
zs,t = γ
z · scit · dcis + βz · X̃s,t + δzs + ηzt + εzs,t. (4.6)
where zs,t is a specic labor market outcome of interest in state s and year t. X̃s,t is the set
of time-varying state-specic variables that can be expected to aect labor market outcomes




s,t is the residual.
Variables and Data Sources
The interaction term scit · dcis remains the regressor of interest.16 Using this interaction term
instead of a direct measure of court rulings in a state isolates the change in state-specic
court rulings which is driven by a nation-wide development, i.e., the changing Supreme Court
ideology. This strongly ameliorates any concerns about reverse causality. Judge decisions have
been shown to be aected by economic conditions (cf. Ichino et al., 2003; Marinescu, 2011), but
our interaction term is arguably unaected by changing labor-market conditions in the specic
state. Since the measure of district court ideology is time-invariant and determined from pre-
sample data, it does by construction not react to changes in the state’s economy. Furthermore,
economic conditions may also aect the ideology of the Supreme Court. For example, the
Great Recession with its high levels of unemployment is believed to have contributed to the
election of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential elections and thus also to the appointments
of the rather liberal justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. Nevertheless, it is likely
national economic conditions which aect the Supreme Court and, for our results to be aected
by reverse causality, Supreme Court ideology would have to be aected by changes in (the
distribution of) state-level labor market conditions.
Instruments such as ours have recently been criticized for causing biases, as they might be
correlated to previous shocks (cf. Jaeger et al., 2018; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018). For such
a correlation between instrument and responses to past shocks to drive our results, one would
have to argue that unfavorable past shocks to a state’s economy have led to the appointment
of more liberal district court judges and are still driving economic performance in our sample,
such that the recovery from those shocks drives the positive correlation between the increase
in Supreme Court ideology and economic performance in states with rather liberal district
court judges. We are condent that the long time period we can use for the calculation of the
pre-sample measure of district court ideology makes this a minor issue for our analysis. The
average judge (weighted by years in oce) who inuences our pre-sample measure of district
16
See Section 4.3 for denitions and sources of scit and dcis.
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court ideology was appointed in 1956, more than 20 years before the start of our regression
sample. Business cycle shocks are usually considered to fade a lot quicker and permanent
shocks to a state’s economy are taken into account by using state xed eects.
Labor Market Outcomes For labor market outcomes, which are the dependent variables of
our regressions, we draw on the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey
of about 60,000 U.S. households conducted by the United States Census Bureau. The sample is
representative of the civilian noninstitutional population. We construct yearly data on state-
specic unemployment rates, job-nding rates, employment rates, hourly wage rates, other job
attributes, employment shares by industry and occupational group, and inequality measures
using weights from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). More information on
the dependent variables can be found in Appendix C.5. Due to the small sample size of the CPS
in some smaller states, variables for these states are measured rather noisily. We address this
issue by weighing observations by state population.
Control Variables We include the following time-varying state-specic variables that can
be expected to aect labor market outcomes directly. Note that all variables that are either
state-specic but constant or time-varying but determined at the national level are captured by
the respective xed eects. For example, the party holding the Presidency, which is correlated
with Supreme Court ideology, see Figure 4.6, does not vary by state and its eects are hence
captured by the year xed eect.
A rst set of control variables, taken from the CPS, describes the state’s industry and occu-
pational composition. It includes the employment shares in the construction, manufacturing,
transportation, trade, nancial, and services industries as well as employment share in abstract,
routine, and manual occupations, following the categorization by Autor and Dorn (2013).
We further control for a set of state-specic policy measures. This set includes a measure of
the tax burden, the state minimum wage, the state’s federal intergovernmental revenue and a
measure of employment protection laws in the state. The tax burden is the total amount paid in
taxes by a state’s residents divided by the state’s total income computed by the Tax Foundation.
Minimum wages are the minimum wage rates by state from Federal Reserve Economic Data.
Data on the federal intergovernmental revenue of a state is taken from the State and Local
Government Finance Dataset constructed by the Census Bureau through the Annual Survey of
State and Local Government Finances. These revenues consist of all monies a state obtains from
the federal government. Regarding employment protection, dummies for exceptions from the
doctrine of at-will employment are constructed using the data provided in Autor et al. (2006a).
We include controls for state government and legislative majorities. Specically, we add
dummies indicating the party of the governor, the majority party in the state senate, and the
majority party in the state house.
In robustness checks, we also include control for state demographics (like in the regressions
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Supreme Court ideology scit 0.0705 −0.0565 −0.0831
× district court ideology dcis (0.0208) (0.0247) (0.0297)
p= 0.0007 p= 0.0223 p= 0.0052
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0358 0.0287 0.0422
Observations 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.7561 0.6414 0.8623
Industry and occupation controls yes yes yes
State policy controls yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the
standerd errors.
for court rulings) and take into account that a Republican president might aect labor market
outcomes in liberal states through other channels than the judiciary. Since the party of the
President is correlated with Supreme Court ideology, see Figure 4.6, and states with liberal
district courts tend to be also otherwise liberal states, see Figure 4.3, such channels would
bias our results. To address this possibility, we control for the interaction between a dummy
for a Republican President and the 2008 general-election voting share for John McCain (as a
continuous "blue-state/red-state" measure) taken from the Federal Election Commission. More
information on the control variables is provided in Appendix C.5.
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Table 4.4. Regression Results for Job Attributes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
Avg. hourly Vol. PT PT/FT Union
wage rate share wage rate coverage
Supreme Court ideology scit 0.1739 0.0375 0.4265 0.1305
× district court ideology dcis (0.0707) (0.0186) (0.2065) (0.0267)
p= 0.0140 p= 0.0447 p= 0.0391 p= 0.0000
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0884 -0.0191 -0.2168 -0.0663
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.9933 0.8071 0.4180 0.9666
Industry and occupation controls yes yes yes yes
State policy controls yes yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the standerd
errors.
Results
Our main results are summarized in Tables 4.3–4.7. In order to discuss the direction of the eects
of court rulings on the labor market, it is most intuitive to consider the eect of conservatism,
calculated as the ratio of the regression coecients γz from the labor market regression in
Equation (4.6) and γ from the court-ruling regression in Equation (4.2). This ratio gives the
change in the dependent variable per increase in conservatism of district court rulings. While
the sign of this statistic facilitates understanding the eects of judical ideology, its size relates
to an extreme thought experiment, as a one-unit increase in the conservatism of district court
rulings corresponds to, e.g., a change in the share of pro-business decisions from 50% to 100%.
We will therefore discuss the implied eects of more moderate changes in judicial ideology
below.
84
4.4 Labor Market Eects of Judicial Ideology




emp. share emp. share emp. share
Supreme Court ideology scit −0.0645 0.0633 0.0220
× district court ideology dcis (0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0209)
p= 0.0093 p= 0.0116 p= 0.2932
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) 0.0328 -0.0322 -0.0112
Observations 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.9055 0.8267 0.7951
Industry and occupation controls no no no
State policy controls yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below
the standerd errors.
Table 4.3 shows that judicial conservatism tends to promote labor market uidity. We nd
that more conservative, i.e. more pro-business, rulings increase the employment rate, reduce
the unemployment rate, and increase the probability for unemployed people to nd a new
job. Quantitatively, a change from neutral decision making (r = 0), where half the cases are
decided pro-business, to a situation of completely conservative decision making (r = 1), where
all cases are decided pro-business, reduces the unemployment rate by about 3.5 percentage
points, raises the job-nding rate by close to 3 percentage points, and raises the employment
rate by about 4 percentage points. While these numbers appear stark at rst glance, bear in
mind the strong change in court decision-making considered here. A more modest increase in
the share of conservative district court decisions, e.g., by ten percentage points, reduces the
unemployment rate by about 0.7 percentage points.
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emp. share emp. share emp. share
Supreme Court ideology scit −0.0456 0.1428 −0.0930
× district court ideology dcis (0.0160) (0.0297) (0.0260)
p= 0.0044 p= 0.0000 p= 0.0004
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) 0.0232 -0.0726 0.0473
Observations 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.6692 0.9287 0.9013
Industry and occupation controls no no no
State policy controls yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the
standerd errors.
Over the 34 years in our sample, the share of pro-business rulings increased by 6 percentage
points. Our ndings indicate that such a development can reduce the unemployment rate
by about 0.4 percentage points. Of course, such a transfer of the results from our state-level
analysis to the aggregate level neglects potential general equilibrium eects of court rulings in
other states. Nevertheless, we nd this transfer informative and helpful to put our results into
perspective.
Turning to job attributes (Table 4.4), we nd that a larger share of pro-business rulings
reduces average hourly wages, the employment share of voluntary part-time workers, and
union coverage, while increasing the part-time hourly wage penalty. Hence, as employment
increases, labor earnings, workplace exibility (voluntary part-time employment), and job
security (union coverage) all decrease. The rise in the part-time penalty can be seen as an
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Supreme Court ideology scit −0.3674 −0.1973 −0.1701
× district court ideology dcis (0.1592) (0.0753) (0.1331)
p= 0.0211 p= 0.0089 p= 0.2013
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) 0.1868 0.1003 0.0865
Observations 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.8228 0.8281 0.7006
Industry and occupation controls yes yes yes
State policy controls yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below
the standerd errors.
increase in rms’ ability to discriminate between dierent groups of workers in terms of pay,
which is brought about by a lower risk of losing lawsuits.
The results concerning occupational employment shares (Table 4.5) and industry composi-
tion (Table 4.6) indicate that conservative court rulings also lead to a decline in the routine-
manufacturing employment share while increasing the employment share of abstract workers
and of employees in the construction and in the service sector.
17
In this sense they accelerate
the hollowing out of the middle-class, as workers in routine-manufacturing jobs typically rank
in the middle of the income distribution.
Finally, more pro-business rulings also contribute to rising income inequality. Table 4.7
shows results for the 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 percentile ratios of the distribution of family
17
Obviously, we cannot control for the state’s industry-occupation composition in these regressions. For com-
pleteness, Table C.2 in Appendix C.4 shows results for further industry groups not included in Table 4.6.
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income.
18
The coecient on the interaction term is only signicant for the 90/10 and 90/50
family income ratios, indicating that the increase in income inequality due to increasingly
conservative district court rulings is mainly driven by increasing inequality at the top half of
the income distribution.
Quantitatively, a ten percentage point increase in the share of conservative rulings decreases
hourly wages by 1.7%, union coverage by 1.3 percentage points, the routine employment
share by 0.6 percentage points, and income inequality, measured as the 90/10 family income
ratio, by 3.7%. A back-of-the-envelope calculation hence indicates that the rise in the share
of conservative court decisions from 1978 to 2011 (about 6 percentage point) can be expected
to be responsible for a decrease of about 1.1% in wages, a fall in union coverage of about 0.8
percentage points, a 0.4 percentage point reduction in the routine employment share, and a
2.2% increase in the 90/10 income ratio. In this light, increasing judicial conservatism seems to
have contributed, although in a moderate way, to important long-run economic development
such as wage stagnation, deunionization, job market polarization, and rising inequality.
Again, we perform several checks to test the robustness of our ndings.
19
Specically, we
vary the set of included controls in order to illustrate that our results are not driven by the
inclusion or exclusion of certain control variables, include controls for state demographics, and
include controls for the eect of a Republican president. All of these checks support our results.
Intuitively, more pro-business decisions lower costs for rms while also improving their
bargaining position. This reduces unemployment at the cost of lower wages and higher
inequality. In the subsequent Section 4.4.2 we develop a theoretical model of the labor market
that makes this argumentation explicit. The results regarding the other considered variables can
be understood in a similar way. As the union bargaining power is depressed by higher chances
of pro-business rulings, incentives to join a union fall, which further contributes to lower wages
and larger income inequality. Furthermore, as the adoption of new technologies proceeds
slower in unionized rms due to employment protection (cf. Connolly et al., 1986; Bradley et al.,
2017), lower unionization rates might also explain (at least part of) the documented changes in
industry employment shares and in the occupational composition.
4.4.2 Explanation
In this section, we extend the canonical search and matching model presented in Michaillat
(2012) by including the possibility of wrongful-termination lawsuits. To keep the model simple,
lawsuits are introduced in a way that proceeds analogous to standard ring costs. The purpose
of this exercise is to theoretically evaluate the economic eects of a conservative shift of the
ideological leanings of the judiciary. We conrm that our empirical ndings can be rationalized
in this simple model.
18
We consider the 80/20, 80/50, and 50/20 income ratios in Table C.3 in Appendix C.4 and nd similar eects of
judicial ideology.
19
See Appendix C.4 for a detailed description.
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Labor Market
The model is populated by a unit mass of risk-neutral workers that can either be employed or
unemployed and searching for a job.
20
On the labor market, a continuum of rms i ∈ [0, 1] hire
workers by posting vacancies. Existing worker-rm matches are destroyed at the exogenous
rate s. Newly separated workers begin searching for a job in the next period. The number of
unemployed workers is given by
ut = 1− (1− s)nt
and the number of employed workers evolves according to
nt = (1− s)nt−1 + ht.







where µ is the matching eciency and η is the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to the number of unemployed workers. The labor market tightness is dened as θ ≡ vt/ut,
such that the job-nding probability of a worker is given by f(θt) = ht/ut and the job-lling
probability for a rm is q(θt) = ht/vt. The cost of opening a vacancy is c and there is no
randomness on the rm side. It follows that a rm can hire a new worker with certainty by
opening 1/q(θt) vacancies.
Firms
The setting allows for the existence of a representative rm. The real prot of this rm is given
by




where g(nt) = nt is the production function and wt are wages. As the production function
implies that the Nash-bargained wages will not depend on the number of employed workers,
the rst order condition for employment is









where δ is the discount factor. The rm hires new workers until the marginal product of labor
and the discounted costs of hiring next period are equal to the marginal cost of labor, i.e., the
wage and the hiring cost.
20
There is no saving technology, which implies that workers consume their entire income in each period.
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Wage Bargaining
As is standard in most of the search and matching literature, wages are determined as the
solution of a generalized Nash bargaining problem. Without loss of generality, we assume that
new workers are paid the same wage as incumbent workers and only enter wage negotiations
in the next period. It follows that for a worker the value of being employed is
Wt = wt + δEt [(1− s)Wt+1 + sUt+1]
and the value of being unemployed is
Ut = δEt [(1− f(θt+1)Ut+1 + f(θt+1)Wt+1] .
The dierence between these two value functions then gives the worker’s surplus from a
successful renegotiation. We explicitly assume that the costs of lawsuits are lost to the worker-
rm pair (think of a ring cost as opposed to a severance payment from the rm to the worker).
This choice is based on two observations. First, compared to the legal fees and court fees on
both sides, actual payments from rms to workers make up a relatively small part of the costs
of employee lawsuits according to the 2017 Hiscox Guide to Employee Lawsuits. Second, as the
settlement payment is meant to compensate the employee for forgone earnings and emotional
damage due to illegal employer behavior, it would be misleading to include these payments in
the worker’s value function.
On the rm side, an unsuccessful wage renegotiation and a subsequent termination of the
match entails the risk of a wrongful-termination lawsuit. Thus, the rms’ surplus from a
successful renegotiation is the hiring cost per worker c/q(θt), plus the expected costs of a
wrongful-termination lawsuit L, times the probability of losing the lawsuit (1-ρ), where ρ is
the probability of a pro-business ruling. Because the possibility of losing a lawsuit enters a
rm’s value function as a cost, it facilitates exposition to summarize judicial ideology by the
loss probability from the perspective of rms in this model. The probability of a pro-business
ruling ρ is linked to the average ruling r from the model presented in Section 4.3 through
the denition ρ = (1 + r)/2. Denoting the bargaining power of the worker with β, Nash
bargaining solves






+ (1− ρ) · L
]
.











4.4 Labor Market E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Table 4.8. Parameter Calibration
Symbol Interpretation Value Source/Target
δ Discount factor 0.999 5% Annual discount rate
s Separation rate 0.0095 Michaillat (2012) using JOLTS
µ Matching eciency 0.233 Michaillat (2012) using JOLTS
η Unemployment-elasticity of matching 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
c Vacancy posting costs 0.32 0.32 x steady state wage
β Bargaining power of workers 0.5 Shimer (2005)
ρ Probability of pro-business ruling 0.55 Carp and Manning (2016)
L Cost of lost lawsuit 0.78 6.4% unemployment rate
Theoretical Eects of More Pro-Business Rulings
Now that we have derived both the rst order condition for employment and the wage schedule,
we consider the eects of an increase in the probability of pro-business decisions on labor
market outcomes in our simple model.
As the lower expected average cost of a lawsuit reduces the employer’s surplus from wage
negotiations, the employer is able to enforce lower wages. Intuitively, the employer can credibly
claim that the continuation of the worker-rm relationship is less valuable, as a lawsuit upon
termination hurts the rm less. The eect of an increase in the share of pro-business rulings ρ
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As the increase in ρ reduces labor costs, rms will post more vacancies which attenuates the









[1− δ(1− s)] c
] 1−η
η 1
[1− δ(1− s)] c
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Table 4.9. Theoretical Effects of Pro-Business Rulings
Probability of a pro-business ruling increases by...
5 ppt. 10 ppt. 15 ppt.
Unemployment -0.35 ppt. -0.66 ppt. -0.95 ppt.
Employment +0.38 ppt. +0.67 ppt. +0.95 ppt.
Job-nding rate +3.71 ppt. 7.43 ppt. 11.17 ppt.
Wage -0.06 ppt. -0.12 ppt. -0.17 ppt.
Note: The entries in this table represent percentage point
changes in a specic labor market outcome following an in-
crease of 5, 10, and 15 percentage points in the probability of a
pro-business ruling.
antitative Evaluation
In this section, we calibrate the model to match quarterly U.S. data for the time period between
1978 and 2011. The calibrated model is used to quantitatively evaluate the eect of an increase
in the share of pro-business rulings in the model.
Calibration In calibrating the model we follow the calibration strategy used in Michaillat
(2012). Table 4.8 lists the parameter values and the source that encourages the specic choice.
The discount factor is set to βc = 0.999, to match an annual discount rate of 5%. The parameter
values for the separation rate s and the matching eciency µ are taken from Michaillat (2012),
who provides estimates based on the Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for
the time period between 2000 and 2009. The calibration targets for the matching elasticity η
and for the bargaining power β are standard in the literature (cf. Petrongolo and Pissarides,
2001; Shimer, 2005). Following Michaillat (2012), who bases his estimates on studies by Barron
et al. (1997) and Silva and Toledo (2009), the vacancy posting costs c are calibrated to 32% of
the steady state wage. The probability of a pro-business ruling ρ is calibrated to match the
average share of pro-business rulings in district courts in the Carp-Manning database. Finally,
we calibrate the cost of a lost lawsuit L to 0.78 in order to match the average unemployment
rate of 6.4% over the time period between 1978 and 2011.
Simulation Results We use the calibrated model to assess the theoretical eect of an increase
in the share of pro-business rulings ρ. The results are summarized in Table 4.9. A ten percentage
point increase in the probability of winning a lawsuit lowers the simulated unemployment rate
by about 0.66 percentage points (compared to a decrease of 0.7 percentage points in the data).
Given the simplicity of our model, these two numbers are surprisingly close.
21
21
Due to the increased labor market tightness, wage changes are signicantly smaller compared to our empirical




In this paper, we have documented substantial economic eects of ideological tendencies
in court rulings. In a rst stage, we have shown that the share of conservative rulings has
increased in states with rather liberal district courts relative to states with rather conservative
district courts following the shift of the Supreme Court towards the conservative end of
the ideological spectrum since the late 1970s. In a second stage, we have exploited these
dierential eects on U.S. states in order to identify the economic impact of a conservative shift
in ideological tendencies of the judiciary. We nd that an increase in the share of conservative
rulings substantially increases the employment rate and promotes labor market uidity but
also contributes to wage stagnation, job market polarization, deunionization, and rising income
inequality.
which the model abstracts from. While an increase of 7.4 percentage points in the job-nding rate appears
stark at rst glance, keep in mind that the model is calibrated to quarterly frequency, whereas we look at




This thesis provides three main conclusions, each related to one of the three preceding chapters.
First, I illustrate that a search and matching model with both nancial frictions and wage
rigidity is able to replicate important unemployment dynamics which are lacking in canonical
models of the labor market. I nd that wage rigidity is responsible for the steeper increase
in the unemployment rate in recessions, whereas credit constraints ensure that the decrease
in recovery periods is atter. Joblessness occurs when recovery periods are characterized by
concomitantly eroding credit conditions.
Second, Anna Hartmann and I provide empirical, analytical, and simulated results on the
eects of routine-biased technical change on unionization rates. Employing a search and
matching model with an occupational choice and endogenous union formation, we illustrate
that manual workers, who benet from the changing demand structure, are discouraged from
voting in favor of a collective bargaining agreement, as unions aiming at equal wage growth
would reallocate part of these benets to routine workers. This result emphasizes routine-biased
technical change as an important driver of both job market polarization and deunionization.
Third, Anna Hartmann, Christian Bredemeier, and I expose substantial eects of judicial
ideology on the labor market. The economic impact is identied by exploiting dierences in the
eect of a shift in U.S. Supreme Court ideology on district court rulings across U.S. states. An
increase in the share of conservative rulings increases the employment rate and promotes labor
market uidity but also contributes to wage stagnation, job market polarization, deunionization,
and rising income inequality.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Household’s Maximization Problem
Having dened the state vectors in Section 2.3, the household maximization problem can be
written as
Ht(ωht ; Ωt) = max{ct,at}





+ Tt ≤ wtnt + at + uts. (A.1)
A.2 Derivation of the Enforcement Constraint
The derivation of the enforcement constraint follows the derivation in Garín (2015). Referring
to the respective optimization problem, the value of a rm can be written as
J(ωct ; Ωt) = dt + EtΛct+1|tJ(ωct+1; Ωt+1).
With the possibility of default before the loan is due and after production is realized, the value
of not defaulting is
νf,n = EtΛct+1|tJ(ωct+1; Ωt+1).
In the case of default, rms and lenders renegotiate. If an agreement is reached, rms pay
lenders a fraction νt of the continuation value. Therefore, the value of a successful renegotiation
is
νf,s = EtΛct+1|tJ(ωct+1; Ωt+1) + lt − νt,
where rms continue to produce, get another loan lt, but have to pay a part of the continuation
value to the lenders. As production cannot be seized by lenders in the case of default, the value
of an unsuccessful renegotiation for the rm is simply νf,u = lt. Consequently, the net value
of an agreement is given by
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νf,net = EtΛct+1|tJ(ωct+1; Ωt+1)− νt.
From the perspective of a lender, the value of a successful renegotiation is




In the case that no agreement is reached, lenders cannot seize production. As they do not value
the stock of workers in the rm, the value of an unsuccessful renegotiation is
νl,u = ηtqk,tkt
from the lender’s point of view. This results in the net value of an agreement for the lender of




The joint surplus of renegotiating is the sum of the net values of the rm and the lender. Since
nancial intermediaries have no bargaining power in the renegotiation of debt, the rm gets
the value




in case of a default. This value is equal to its liquidity plus the joint surplus of renegotiating
the debt. In order to rule out defaults, the value of not defaulting for the rm has to be at least






which constrains a rm’s ability to borrow below the value of the fraction of the physical
capital stock that lenders can recuperate after default.
A.3 Firm’s Maximization Problem
Using the assumptions made in Section 2.3, the optimization problem of the rm can be
summarized by
Jt(ωct ; Ωt) = max{dt,mt,it,kt+1,bt+1}
dt + EtΛct|t+1Jt+1(ωct+1; Ωt+1)


















the law of motion for the capital stock












the law of motion for employment,
nt = (1− s)nt−1 +mt, (A.5)
and the borrowing constraint







+ it + bt ≤ ηtqk,tkt, (A.6)
where the loan lt is replaced by the working capital requirements. Denoting the multipliers on
the budget constraint, the law of motion for the capital stock, the law of motion for employment,
and the borrowing constraint with µc,t, µk,t, µe, t, and µb,t and taking derivatives results in the
following rst order conditions:





































where qk is the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers µk,t and µc,t. As is standard in the literature,
qk,t represents the value of the installed capital relative to its replacement costs.
A.4 Wage Bargaining
In order to derive the wage schedule, I rst dene the value functions Hm,t, Hn,t, and Hu,t. Hm,t
is the marginal value of having an additional member matched from the household perspective,
Hn,t the value function associated with having an additional member employed, and Hu,t the
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value function associated with having an additional member unemployed. Using the law of
motion for employment, nt = (1− x)nt−1 + f(θ)ut, Hn,t can be written as
Hn,t = −ϕ+ λtwt + βEt{x[1− f(θt+1)]Hu,t+1 + [1− x+ xf(θt+1)]Hn,t+1}
and Hu,t as
Hu,t = λts+ βEt{f(θt+1)]Hn,t+1 + [1− f(θt+1)]Hu,t+1},
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint. The marginal value




+ wt − s+ (1− x)EtΛht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Hm,t+1, (A.12)
where Λht+1|t = βhEt
λt+1
λt
is the household’s stochastic discount factor.
With both value functions dened, the wage that solves the bargaining problem can be
expressed as














that can be rewritten as
φJn,t = (1− φ)Hm,t.
In the next step I dene the total surplus of the match St as the sum of the rm’s and the
worker’s surplus. This results in
St = (αztnα−1t k1−αt )(1− µb,t)− s− ϕct
+ (1− x)Et{Λct+1|tJn,t+1Λht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Hm,t+1}.
Using Hm,t I can write Hm,t = φSt and Jn,t = (1 − φ)St. Multiplying the total surplus with
(1− φ), using Jn,t = (1− φ)St and the rst order condition
Jn,t = (1− φ)(αztnα−1t k1−αt )(1− µb,t)− (1− φ) [s+ ϕct]
+ (1− φ)(1− x)Et{Λct+1|tJn,t+1}
+ φ(1− x)Et{Λht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Jn,t+1}.
In the last step I replace Jn,t by the value function of the rm and use that Jn,t+1 = κmt+1q(θt+1)2 .
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A.5 Role of Investment Adjustment Costs
In this section I deviate from the conservative choice of investment adjustment costs in the
main text. A parameter value at the lower end of the range found in the literature was chosen
for the quantitative analysis because higher investment adjustment costs increase the incentive
for rms to keep uctuations in investment low. This increases the volatility of labor market
variables and strengthens the asymmetric behavior of unemployment.
To asses the theoretical ability of the model mechanisms to generate positive skewness in the
unemployment rate, the investment adjustment costs are increased by a factor ten to the value
used in an early version of Perri and Quadrini (2018), ξ = 0.5. Under the new parametrization,
the skewness of the unemployment rate increases to 0.92 in levels (0.72 in the data) and 0.70
in changes (1.30 in the data). All of the skewness in levels and over 50% of the skewness
in changes is explained by nancial frictions in conjunction with wage rigidity under high
investment adjustment costs.
Even though investment adjustment costs can generate skewed unemployment dynamics in
my model, I conrm that they are not the main driving force behind the results in this paper.
Setting the adjustment costs to zero reduces the skewness of the simulated unemployment rate
by no more than 5%. This implies that a value of ξ = 0.05 is already small enough as not to
blur the emphasized mechanism.
A.6 Benchmark Model
The model described in this section exhibits perfect credit markets and exible wages. It acts
as a benchmark in the quantitative analysis in order to gauge the performance of the complete
model with nancial frictions and wage rigidity. The benchmark model is based on the appendix
to Garín (2015). The labor market and the household sector are unchanged by the introduction
of nancial frictions. Therefore, the rst two subsections from Section 2.3 hold for this model
as well.
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A.6.1 Firms
Under the same assumptions as in Section 2.3, the maximization problem of the rm can be
expressed as
Jt(ωet ; Ωt) = max{dt,mt,it,kt+1,bt+1}
dt + EtΛct|t+1Jt+1(ωet+1; Ωt+1)
















the law of motion for the capital stock












and the law of motion for employment
nt = (1− x)nt−1 +mt. (A.16)
Denoting the multipliers on the budget constraint, the law of motion for the capital stock, and
the law of motion for employment, with µc,t, µk,t, and µe,t respectively, and taking derivatives
results in the following rst order conditions:









































+ (1− x)EtΛct|t+1Jn,t+1. (A.22)
102
A.6 Benchmark Model
The rst term is the the net return of an additional worker for the rm. The second term is the
discounted benet of having an additional worker in the next period. Combining the marginal















Again, the rm hires additional workers until the marginal costs of hiring equal the marginal
benets. In contrast to the model in Section 2.3, the job creation condition does not depend on
nancial conditions.
A.6.2 Wage Bargaining
Since the nancial frictions introduced in Section 2.3 only aect the rm side, the marginal
value of the match for the household is the same as in the model with nancial frictions. With
both value functions dened, the wage that solves the bargaining problem can be expressed as





where φ is a parameter that governs the bargaining power of the worker and the rm. Taking








that can be rewritten as
φJn,t = (1− φ)Hm,t.
As a next step I dene the total surplus of the match St as the sum of the rm’s and the worker’s
surplus. This results in
St = αztnα−1t k1−αt − s− ϕct
+ (1− x)Et{Λct+1|tJn,t+1 + Λht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Hm,t+1},
where I use that λt = u
′(ct). Next, I use Equation (A.12), Hm,t = φSt and Jn,t = (1 − φ)St.
Multiplying the total surplus with (1 − φ), using Jn,t = (1 − φ)St, φJn,t = (1 − φ)Hm,t and
rearranging terms gives
Jn,t = (1− φ)(αztnα−1t k1−αt )− (1− φ) [s+ ϕct]
+ (1− φ)(1− x)Et{Λct+1|tJn,t+1}
+ φ(1− x)Et{Λht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Jn,t+1}.
In the last step I replace Jn,t by the value function and use that Jn,t+1 = κmt+1q(θt+1)2 . Rearranging
terms gives the wage equation
103























With the model completetly described, I dene the equilibrium.
Denition 3. A recursive equilibrium is dened as a set of i) rm’s policy functions d(ωc; Ω),
k(ωc; Ω), i(ωc; Ω), and v(ωc; Ω); ii) household’s policy function c(ωh; Ω); iii) a lump-sum tax
T (Ω), iv) prices w(Ω) andR(Ω); and v) a law of motion for the aggregate states, Ω′ = Ψ(Ω), such
that: i) rm’s policies satisfy the rm’s rst order conditions (Equations (A.17)–(A.21)) and the
job creation condition (Equation (A.23)); ii) household’s policy function satises the household’s
rst order condition (Equation (2.2)), iii) the wage is determined by Equation (A.24); iv) the law of
motion Ψ(Ω) is consistent with individual decisions and with the stochastic process for technology
z, and v) the government has a balanced budget such that s(1− n) = T .
A.6.4 Simulation Results
The model without nancial frictions and without wage rigidity is calibrated to match the
same steady state values as the complete model. Simulation results are given in Table A.1
and are strikingly close to the results obtained by Shimer (2005) in the simulation of a model
with only labor productivity shocks. While the model performance is good along several
important dimensions, it is unable to match the high volatility of the key labor market variables
unemployment, vacancies, and labor market tightness. The volatiliy of vacancies and labor
market tightness is even lower than in Shimer (2005), as the presence of capital and bonds in
the benchmark model gives rms more possibilities to adjust to technology shocks.
A.7 Private Eiciency of Wages
Proof. The proof draws from the proof of private eciency in the online appendix to Michaillat
(2012). Note that wages are privately ecient if neither rms nor workers have any incentive
to separate as long as there are positive bilateral gains from the match.
The rst part of the proof is relatively simple. For the household side private eciency




+ wt − s+ (1− x)EtΛht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Hm,t+1 ≥ 0.
This equation can be rearranged to give
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Table A.1. Simulated Moments – Flexible Wages and Perfect Credit Markets
u v θ w y z
Standard deviation 0.009 0.014 0.023 0.014 0.016 0.015
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Autocorrelation 0.940 0.792 0.865 0.839 0.845 0.830
(0.028) (0.078) (0.058) (0.070) (0.067) (0.069)
Correlation 1 -0.891 -0.958 -0.941 -0.947 -0.933
(0.035) (0.016) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026)
— 1 0.983 0.970 0.974 0.994
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001)
— — 1 0.985 0.991 0.996
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001)
— — — 1 0.999 0.990
(0.000) (0.005)
— — — — 1 0.992
(0.003)
— — — — — 1
Note: Results from simulating the model with stochastic technology with a second-order
perturbation method. All variables are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 105. Simulated standard errors (standard deviations across 500 simulations)
are reported in parentheses.




The household has no incentive to have the last worker separated from the match if the wage
plus the continuation value of the match is larger than unemployment benets plus the utility
value of leisure. Since I focus only on symmetric equilibria, all rms pay equal wages and no
worker has an incentive to switch rms.
For the second part of the proof, let the marginal revenue of an additional worker be dened
by
v̂t ≡ αzt[(1− x)nt−1]α−1k1−αt (1− µb,t),
which is the highest marginal product the rm can receive in a given period without laying o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(i) if v̂t < v̂
L
t , the rm lays o workers
1
;
(ii) if v̂t ∈ [v̂Lt , v̂Ht ], the rm freezes hiring;
(iii) if v̂t > v̂
H
t , the rm hires workers.
Now dene as Lt the value function of the rm accounting for the possibility of layos. This
function is given by
Lt = max
{dt,ht,it,kt+1,bt+1}









= dt + bt + wtnt + it







[nt − (1− x)nt−1],












nt = (1− x)nt−1 +mt,
and







[nt − (1− x)nt−1] + it + bt ≤ ηtqk,tkt,
where 1{nt > (1 − x)nt−1} is the indicator function that is equal to one if and only if the
rm hires workers and equal to zero otherwise. The marginal costs v̂Ht and v̂
L
t are dened as
follows:















where Lt+1 is the value function of the rm as seen from period t + 1. v̂
L
t are the lowest
marginal costs a rm can achieve by keeping its workforce, while v̂Ht ≥ v̂Lt are the lowest
marginal costs a rm can achieve by hiring an innitesimal amount of workers. Now let F be
the σ-algebra generated by future realizations of the stochastic processes z and η, taking as
given the information set at time t. F can be partitioned in
1
Here I allow for mt < 0.
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F = F+ ∪ F− ∪+∞h=1 F
h,
where F+ is the subset of all future realizations of z and η such that the rm is hiring next
period, F− is the subset such that there are layos and Fh is the subset such that there is a
hiring freeze for the next h periods. Let p+ = P(F+), p− = P(F−), and ph = P(Fh) be the





































































Next, note that in a symmetric environment hiring freezes occur with a probability of zero. As
the environment is symmetric, if one rm decides to freeze hiring all rms will do so. However,
when all rms freeze hiring, θ is equal to zero, as there are no vacancies. This implies κmt
q(θt)2
= 0
and thus vLt = v
H
t . I have already shown that a necessary and sucient condition to avoid
























Using this equation, a necessary and sucient condition to avoid layos is
s+ ϕct − (1− s)EtΛht+1|t[1− f(θt+1)]Hm,t+1





which is equal to the equation in Proposition 2.
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A.8 Staggered Nash Bargaining
In this section I derive the wage schedule arising from a staggered Nash bargaining setup as in
Gertler and Trigari (2009) in a model with nancial frictions.
2
Going back to the idea of Calvo (1983), only a fraction τ of all rms is able to renegotiate
wages with its workforce in each period. Workers hired in between wage renegotiations receive
the current wage. In order to ensure that a determinate equilibrium exists, the model presented
in Section 2.3 needs to be adjusted. First, I assume quadratic costs of adjusting employment.
Second, workers hired in this period do not become productive immediately but only in the






















Next, I dene the value functions. The worker surplus at rm i isHt(i) = Vt(i)−Ut(i), where
Vt(i) is the value of a worker being employed at rm i. Ut is the value of being unemployed.




+ wt(i)− s+ EtΛht+1|t[(1− x+ xf(θt+1)]Ht+1(i)− f(θt+1)Hx,t+1,
where Hx,t+1 is the average worker surplus conditional on being a new hire.






where Ht(r) and Jt(r) are the value functions of renegotiating workers and rms, respectively.
Due to the multi-period setup of the wage schedule, rms need to take into account the
discounted expected sum of future wage payments and workers the discounted future sum of
expected wages. The corresponding equations are given by


















For a more detailed derivation of the wage schedule in a model without nancial frictions see Gertler and
Trigari (2009).
108
A.9 Further Business Cycle Statistics





(r)(1− τ)jΛct+j|t and ∆t = Et
∑∞
j=1(1−x)j(1− τ)jΛht+j|t are the
cumulative discount factors of the rm and the worker, respectively.
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem is











t (r) + χt(r)(1− γ)(1− x)EtΛct+1|t∆t+1w∗t+1
+ (1− χt(r))(1− γ)(1− x)EtΛht+1|t∆t+1w∗t+1
for the wage, where the the target wage is given by


















This wage schedule collapses to the one derived in Gertler and Trigari (2009) in the absence




In the remainder of this section I discuss the results obtained by simulating the model with
nancial frictions using the wage schedule derived above. The model is calibrated to match the
same steady state values as the model in the main text. The simulated moments are given in
Table A.2.
The second moments of key labor market variables are close to the results in Section 2.4. The
amplication of shocks is again close to the data. In the model, a 1% decrease in productivity
increases unemployment by 4.9% (4.2% in the data), decreases vacancies by 6.7% (4.5% in the
data), and decreases labor market tightness by 12.2% (8.6% in the data).
The ndings concerning the skewness of the unemployment rate in levels and in changes
also carry over to this version of the model. However, the wage rate arising from this staggered
bargaining setup generates skewness at a higher frequency than the ad-hoc wage schedule.
Before ltering the data, the skewness results for the two models are qualitatively the same
and quantitatively very close. After ltering the skewness is smaller, but the qualitative results
still hold.
A.9 Further Business Cycle Statistics
In this section I evaluate the business cycle statistics for the benchmark model with wage
rigidity and for the model with nancial frictions but without wage rigidity. This robustness
exercise emphasizes the importance of the interaction between wage rigidity and nancial
frictions, not only for explaining unemployment dynamics, but also for explaining business
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Table A.2. Simulated Moments – Alternative Wage Schedule and τ = 0.25
u v θ w y z
Standard deviation 0.096 0.115 0.204 0.012 0.022 0.015
(0.024) (0.020) (0.052) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Autocorrelation 0.920 0.813 0.912 0.717 0.910 0.829
(0.030) (0.065) (0.031) (0.115) (0.039) (0.070)
Correlation 1 -0.644 -0.863 -0.579 -0.882 -0.772
(0.228) (0.085) (0.105) (0.044) (0.082)
— 1 0.921 0.402 0.810 0.887
(0.066) (0.150) (0.209) (0.189)
— — 1 0.523 0.913 0.907
(0.092) (0.066) (0.054)
— — — 1 0.664 0.559
(0.130) (0.135)
— — — — 1 0.963
(0.010)
— — — — — 1
Note: Results from simulating the model with stochastic technology with a second-order
perturbation method. All variables are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 105. Simulated standard errors (standard deviations across 500 simulations)
are reported in parentheses.
cycle statistics. I strengthen this point by showing that neither the benchmark model with wage
rigidity nor the model with nancial frictions and without wage rigidity is able to generate
volatility in labor market variables comparable to the data.
Without wage rigidity, the volatility of the key labor market variables drops sharply. The
volatility of unemployment decreases by 39%, the volatility of vacancies by 30%, and the
volatility of labor market tightness by 32%. The response of unemployment, vacancies and
labor market tightness to a 1% percent decrease in productivity is lower: unemployment
increases by 1.5%, vacancies decrease by 2.5%, and labor market tightness decreases by 3.9%.
For the benchmark model, the introduction of wage rigidity increases the volatility of
unemployment by 45%, the volatility of vacancies by 71%, and the volatility of labor market
tightness by 61%. Despite the large relative increases, the absolute values remain small. Even
with larger wage rigidity than in the model with nancial frictions, the benchmark model does
not generate enough amplication to match the empirical volatility of the key labor market
variables or the amplication of shocks in the data.
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Table A.3. Simulated Moments – Financial Frictions and τ = 0
u v θ w y z
Standard deviation 0.049 0.114 0.154 0.013 0.018 0.015
(0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Autocorrelation 0.758 0.257 0.408 0.841 0.855 0.829
(0.055) (0.077) (0.083) (0.066) (0.065) (0.070)
Correlation 1 -0.772 -0.876 -0.482 -0.631 -0.443
(0.018) (0.015) (0.192) (0.142) (0.202)
— 1 0.979 0.357 0.454 0.336
(0.003) (0.116) (0.093) (0.124)
— — 1 0.418 0.534 0.388
(0.142) (0.109) (0.151)
— — — 1 0.980 0.973
(0.016) (0.012)
— — — — 1 0.958
(0.020)
— — — — — 1
Note: Results from simulating the model with stochastic technology with a second-order
perturbation method. All variables are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 105. Simulated standard errors (standard deviations across 500 simulations)
are reported in parentheses.
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Table A.4. Simulated Moments – Benchmark Model and τ = 0.25
u v θ w y z
Standard deviation 0.012 0.024 0.037 0.012 0.017 0.015
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Autocorrelation 0.888 0.610 0.726 0.949 0.849 0.830
(0.036) (0.091) (0.077) (0.028) (0.065) (0.069)
Correlation 1 -0.837 -0.929 -0.798 -0.947 -0.967
(0.026) (0.016) (0.034) (0.013) (0.008)
— 1 0.979 0.499 0.817 0.865
(0.001) (0.065) (0.016) (0.009)
— — 1 0.630 0.899 0.938
(0.056) (0.014) (0.007)
— — — 1 0.904 0.857
(0.035) (0.038)
— — — — 1 0.993
(0.003)
— — — — — 1
Note: Results from simulating the model with stochastic technology with a second-order
perturbation method. All variables are log deviations from an HP trend with smoothing
parameter 105. Simulated standard errors (standard deviations across 500 simulations)
are reported in parentheses.
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B.1 First Order Conditions of Firms
Dening the value of a marginal worker in an abstract non-routine cognitive occupations for a
rm as Ja, the rst order conditions for hiring and for vacancy posting are given by
ca = µaqa
µa = βJa,+1,
where µa is the Lagrange-multiplier on the employment constraint for workers in abstract
occupations. The corresponding value of a marginal worker in abstract non-routine cognitive
occupations is
Ja = pZa − 1uwua − (1− 1u)wna + (1− sa)βJa,+1.
Dening the value of a marginal worker with ability η in a routine occupation for a rm as




where µr is the Lagrange-multiplier on the employment constraint for a worker in routine
occupations. The corresponding value of a marginal worker with ability η in routine occupations
is












where yr is the expected marginal product of a routine worker, wur is the expected union wage,
and wnr the expected non-union wage. The average marginal product and the average wages
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are used here, as rms are unable to condition their job search on the ability level η.
Dening the value of a marginal worker with ability η in a non-routine manual occupation
for a rm as Jm, the rst order conditions for hiring workers in manual tasks and for vacancy
posting are given by
cm = µmqm
µm = βJm,+1,
where µm is the Lagrange-multiplier on the employment constraint for worker in manual
occupations. The corresponding value of a marginal worker with ability η in manual occupations
is
Jm = pZm − 1uwum − (1− 1u)wnm + (1− sm)βJm,+1.
B.2 Job Creation Conditions




with i = a, r,m.


























As we are mainly interested in the long-run eect of routine-biased technical change on the
economy and on the wage bargaining regimes, we focus on the steady state of the economy.
The steady state job creation conditions are given by
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A rm hires workers of each type and each ability level η until the costs of labor are equal to
the discounted expected marginal product. Here the costs consist of the vacancy posting costs
and the discounted expected wage minus the discounted cost of hiring next period.
B.3 Derivation of Wages
In this section we derive the non-union wages in the model. The rst order conditions are
given by




with i = a, r,m.
Abstract Workers
After replacing the value function, the Nash sharing rule for abstract workers is




[pZa − wna + (1− sa)βJna ] .
After some rearrangement, we get
wna = γ
apZa + (1− γn)za + γa(1− sa)βJna
+ (1− γa)β [fa (W na − Una )− (1− sa) (W na − Una )] .
By using the job creation condition (B.1),
ca
qa
= βJna,+1, and the rst order condition resulting
from the Nash sharing rule
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we obtain the wage equation
wna = γ
apZa + γ
acaθa + (1− γa)za.
Routine Workers
After replacing the value function, the Nash sharing rule for routine workers of ability level η
is




[pZryr(η)− wnr (η) + (1− sr)βJnr ] .
After some rearrangement, we arrive at
wnr (η) = γ
rpZryr(η) + (1− γr)zr(η) + γr(1− sr)βJnr
+ (1− γr)β [fr (W nr (η)− Unr (η))− (1− sr) (W nr (η)− Unr (η))] .
By using the job creation condition (B.2),
cr
qr(η)
= βJnr (η), and the rst order condition
resulting from the Nash sharing rule




we obtain the wage equation
wnr (η) = γ
rpZryr(η) + γ
rcrθr + (1− γr)zr(η).
Manual Workers
After replacing the value function, the Nash sharing rule for manual workers is




[pZm − wnm + (1− sm)βJnm] .
After some rearrangement, we get
wnm = γ





m − Unm)− (1− sm)
(
W nm − Unm,+1
)]
.
By using the job creation condition (B.3),
cm
qm)
= βJmm , and the rst order condition resulting
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from the Nash sharing rule




we obtain the wage equation
wnm = γ
mpZm + γ
mcmθm + (1− γm)zm(η).
B.4 Union Surplus
In this section we derive the industrial union surplus. The derivation of the craft union surplus























i (η) d η
}
,
with i = r,m.
After replacing the value function and using the job creation conditions (B.2) and (B.3), the























i (η) d η
}
.































i (η) d η.
























i (η) d η
with i = r,m.
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B.5 Theoretical Evaluation of the Main Mechanisms
The arguments in this section proof Propositions 3 and 4, which state the main mechanisms in
our paper.
B.5.1 Polarization
Routine-biased technical change is modeled as a drop in pk, the relative price of computer capital.
As we are concerned with the incentives of previous routine workers to switch to manual
occupations, we consider the eects of a decrease in pk before any employment adjustment
occurs. Thus, La, Lr, and Lm are constant.
Note that the decrease in the relative price only aects the intermediate rm producing Zr












it follows that K increases if and only if computer capital and workers performing routine tasks
are substitutes, i.e, if σ > 0.1 The increasing computer capital stock increases the production
of the intermediate good Zr.
Keep in mind that a unemployed routine worker switches occupations if Um(η) > Ur(η).
Thus, given that unemployment benets and separation rates are not aected by the drop in
capital prices, the two variables driving changes in the incentives are wages and job-nding
rates. From the wage equations and job creation conditions for both types of occupations
it immediately follows that both variables of interest are driven by changes in the marginal
productivity of the respective workers.
As the relevant elasticities (the elasticity of the wage with respect to productivity and
labor market tightness and the elasticity of the job-nding rate with respect to productivity
and wages) are identical for both types of occupations, it remains to show that the marginal
productivity of manual workers increases by more compared to the marginal productivity of
routine workers due to routine-biased technical change.

























Since the computer capital stock can be adjusted instantaneously and without frictions, an increase in K before
occupational switches occur is in line with the model setup.
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Thus, the relative productivity of routine workers decreases in Zr, if σ > (1− α)ρ, which
proofs Proposition 3. Intuitively, in order for routine-biased technical change to increase the
incentives for occupational switches, capital and routine tasks need to be substitutes and they
need to be better substitutes than routine and manual tasks in the production of the nal good.
B.5.2 Voting Incentives
A manual worker inside a unionized rm votes in favor of collective bargaining coverage, if the
value of being a manual worker in a unionized rm is larger than the value of being a worker
in a non-unionized rm, i.e., if W um > W
n
m. As in Appendix B.5.1, the relevant variables are
again the wages and the job-nding rates. As the marginal productivity of a manual worker
is independent of the union status of the rm, relative changes in the job-nding rates are
entirely driven by relative wage changes. Thus, it suces to show that the non-union wage
rate for manual workers increases relative to the union wage rate.
2
Using the equation for the union surplus (3.8), the union wage schedule (3.6), and the non-





































First, following the arguments in Appendix B.5.1, routine-biased technical change implies
an increase in Zr and thus an increase in the marginal productivity of manual workers, pZm .
Second, note that the eect of routine-biased technical change on the rst term only depends
on the elasticity of this term with respect to pZm . Combining the job creation condition (B.3)
and the wage for manual workers (3.5) yields
((1/β)− 1 + sm)cmΨm(θnm)η + cmγmθnm = (1− γm)pZm .
From this expression it is easy to see that the elasticity of θnm with respect to pZm is larger




to establish that the elasticity of the non-union wage of manual workers is
larger than one. This directly implies that the rst term of equation (B.4) decreases in pZm .
2
Note that the positive eect of a wage increase on the value function is not oset by a decrease in the job-nding
rate.
3
Since wui and zi(η) are both unaected by routine-biased technical change and set to zero in the simulation,
they are left out in order to facilitate representation.
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Intuitively, routine-biased technical change increases the productivity of and therefore the
demand for manual workers. The non-union wage for manual workers increases as both the
productivity and the labor market tightness increase. The union wage for manual workers
increases by less, as the dierent outside options in the two bargaining regimes imply that the
greater labor market tightness does not aect the collective bargaining.














Thus, an increase in K due to routine-biased technical change reduces Zr
Z′r
































if routine and manual tasks are substitutes, i.e, if ρ > 0.
Taken together, routine-biased technical change reduces the union wage of manual workers
relative to the non-union wage of manual workers, if ρ > 0. This proofs Proposition 4. This
result does not depend on our choice of the union wage schedule, as the proof also holds if we
exchange the union wage of manual workers for the union surplus.
B.6 Robustness Checks
In this section we present several robustness checks: regressions using the average routine share
instead of the initial routine share in our instrument, unweighted regressions, and regressions
using union coverage as the dependent variable,. The results are summarized in Tables B.1–B.3.
Our instrument remains highly statistically signicant across all alternative specications. As
was to be expected, union coverage reacts less to falling relative prices for investment goods.
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Table B.1. Regression Results for Unionization Rates – Average Routine Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital prices 0.4116*** 0.6254*** 0.4054*** 0.6099***
× routine employment share (0.0743) (0.0724) (0.0702) (0.0682)
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116
R2 0.9870 0.9834 0.9863 0.9822
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no no
State policy controls yes no yes no
State legislation controls yes no yes no
State demographic controls yes no yes no
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes
Note: Observations are weighted by the average state population over our sample period. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level, **
indicates signicance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.2. Regression Results for Unionization Rates – Unweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital prices 0.1961*** 0.1982*** 0.1508*** 0.1522***
× routine employment share (0.0422) (0.0416) (0.0379) (0.0403)
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116
R2 0.9765 0.9727 0.9753 0.9721
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no no
State policy controls yes no yes no
State legislation controls yes no yes no
State demographic controls yes no yes no
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes
Note: Observations are weighted by the average state population over our sample period. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level, **
indicates signicance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level.
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Table B.3. Regression Results for Union Coverage Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital prices 0.2031*** 0.3468*** 0.1913*** 0.2817***
× routine employment share (0.0583) (0.0578) (0.0536) (0.0514)
Observations 1116 1116 1116 1116
R2 0.9839 0.9802 0.9828 0.9784
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no no
State policy controls yes no yes no
State legislation controls yes no yes no
State demographic controls yes no yes no
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes
Note: Observations are weighted by the average state population over our sample period. The
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** indicates signicance at the 1 percent level, **
indicates signicance at the 5 percent level, and * indicates signicance at the 10 percent level.
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B.7 Data Appendix
In Table B.4 we provide the complete list of control variables used in the regressions in Section
3.2.
Table B.4. List of Control variables
State demographics
Share of population living in a central city (urban density) CPS
Share of population living in a city (urban density) CPS
Share of black population (ethnic composition) CPS
Share of white population (ethnic composition) CPS
Shares of population in age groups 16-24; 25-44; 45-54; >55 CPS
Share of workers with each educational level: CPS
less than high school; high school; some college; college or more
Share of male population CPS
Industry-occupation controls
Shares of workers employed in industry groups: CPS
construction; manufacturing; transportation, communcations, and other public utilities;
wholesale and retail trade; services; nance, insurance, and real estate
Shares of workers employed in occupational groups: CPS + AD
abstract; routine; manual
State policy controls
Minimum wage rate FRED
Total federal intergovernmental revenue SLGFD
Total tax burden TF
State gov. and leg. controls
State senate majority party NCLS
(1: Rep., -1: Dem., 0: other/indep./no majority)
State house majority party NCLS
(1: Rep., -1: Dem., 0: other/indep./no majority)
Political party of the governor NCLS
(1: Rep., -1: Dem., 0: other/indep./no majority)
Note: AD: Autor and Dorn (2013); CPS: Current Population Survey; FRED: Federal Reserve Economic
Data; NCLS: National Conference of State Legislatures; SLGFD: State and Local Government Finance
Dataset; TF: Tax Foundation.
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C.1 Ideological Leanings in the District Courts
In Figures C.1–C.6 we provide evidence on the evolution of the average ideology score in
each of the 90 U.S. district courts that have been active over our entire sample period from
1978 to 2011. While the ideology score did not experience a strong conservative shift in most
district courts, there is some evidence of liberal (conservative) district courts becoming more
conservative (liberal) over time. These slight tendencies towards the middle motivate us to
include the lagged dependent variable in our regressions for district court rulings to account
for mean-reverting dynamics which may also be present in rulings.
Figure C.1. Average Ideology Score in the District Courts (1/6)
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Figure C.2. Average Ideology Score in the District Courts (2/6)
Figure C.3. Average Ideology Score in the District Courts (3/6)
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Figure C.4. Average Ideology Score in the District Courts (4/6)
Figure C.5. Average Ideology Score in the District Courts (5/6)
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Figure C.6. Average Ideology Score in the District Courts (6/6)
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C.2 Share of Judges Appointed by a Republican President
In this section we compare the share of district court judges appointed by Republican presidents
to the share of Supreme Court justices appointed by Republican presidents. As depicted in
Figure C.7, ve of the nine Supreme Court Justices serving in 1970 have been appointed by
a Republican president. This ratio increased to eight out of nine justicesin the early 1990s
and only reverted back in 2010. In contrast, the share of district court judges appointed by
a Republican president has remained close to 50% over the entire time period. Thus, it is
unlikely that the relative increase in the share of conservative rulings is driven by increasingly
conservative district court judges. Furthermore, eects of changes in the national composition
of district court judges are absorbed in the time xed eects in our regressions.
Figure C.7. Share of Justices and Judges Appointed by a Republican President
Note: This graph depicts the share of Supreme Court justices and the share of district court judges appointed by a Republican president. The
black line indicates parity between the number of justices and judges appointed by a Republican president and the number of justices and
judges appointed by a Democratic president.
We additionally provide evidence on the evolution of the share of district court judges that
were appointed by a Republican president in each district court in Figures C.8–C.13. The
majority of the district courts did not experience a strong conservative shift between 1978
and 2011. However, as there is some evidence that at district courts where many judges
were appointed by a Republican (Democratic) president the share of Republican (Democratic)
appointees declines over time, we include the share of district court judges appointed by a
Republican president as a control variable in our regressions.
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Figure C.8. Share of District Court Judges Appointed by a Republican President (1/6)
Figure C.9. Share of District Court Judges Appointed by a Republican President (2/6)
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Figure C.10. Share of District Court Judges Appointed by a Republican President (3/6)
Figure C.11. Share of District Court Judges Appointed by a Republican President (4/6)
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Figure C.12. Share of District Court Judges Appointed by a Republican President (5/6)
Figure C.13. Share of District Court Judges Appointed by a Republican President (6/6)
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C.3 Further Rulings Regressions
In Table C.1 we present the results for several robustness checks. In Column (1), we control
for local labor market conditions by including the unemployment rate and the real state GDP
growth rate. This evaluation is motivated by the evidence that court rulings can be aected by
economic conditions, see Section 4.2. In Column (2), we use a moving average over a four year
window of our measure of Supreme Court ideology scit, taking into account the possibility that
district court judges orientate themselves partly on past Supreme Court ideology. In Column
(3), we include four (instead of one) lags of the dependent variable, allowing us to capture
more general mean-reverting tendencies in district court rulings. Finally, in Column (4), we
weigh rulings by the number of rulings per state population which reduces the importance
of observations where unusually few rulings are published. In all of these specications the
coecient on the interaction term between Supreme Court ideology and district court ideology
remains negative and statistically siginicant.
Table C.1. Regression Results for District Court Rulings – Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supreme Court ideology -2.0298 -2.0738 -1.7567
× district court ideology (0.7114) (0.7155) (0.7227)
p=0.0044 p=0.0038 p=0.0152
Supreme Court ideology (MA) -1.7085
× district court ideology (0.9320)
p=0.0670
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.2631 0.2592 0.2734 0.2748
Lagged dependent variable yes yes yes yes
Additional lags no no yes no
Weights no no no yes
State demographics yes yes yes yes
Court, judge, and case characteristics yes yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes yes
State GDP and unemployment yes no no no
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported
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C.4 Further Labor Market Regressions
In this section we present regressions for additional labor market outcomes and alternative
specications for the regressions in Section 4.4.
C.4.1 Additional Outcome Variables
First, we run the regression in Equation (4.6) for additional industry groups and for additional
inequality measures. Table C.2 shows results for further industry groups. We nd that con-
servative court rulings increase employment in nancial industries disproportionately, while
there is no discernible change in the trade and transportation employment shares. Table C.3
shows results for additional inequality measures, which support our ndings of increasing
inequality in response to rising judicial coservatism documented in Section 4.4.





emp. share emp. share emp. share
Supreme Court ideology scit 0.0207 0.0206 −0.0287
× district court ideology dcis (0.0220) (0.0132) (0.0117)
p= 0.3477 p= 0.1177 p= 0.0148
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0105 -0.0105 0.0146
Observations 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.5962 0.6122 0.7606
Industry and occupation controls no no no
State policy controls yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are
reported below the standerd errors.
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Supreme Court ideology scit −0.2235 −0.1157 −0.1078
× district court ideology dcis (0.1037) (0.0584) (0.0807)
p= 0.0313 p= 0.0476 p= 0.1816
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) 0.1136 0.0588 0.0548
Observations 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.8427 0.8077 0.7182
Industry and occupation controls yes yes yes
State policy controls yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are
reported below the standerd errors.
C.4.2 Alternative Specifications
Second, we present the results of several robustness checks. For simplicity, we concentrate
on ve dependent variables which represent our main results that conservative court rulings
promote labor market uidity but also contribute to wage stagnation, job market polarization,
deunionization, and rising inequality. Specically, we show results for the unemployment
rate, the average hourly wage rate, the employment share in routine occupations, the union
coverage rate, and the 90/10 income ratio.
In Table C.4, we additionally control for state demographics, which are also included in
the regressions for district court rulings. Results are similar to the baseline case presented in
Section 4.4.
In Table C.5 we take into account the possibility that the economic eects of national
executive policy vary by state political orientation. Specically, we additionally include the
interaction between a dummy for a Republican president and the state-specic 2008 presidential-
election voting share for John McCain as an indicator for the state’s Republican orientation.
The results are only slightly aected by this inclusion. We have also considered other indicators
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of state political orienations such as the number of years with a Republican governor or a
Republican state legislative majority in our sample which led to similar results (not shown).
In Tables C.6–C.8 we leave out sets of control variables one after another. These exercises
serve two purposes. First, they reveal whether our results rely on specic control variables.
Second, they are informative about endogenous responses of the control variables to changing
Supreme Court ideology and their eects on our variables of interest. These indirect eects
allow for a more complete picture of the eects of changing Supreme Court ideology but are
not part of the direct eects of ideological leanings in court rulings which we are primarily
interested in.
In Table C.6, we leave out control variables for state politics. This has no eect on the
direction or the signicance of the eects but changes the size of some coecients visibly.
For example, the eect on wage is strengthened, suggesting that increasing Supreme Court
conservatism induces changes in state governments and legislatures which further weaken
workers’ bargaining power. In Table C.7, we leave out control variables for state-specic
policies. The eects on the results are negligible. Finally, we refrain from controlling for the
state’s industry-occupation composition in Table C.8. By construction, the specication for the
routine employment share is unchanged because it did not control for the industry-occupation
composition in the rst place. Most of the results are barely aected, only for the log hourly
wage rate there seem to be some counteracting composition eects which weaken the precision
of the estimate.
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Table C.4. Regression Results – Controlling for State Demographics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
Unemployment Avg. hourly Routine Union 90/10
rate wage rate emp. share coverage percentiles
Supreme Court ideology scit 0.0706 0.1283 0.0706 0.1095 -0.4061
× district court ideology dcis (0.0209) (0.0679) (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.1604)
p= 0.0008 p= 0.0590 p= 0.0049 p= 0.0000 p= 0.0115
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0359 -0.0652 -0.0359 -0.0557 0.2064
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.7617 0.9940 0.8335 0.9705 0.8266
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no yes yes
State policy controls yes yes yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes yes yes
State demographics yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the standerd errors.
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Table C.5. Regression Results – Accounting for Potentially Heterogenous Effects of
National Executive Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
Unemployment Avg. hourly Routine Union 90/10
rate wage rate emp. share coverage percentiles
Supreme Court ideology scit 0.0635 0.1743 0.0631 0.1329 -0.4065
× district court ideology dcis (0.0205) (0.0708) (0.0251) (0.0267) (0.1581)
p= 0.0020 p= 0.0139 p= 0.0120 p= 0.0000 p= 0.0103
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0323 -0.0886 -0.0323 -0.0676 0.2066
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.7638 0.9933 0.8267 0.9667 0.8257
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no yes yes
State policy controls yes yes yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes yes yes
Republican president × state ideology yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the standerd errors.
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Table C.6. Regression Results – Not Controlling for State Politics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
Unemployment Avg. hourly Routine Union 90/10
rate wage rate emp. share coverage percentiles
Supreme Court ideology scit 0.0736 0.2083 0.0659 0.1420 -0.3412
× district court ideology dcis (0.0208) (0.0719) (0.0249) (0.0269) (0.1589)
p= 0.0004 p= 0.0038 p= 0.0084 p= 0.0000 p= 0.0320
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0374 -0.1059 -0.0335 -0.0722 0.1734
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.7535 0.9930 0.8262 0.9658 0.8217
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no yes yes
State policy controls yes yes yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls no no no no no
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the standerd errors.
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Table C.7. Regression Results – Not Controlling for State Policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
Unemployment Avg. hourly Routine Union 90/10
rate wage rate emp. share coverage percentiles
Supreme Court ideology scit 0.0824 0.1412 0.1151 0.1447 -0.4649
× district court ideology dcis (0.0198) (0.0663) (0.0237) (0.0255) (0.1494)
p= 0.0000 p= 0.0333 p= 0.0000 p= 0.0000 p= 0.0019
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0419 -0.0718 -0.0585 -0.0736 0.2363
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.7453 0.9932 0.8202 0.9650 0.8208
Industry and occupation controls yes yes no yes yes
State policy controls no no no no no
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the standerd errors.
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Table C.8. Regression Results – Not Controlling for the Industry-Occupation Composi-
tion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
Unemployment Avg. hourly Routine Union 90/10
rate wage rate emp. share coverage percentiles
Supreme Court ideology scit 0.0658 0.0927 0.0633 0.1405 -0.5037
× district court ideology dcis (0.0209) (0.0726) (0.0250) (0.0270) 0.1637
p= 0.0017 p= 0.2017 p= 0.0116 p= 0.0000 p= 0.0021
Eect of conservatism (γz/γ) -0.0334 -0.0471 -0.0322 -0.0714 0.2560
Observations 1499 1499 1499 1499 1499
R2 0.7430 0.9927 0.8267 0.9647 0.8057
Industry and occupation controls no no no no no
State policy controls yes yes yes yes yes
State gov. and leg. controls yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
State xed eects yes yes yes yes yes
Note: The standard errors are reported in parantheses. The p-values are reported below the standerd errors.
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C.5 Data Appendix
In Tables C.9–C.11 we provide a complete list of dependent variables and a complete list of
control variables that were used in our regressions. All regressions include state and year xed
eects. GDP growth by state is calculated using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The term publishing judge refers to the judge publishing the opinion in the Federal Supplement.
Concerning the state legislature controls, Nebraska constitutes an exception in the sense that
it is both unicameral and ocially non-partisan. We decide to use the de facto majority in the
Nebraska legislature for both the state house and state senate variable. However, as the state
legislature in Nebraska has featured a de facto Republican majority in all years of our sample,




Table C.9. Dependent Variables
Dependent variable in Section 3 and Appendix C
Average idelogy score (1: conservative, -1: liberal) of rulings CM
in Economic Regulation and/or Labor Cases in federal district courts
by state and year
Dependent variables in Section 4 and Appendix D.2
Unemployment rate (number unemployed divided by labor force) CPS
Job-nding rate (inverse of average duration of unemployment in weeks) CPS
Employment rate (number employed divided by adult population) CPS
Avg. hourly wage rate (log of the wage rate) CPS
Vol. PT share (log of number voluntary part-time employed CPS
divided by all employed)
PT/FT wage rate (log of voluntary part-time wages CPS
divided by full-time wages)
Employment share in construction industries CPS
Employment share in manufacturing industries CPS
Employment share in service industries CPS
Employment share in abstract-intensive occupations CPS + AD
Employment share in routine-intensive occupations CPS + AD
Employment share in manual task intensive occupations CPS + AD
90/10 percentiles (log of 90th percentile family income CPS
divided by 10th percentile)
90/50 percentiles (log of 90th percentile family income CPS
divided by 50th percentile)
50/10 percentiles (log of 50th percentile family income CPS
divided by 10th percentile)
Dependent variables in Appendix D.1
Employment share in wholesale and retail trade industries CPS
Employment share in transportation, communcations, and other public utilities industries CPS
Employment share in nance, insurance, and real estate industries CPS
80/20 percentiles (log of 80th percentile family income CPS
divided by 20th percentile)
80/50 percentiles (log of 80th percentile family income CPS
divided by 50 percentile)
50/20 percentiles (log of 50th percentile family income CPS
divided by 20th percentile)
Note: AD: Autor and Dorn (2013); CM: Carp and Manning (2016); CPS: Current Population Survey.
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Table C.10. Independent Variables (1/2)
Regressor of interest
Median ideology score of Supreme Court justices by year × Boyd + Bailey
pre-sample average ideology score of district court judges by state
Court, Judge, and Case Characteristics
Share of judges appointed by a Republican president CM+FJC
Average ideology score at the responsible court of appeals CM+FJC
Share of cases in each case type category in the U.S. District Court Database CM
(union v. company; member v. union; employee v. employer; commercial regulation;
environmental protection local/state economic; labor dispute – govt v. union/employer; rent
control; excess prots)
Average age of district court judges FJC
Share of white district court judges FJC
Share of male district court judges FJC
Share of publishing judges with Republican Party aliation CM
Share of publishing judges with Democrat Party aliation CM
Share of white publishing judges CM
Share of male publishing judges CM
Shares of publishing judges appointed by each president CM
Experience of publishing judges (years of service at current court, shares) CM
State demographics
Total adult state population CPS
Share of population living in a central city (urban density) CPS
Share of population living in a city (urban density) CPS
Share of black population (ethnic composition) CPS
Share of white population (ethnic composition) CPS
Shares of population in age groups 16-24; 25-44; 45-54; >55 CPS
Industry-occupation controls
Shares of workers employed in industry groups: CPS
construction; manufacturing; transportation communcations, and other public utilities;
wholesale and retail trade; services; nance, insurance, and real estate
Shares of workers employed in occupational groups: CPS + AD
abstract; manual; routine
Note: AD: Autor and Dorn (2013); Bailey: Bailey (2013); Boyd: Boyd (2015a); CM: Carp and Manning (2016); CPS: Current Popula-
tion Survey; FJC: Federal Judicial Center: Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges.
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Table C.11. Independent Variables (2/2)
State policy controls
Minimum wage rate FRED
Total federal intergovernmental revenue SLGFD
Total tax burden TF
Public policy exception to employment at-will ADS
Implied contract exception to employment at-will ADS
Good faith exception to employment at-will ADS
State gov. and leg. controls
State senate majority party NCLS
(1: Rep., -1: Dem., 0: other/indep./no majority)
State house majority party NCLS
(1: Rep., -1: Dem., 0: other/indep./no majority)
Political party of the governor NCLS
(1: Rep., -1: Dem., 0: other/indep./no majority)
Additional control variables in robustness checks
State unemployment rate FRED
Growth rate of real state GDP BEA
Voting share for John McCain in 2008 presidential election FEC
× Republican president
Note: ADS: Autor et al. (2006a); BEA: Bureau of Economic Analysis; FEC: Federal Election Commission; FRED: Federal Reserve
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